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Abstract 
Effective fireground decision - making requires good situation awareness 
(SA) and appropriate selection from the information available to the incident 
commander.  Individuals can display different information bias / scope in their 
view of the operational incident: either a liberal bias / scope towards 
accepting information as true with a risk of false alarm errors and / or a 
conservative bias / scope towards rejecting information with a risk of misses. 
Such decision - making bias / scope was examined over a series of five 
separate studies including operational fire fighters and incident commanders.  
The studies included a breathing apparatus (BA) exercise, two different table 
top operational incidents (domestic and commercial) and two exercises for 
flexible duty managers (FDM) in an assessable simulated fireground incident 
in 2012 and again in 2013. The studies were based on realistic incidents that 
both fire fighters and FDMs would be expected to respond to, in the final two 
studies each individual had to take over command and move towards a 
successful conclusion from an operational, environmental and social 
perspective. In all the studies, participants were required to answer true or 
false to a series of probe statements about the incident, which were analysed 
by a signal detection tool (QASA) to give a measure of actual situational 
awareness (ASA), perceived situational awareness (PSA) and bias / scope.  
 
The first exercise was a BA exercise undertaken to identify if bias was shown 
by FF’s when undertaking training, the data analysed by the QASA identified 
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that most individuals displayed a high level of ASA about the incident, but 
also showed either a conservative bias / scope (with miss errors) or a liberal 
bias /scope (with false alarm errors). The results however also show that two 
individuals can appear to have similar ASA, but in fact still have very different 
bias / scope in regard to that knowledge.  Once it was established that bias 
was identified this was developed using table top exercises as it allowed 
more participants and more control over undertaking the research within 
normal programmed training periods. The analysis of the two table top 
exercises showed ASA was high in both, but fire fighters perceived their PSA 
in a similar way if they had high confidence in one exercise they also had 
high confidence in the other exercise, or vice versa. However there was no 
significant correlation between the ASA scores and the PSA scores, with the 
pattern of bias / scope tendencies being differed across the two studies; with 
no significant correlation.  In reviewing these results the identified difference 
in undertaking the 2 exercises was that in the second FF’s were familiar with 
the process and this allow a more relaxed approach, reducing pressure on 
the individual. While individuals showed bias patterns within the exercises 
undertaken, more pressurized exercises were identified to see if this bias 
was consistent for the individual when under pressure. Using the assessable 
incident commander exercises run by the FRS to test incident commander 
competence at a FDM level to undertake this. The exercises were used in 
2012 and 2013 using the same individuals to compare their results, the 
outcome of these two simulated assessable fireground incident studies were;  
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 for ASA: there was no significant correlation: r = -.120 and p= .623;  
 for PSA: there was a significant positive correlation: r =.577 and p = 
.012; 
 for bias / scope there was found a strongly positive significant 
correlation across the scores: r = .592 which is significant at the .008 
level. 
 
The conclusion of the research is that individuals hold bias / scope 
tendencies and under pressure these tendencies are shown to be resting 
and will impact (condition) the individual’s decisions during periods of 
operational command during stressful conditions.  The finding of bias / scope 
patterns is an important one that may have implications for understanding 
errors in incident ground decision - making.  The finding of resting bias / 
scope patterns in FDM is an even more important one, which will have 
implications for understanding errors in incident ground decision - making 
and how we can help to reduce them.  In semi structure interviews with 
FDMs who had undertaken the assessable exercises, they believed that 
knowing their bias was a first step to altering it to allow them to improve their 
decision making at pressurized incidents.  Which supported the ultimate goal 
of the current research to further the understanding of bias / scope tendency, 
in order to support the training of effective fireground decision - making. 
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Chapter 1 
1.1. Overview of Thesis:  How does bias / scope influence the 
operational outcome of pressurised fire incident command 
decisions? 
 
1.1.1 Background to the research: The research is broadly based on 
‘Naturalistic Decision Making’ models (Klein, 2008; Zsambok and Klein, 
1997) which identify how ‘Recognition Primed Decision Making’ (Klein, 
1997) has the ability to influence decision - making and outcomes on 
the fire incident ground. Effective decision - making is dependent on 
good or accurate situation awareness (SA).  SA involves being aware of 
what is happening around you, in order to understand how information 
and one's own actions will impact on objectives, both immediately and 
in the near future, an innate feel for situations and events that play out 
due to variables the incident commander can control. SA is especially 
important in work domains where the information flow can be high and 
poor decisions may lead to serious consequences, or impact on the 
understanding of what is happening in the situation (Endsley, 2000). 
There are a number of different theoretical approaches to explain how 
good SA or effective decision - making occurs (Endsley, 1987; Flin, 
O'Connor, and Crichton, 2008), but here the focus is on the concept of 
information bias which reflects the extent or scope of the available 
information used by the decision - maker in dynamic high pressure / 
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stress environments (Edgar and Edgar, 2007). Bias can tend either to 
cognitive and perceptual tunneling on a narrow band of information 
(narrow scope or conservative bias) or alternately towards accepting 
and using a broader band of information (broader scope or liberal bias).  
The  way an individual applies bias or scope to the situation can 
influence the ability to arrive at a satisfactory outcome to the situation 
with “miss” errors associated with conservative bias or tunneling scope 
and “false alarms” with liberal bias or broadening scope that may 
produce a “butterfly syndrome” in which irrelevant information attracts 
as much attention as important information. This issue will be explored 
here in the context of fireground exercises with operational Fire and 
Rescue Service (FRS) fire fighters and incident commanders. 
 
1.1.2 Broad Aims: These are to; 
1) gain further understanding of fireground command and control decision 
making in relation to how bias or scope influence decisions, and 
2) determine, if once identified, this can contribute to training guidelines for 
self-awareness of how information is scoped personally in fireground 
situations.   
In essence the basis of good SA must be a full understanding of any 
personal bias / scope and how personal bias scope can / will impact on 
understanding and implementing operational decisions. 
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1.1.3 Direct Aims of the Research: The aims here are to; 
1) understand if or how information bias / scope by the individual influences 
or impacts on decisions and outcome in fireground exercises, then if bias / 
scope is in evidence, 
2) determine whether bias / scope works in different ways across individual 
incident commanders, and 
3) finally to then progress this work from the theoretical model into a training / 
assessment scenario to determine if an individual’s bias / scope can be 
identified and whether this knowledge assists the outcome of the decisions in 
actual fireground conditions. 
 
1.1.4 Hypotheses: The predictions or hypotheses are:  
i) FRS personnel will display either conservative or liberal decision - making 
bias / scope (with related miss or false alarm errors respectively) during FRS 
training exercises involving simulations of fireground incidents. 
ii) any such bias / scope error patterns will be consistent for individuals over 
situations / scenarios. 
iii) experienced FRS personnel will be less prone to displaying such bias / 
scope errors. 
iv) any such bias / scope will be reduced or moderated by providing detailed 
personal feedback on bias / scope and error tendencies to individuals 
following training exercises ( i.e. individuals can use understanding about 
their own bias / scope to reduce errors in decision - making). 
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1.2 Leadership in Incident Command  
 
Before looking at bias / scope with both fire fighters who can and will take 
command positions on the incident ground (figure 1.2) and incident 
commanders there is a need for a general understanding of the models that 
are used within the FRS to help the individual provide both leadership and 
incident command.  Looking at these models provides the underpinning 
understanding of the FRS development of the incident commander and will 
also provided the background to see how the findings from this research 
could assist in future development to improve understanding of bias / scope 
in relation to incident decision - making.   
 
Models on leadership and identified requirements for the incident 
commander are numerous within the FRS internationally, with the UK FRS 
model ‘Aspire’ (Figure 1.1) breaking these down to leadership capacities for: 
organising and changing, partnership working, delivering services, 
community leadership, setting direction, priorities and resources and 
personal and team skills and showing these qualities  practiced within three 
leadership domains; operational, political and personal and team approach, 
with operational incident command leadership taking on the risk critical 
central role for delivery.   
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Figure 1.1. Aspire, leadership model (FRS manual V.2, Fire Service 
Operations; Incident Command 3rd Edition 2008). 
 
This risk critical incident command has been characterised by the need to 
deal with uncertainty in a demanding, compressed time and ambiguous 
framework, with this being identified not just in the UK (Flin, Salas, Strub, and 
Martin, 1997), but also in the USA, with the United States Fire 
administration’s objective 3.1, ‘Improve the Nation’s incident decision making 
skill’s’ (United States Fire Administration, 2009, p. 8.). Henry Kissinger 
identified / argued that that the most important role of a leader is to take on 
his shoulder the burden of ambiguity inherent in difficult choices; with that 
accomplished his subordinates then have criteria and can turn their attention 
to implementation, (Kissinger, 1982).  Removal of ambiguity is key for FRS 
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incident commanders in providing clear operational direction for crews and 
understanding how bias / scope could impact on this is crucial for the 
research. Organisational leadership calls for 4 major attributes: strategic 
thinking about the organisation’s environment, mobilisation of its resources to 
achieve its strategy, execution of the strategy and selflessness (Useem, 
Cook, and Sutton, 2005). All key areas for the incident commander from an 
operational perspective in making decisions on any incident ground to bring it 
to a safe conclusion. 
 
1.3 The Fire and Rescue Service operational environment 
 
Fire causes more than 20,000 deaths and up to 500,000 injuries annually in 
the European Union (EU) (EU Centre for Fire Statistics, 2006). Tragically, 
these statistics include well trained fire fighters, even through all FRSs aim to 
provide effective training for their personnel, showing that even highly trained 
and well skilled fire service personnel can be at risk of making unsafe 
decisions under the dynamic and high pressure conditions of the fireground, 
with potentially fatal consequences. For example in the UK, operational 
fatalities in the fire and rescue service average about one fire fighter a year 
(Officer of the Deputy Prime Minister, 2004), which from a fire fighter 
population of 50,000 would indicate the risk is well managed.  While a more 
recent report identifies that a duty related fire fighter death has occurred 
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every 3 months for the past 30 years (Fire Brigades Union Report, 'In the 
Line of Duty', 2008).  
 
The FRS respond to a variety of incidents from fires in the home and in the 
work place, to fire in external buildings, grass and forest fires, to road traffic 
collisions (heavy goods vehicles or single or multiple cars, on or off country 
lanes, major roads and motorways), building collapse and animal rescue.  It 
has over recent years taken on the response for a high number of flooding 
incidents and has become the main responder to fast water incidents / 
rescues.  It is also the primary responder to a number of different types of 
incidents, working at height (from window cleaners in distress on high rise 
buildings to people falling when out walking their dog near a quarry to rock 
climbers in some mountain ranges) or below ground (for cave rescue, or with 
the mines rescue teams at either working or old disused mine shafts).  The 
type of incident, the number and age of people involved and the environment 
in which the incident takes place provides the degree of difficulty that the 
incident commander finds themselves managing to a safe conclusion.  
Identified within the UK FRS are four qualifications for fire incident command 
(Figure 1.2) that form the basis of all development and assessment for 
commanders who deal with the different levels of incident response.  This 
training provides the knowledge that underpins and supports the incident 
commander, allowing the support structure to be developed and managed in 
support of the incident commander as the incident grows. The training also 
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provides a structure that covers the command of the incident and supports 
the incident commanders' decisions made on how the incident is tackled to 
bring it to a safe conclusion (GFRS incident command model, Table 1.1, but 
each FRS will have its own variation on this model). The key dynamic 
decisions made will be dependent on the operational needs of the incident; 
number of staff, appliances, specialist appliances and how best to deploy 
them to meet the tactical objectives decided by the incident commander.  
The change out of the incident commander to a more senior incident 
commander happens where decisions that need to be made for the incident 
outcome are not necessarily bigger, but are different.   As the decisions in 
relation to the incident become more dependent on the duration of the 
incident, or on the size of the incident and complexity.  Or if the outcome of 
the incident becomes more significant in the sense of loss (either loss of life 
or the increased cost of the incident) if the emergency situation is not 
managed properly.  Each incident commander will make the type of decision 
they feel is required to bring the incident to a safe conclusion, with the 
different command levels dealing with the nature, size and complexity of the 
operation.   
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Figure 1.2.  Core operational skills, knowledge and understanding.   
 
The diagram above illustrates the relationship between core skills and 
knowledge and the application of these changes as a fire fighter progresses 
through the command structure to Strategic Commander (Command 
Qualifications and Command Training – Guidance Document; CFOA July 
2013). 
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No of  
Appl’s  
Role 
of 
OIC  
Commander 
Informed  
Managers & Roles  
1 - 4  
CC / 
WC 
Property fire; RTC 
persons trapped.  
Stn. Commander  
 Incident Commander - Appliance 
Commander.  
 SC. if required for specialist roles (i.e. 
FI, Hazmat, Water, Rope, & OPA)  
    5  SC   
Large property fire; 
RTC persons 
reported.  
Group Commander 
 Incident Commander - Appliance 
Commander either CC or WC.  
 SC. if required for specialist roles (i.e. 
FI, Hazmat, Water, Rope, & OPA)  
6 - +   GC  Area Commander  
 IC Stn. C. + 1 x Stn. C. + 1 x Group 
C.  
 SC. perform specialist roles (i.e. FI, 
Hazmat, Water, Rope, & OPA)  
 
Table 1.1.  Break down of the responding commander; Gloucestershire Fire 
and Rescue Service (GFRS) command model 2010. 
 
Sectorisation (sectorisation diagram Figure 1.3) is used to break down the 
incident into smaller and more easily manageable areas to gain maximum 
control of the emergency incident.  The sectorisation of the incident ground 
will allow for the incident to be broken down into smaller areas of control.  
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This will allow the reduction in the span of control (number of staff reporting 
to an individual) for each of the sector commanders, which will then build in 
pyramid fashion to the single incident commander taking on the role and 
making the major decisions.  As the incident develops the incident 
commander will change to provide a more senior and higher qualified 
commander and at a certain size (number of staff, size of incident) there will 
be a need for an advanced incident commander (level 3 command, shown 
below, figure 1.3), which will also introduce another tier of command.  This 
next tier of command will provide the incident with an operational 
commander, this commander's responsibility will be dealing with the tactics 
for the dynamic incident and the incident ground, as well as a command 
support officer dealing with the resources and information flow on and off the 
incident ground, both reporting to the incident commander.  This will then 
allow the advanced incident commander to manage and control the holistic 
incident, looking not just at bringing the incident to a safe conclusion, but also 
looking at the wider concerns and the impact the incident may have outside 
the incident ground. The four levels of command are; 
1. The initial incident commander (first stage), this is the first 
attendance incident commander or experienced fire fighter (who 
would normally attend on the fire engine with the crew) who will be 
trained and assessed as having the ability to command and control 
operations at a task focused supervisory level, or to manage and 
Page | 31 
 
control a more serious incident that is starting to escalate normally 
a watch commander (WC), or crew commander (CC). 
2. The intermediate incident commander (second stage) would be the 
responding tactical commander (responding in his provided car 
from the work place or home), mobilised when the incident is 
growing or is of a higher risk and following on from the appliance 
first in attendance.  This commander has the ability to review the 
current operations and decisions made by the initial incident 
commander, and determine the incident status.  They would have 
the ability and training to assume responsibility and take over 
command of the incident should they need to.  Their tactical 
training and experience would ensure they operate at a middle 
manager level for the organisation (station commander (SC) or 
group commander (GC)). 
3. An advanced incident commander (third stage) is the officer 
trained to tactically command the largest and most serious 
incidents, working at the incident scene or from a suitable location 
close to the incident from the incident command unit.   They will 
undertake tactical co-ordination and manage both the operational 
side of the incident and the command support side of it (group 
commander (GC) or area commander (AC)). 
4. The fourth stage is the strategic commander who would work with 
the strategic co-ordinating group (SCG), the other key players 
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(Police, Ambulance, Local Authority, Environmental Agency, etc.) 
meeting at the SCG designated co-ordinating position off the 
incident ground (normally Police Head Quarters) and dealing with 
the overall impact of the incident for the community. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3.  Simple sectorisation of an operational incident (FRS manual; 
Volume 2, Fire Service Operations, Incident Command 3rd Edition 2008). 
 
For operational commanders the understanding of the successful outcome to 
operational incident management is a changing dynamic: changing from just 
the risk minimisation of direct harm to life or property, to the wider impact of 
environmental considerations, political perspective and cost minimisation 
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now becoming key to the understanding of a successful outcome.  The five 
characteristics of a risk critical incident (FRS manual V.2, Fire Service 
Operations; Incident Command 3rd Edition 2008) have some generic / shared 
considerations covering:  
 Time sensitivity / tempo of activity; time pressure on decision - making 
is critical to the quality of the decision.  With the increased pressure 
within the operational incident, a condensed timeframe can induce 
further pressure to the situation, adding to the incident’s dynamic by 
increasing the real / perceived tempo of the decision - making 
considerations for the incident commander. 
 Complexity; critical incidents bring with them a degree of complexity 
that will be perceived by the incident commander as an increasing risk 
to the successful outcome of the operation.  With an ever increasing 
intrusive media and professional / political (audit, health and safety) 
role and growing understanding of the wider and less well defined 
incident risks, the incident commanders uncertainty of how to meet 
these ill defined requirements bring an increased pressure to outcome 
objectives. 
 Moral pressure; the people / property dynamic of the historic FRS 
critical incident has now widened to include the environmental and 
political (either real or media induced) dimensions, bringing with it an 
increasing pressure on the incident commander to bring about an 
Page | 34 
 
early conclusion to the incident, whether this is warranted from an 
operational perspective at the time or not. 
 Duty of Care; the wider context in which an operational incident now 
sits brings with it further pressure in how a positive action will be 
viewed following a negative outcome!  The increasing uncertainty 
around the legal parameters and responsibilities of the individual 
incident commander’s liability and organisational support brings with it 
an increasing awareness of the professional and personal impacts, 
should the incident not go as planned, and on whose perspective this 
is viewed. 
 Retrospective Scrutiny; also brings a different perspective on the 
incident outcome and how the actions of the incident commander are 
analysed in the longer term, even when it is seen as a successful 
outcome from the FRS's point of view.  A decision taken at 3 am on a 
cold dark February morning in relation to a time compressed incident 
will look different months later on a Wednesday afternoon in July 
viewed by other professionals from their own defined paradigm. 
 
It could be argued that given the increasing considerations for all incident 
commanders, it becomes easier to understand why a critical incident will 
generate an increasingly intense and complex command environment.  While 
these pressures can be seen to be increasing on the incident commander in 
relation to all operations on the incident ground, the impact of them adds to 
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the pressurised environment the incident commanders find themselves in 
and have to be a consideration in the why and how they respond in the way 
they do.   
 
1.4 Current Practice (UK Incident Command System) 
 
The Incident Command System within FRS manual V.2, Fire Service 
Operations; 3rd Edition 2008, is the basic model for all United Kingdom based 
FRS.  It establishes the basic doctrine of the FRS in the context of 
operational incident management and functional command and control 
processes that flow from it.  The key elements of effective incident command 
are represented in three areas; 
 Organisation of the Incident ground; providing a recognised pattern for 
the incident ground for resource organisation. 
 Incident Risk Management; hazard identification and applications of a 
safe system  of work for undertaking the operation 
 Command Competence; skills, knowledge and understanding 
identified as required by the incident command and seen as the 
competencies to be maintained. 
It is considered the system covers the 7 predictable areas within the need for 
command that Brunacini (1985) identifies as required for management of the 
incident ground; 
 Action 
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 Command and Control 
 Coordination 
 Planning 
 Organisation 
 Communications  
 Safety  
These considerations allow for the UK FRS and the incident commander to 
work effectively within the broader multi-agency envelope, that is the growing 
consideration in relation to the changing dynamics of incident / environment 
considerations.  Using the ‘Managing Incident: Decision Making Model’; (FRS 
manual V.2, Fire Service Operations; Incident Command 3rd Edition 2008) 
looking at the Incident needs, resource and hazard and safety information 
available and required; thinking about it and producing prioritised objectives 
for an identified outcome, from which to develop a plan; which needs to be 
communicated and controlled to arrive at the identified outcomes and with an 
evaluation loop to allow for a dynamic environment, changing information 
and needs to meet the identified outcome (Figure 1.4). 
 
Within both the USA and UK FRS there is a drive from all the fire services 
(Flin, et. al. 1997; United States Fire Administration, 2009) to improve 
incident commander’s competence to undertake the role.  There is more 
focus on a model to use in training and an operational environment and a 
need to be a reflective practitioner on the experiences we have.  What is no't 
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seen is an acceptance (FRS manual V.2, Fire Service Operations; Incident 
Command 3rd Edition 2008) that this is providing all that an incident 
commander needs to deliver an acceptable outcome for the incident to the 
plethora of parties involved.  That is, an outcome that can maintain a 
consistency and be produced by all incident commanders, as the training / 
development model and incident command model duplicates the inputs in 
relation to the training and information provision on the incident ground.  
 
It could be questioned what do the incident commanders require to ensure 
they are competent, if training, the incident command system and the current 
operational command decision - making model do not provide it.  If we are 
using the same training inputs and command system for each of our incident 
commanders as they develop, why is it we do not have the same outcomes 
for each incident that we command.    
 
1.5 How does the FRS undertake (support) its fire ground decision - 
making; 
 
In managing an operational incident within the UK FRS there has been a 
move away from the purely experience based exposure (gained at 
operational incidents) and repetitive training (within the drill yard) to produce 
the good incident commander.  This move has been towards the realisation 
that to ensure the best outcome for the incident there is a requirement for a 
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structure on which the incident commander can develop and progress into 
the future their training and experience.  There has been a realisation within 
the FRS that experience and training requires a structure or a process for the 
key learning points and concepts of managing and decision - making at 
incidents to be understood.  This incident command system will then provide 
the knowledge base required to deliver the best outcome for the incident to 
be structured around.  This knowledge progressed through both education 
and training in incident command has been added to and supported by 
experience gained within a learning and reflective operational environment, 
bringing us to the present state of play of the current operational commander 
template. 
 
 
Figure 1.4.  Managing incidents: decision making model (FRS manual V.2, 
Fire Service Operations; 3rd Edition 2008). 
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The model used within the United Kingdom FRS is the ‘Managing Incident: 
Decision - making model’ (FRS manual V.2, Fire Service Operations; 
Incident Command 3rd Edition 2008; Figure 1.4).  
 
This model requires the incident commander to look at the incident 
information they have available and identify what the incident is e. g, a 
person trapped, a car fire, a fire in a domestic building or a fire in a high rise 
flat / office.  Then the requirement is to progress and build this information 
through asking questions based on the other risk factors involved, such as;  
 are there people reported missing, people who are not accounted for 
from the incident (family members, staff, etc.) who could still be within 
the premises, or would their last known whereabouts suggest that they 
are in a particular area / floor of the building or may have left the 
building? 
 are there chemicals within the building and could they be involved 
(either with the fire now, or are there chemicals that could be involved 
if the fire developed on the same level, or travelled to a higher or lower 
level), what are the risks associated with these chemicals and could 
they have an impact for fire fighters even if they are not involved with 
the fire? 
 what is the premise normal fire loading (the amount of combustible 
material available and involved with the fire or within the close vicinity 
of the fire) or has it an enhanced fire loading that could be involved 
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(the amount within the building that could be involved should the fire 
develop)? 
 is there anyone available to provide more detail on risk and more 
current information in relation to the premises and the location the 
incident is within (caretaker, maintenance engineer, senior manager, 
welfare officer, family member etc.) 
The incident commander would then review the resources the service has at 
the incident and those available elsewhere which could respond to the 
incident: for example, how many fire engines, how many members of staff / 
fire fighters, what is the specialist equipment already on the incident ground, 
what else is available and if not immediately available can it be made 
available?  Where is this extra resource that could be used and how long 
would it take to be available at the incident ground, and how will its 
availability, or lack of its availability, impact on the current plan and could this 
plan be changed to maintain the outcome.   Furthermore, what are the other 
concerns (political, criminal, legal) in relation to the incident, how do these 
impact on the decisions to be made and what other agencies will be required 
on the incident ground.  Additionally, what safety information is available 
(premises, structure, hazards, staff competencies, time scales) to feed into 
the decision - making model and if this information is not available what are 
the issues in making it available (access, timescales)?   
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The incident commander is required to draw all this information together and 
to think about what it means in relation to bringing the incident to a safe 
conclusion to identify the best outcome.  Using this wealth of information the 
incident commander has to prioritise what they see as the objectives for the 
incident, from which to develop a plan that will allow a safe conclusion for the 
incident.  This then needs to be communicated (cascaded) to all staff on the 
incident ground, allowing them to implement their specific part of the plan, all 
controlled by the incident commander to arrive at the outcomes they are 
looking for.  The whole model involves an evaluation loop to allow for a 
dynamic environment where new issues / information will become available 
and allow for changes to the plan.   
 
Within the USA the FRS use another version of a decision - making model 
for incident command which was developed within the USA military and is 
built around Boyd’s OODA loop (1987) (Figure 1.5) incorporating four 
essential elements: Observe, Orient, Decide and Act. 
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Figure 1.5. OODA loop; Boyd, J.R. The essence of Winning and Losing, 
June 1987 a five slide set by Boyd. 
The Observe component of this model is the only input from the external 
environment and consequently it determines how well the orientation 
matches the real world.  The ability of the incident commander to orient to a 
situation is seen as the critical element in the loop, involving experience and 
the ability to synergise this with new information, before deciding and acting 
to control the incident.  The OODA Loop shows that prior to making a 
decision (the Decide phase), the person will first have to obtain information 
(Observe) and make a decision on what this means to them and what they 
can do about it (Orient). Greene and Swets (1966) wrote in an article called 
OODA and You that; the proper military mindset is to let go a little, to allow 
some of the chaos to become part of his mental system, and for the 
commander to use it to his advantage by simply creating more chaos and 
confusion for the opponent. 
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Both of these models have embedded within them the traditional decision - 
making processes which have been articulated in various forms, but 
essentially it is some variation of the following;  
1. Define the problem 
2. Identify the decision criteria 
3. Allocate weight to the criteria 
4. Develop alternatives 
5. Evaluate the positives and negatives of the alternatives  
6. Select the best from the list 
7. Make the decision 
8. Evaluate the effectiveness of the decision 
In appraising the effectiveness of these models and the optimum outcome 
they are hoping to produce however, it may be critical to also acknowledge 
that stress, fear and panic take their toll at all levels of incident command.  
Under stress, leadership becomes more dogmatic and self centred, it 
regresses towards more habituated behavior, where most of the information 
available for making the best decision is not utilized (Putnam, 1995). 
Researchers similarly reported that some decisions evolved out of numerous 
discussions, multiple players and unanticipated events, with few sharp edged 
decision moments (Klein, 2008). These considerations make it clear that 
modeling of effective incident command needs to account for how 
commanders personally respond to high demand incidents over and beyond 
their training per se.  
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Incident ground decision - making does not therefore simply mean collecting 
information about the incident and environment to build an understanding / 
representation of the situation (Catherwood, Sallis, Edgar, and Medley, 2011; 
Gasaway, 2008; Klein, Calderwood, and Clinton-Cirocco, 2010; Omedei, 
McLennan, Elliott, Wearing, and Clancy, 2005). It also requires the individual 
to identify the decision criteria with which they're going to work, make the 
appropriate selection and allocate any weighting he / she feels is justified to 
the range of information on offer.  This could be either from the incident 
ground, its contextual environment or their internal knowledge base in 
relation to the incident and the individual making the decision. These 
considerations point to the critical importance of the factor of bias or mental 
scope in decision - making. The application of bias / scope to the situation 
when under a great deal of stress will influence the incident commander's 
ability to arrive at a satisfactory outcome to the situation.  As information 
selection reflects the bias or scope applied by the individual to the 
information and is a key factor in explaining errors of decision - making.  As 
explained above (1.1), too narrow / conservative a bias / scope can lead to 
miss errors or overlooking information, while too broad / liberal a bias / scope 
may mean that information is processed superficially leading to false alarms 
(see Section 1.8 below). Either way SA may be faulty or decision - making 
impaired. Gasaway (2008) looked at barriers to situation awareness and 
impacts to decision - making, describing high stress environments as ones 
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that contained multiple sources of information, physical / mental stress, 
communications issues, distractions, and interruptions among others, a 
necessary skill for understanding what is happening during any fire and 
rescue emergency incident (Gasaway, 2008). These issues are illustrated 
very clearly in the Storm King Mountain incident. 
 
1.6 Incident decision - making and Storm King Mountain 
 
In looking at the impact of these factors in relation to a single fireground 
incident Putman (1995) wrote on the collapse of decision - making and 
organisation structure on Storm King Mountain. The Storm King Mountain fire 
in July 1994 was a wildland fire fighting disaster where 14 fire fighters lost 
their lives. The analysis of this incident identifies that commanders differ in 
both the number of factors they use in decision - making and the value they 
place on each of these individual factors.  It is also identified that in a 
situation where fear and panic is created, individual minds can regress 
towards a simpler, more habitual thinking that does not reflect appropriate 
training guidelines.  Whilst individuals rarely have a full understanding of the 
few facts they have in relation to the incident and how they are processing 
them in making their decisions, possibly leading to a tendency to be over 
confident in their decision - making ability (Tavris and Aronson, 2011). With 
the background briefing on emerging issues for fire managers from the 
Australasian Fire and Emergency Service Authorities Council (AFAC) and 
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Bushfire Co-operative Research Centre (CRC) in 2009 studies (fire note 
2009; p.4) also showing that our thinking tends to underestimate hazards, 
particularly if the hazard is increasing at a logarithmic or exponential rate.  
‘The human consequences of suboptimal decisions by fire leaders are 
compellingly clear and conversely, optimal leadership decisions are no less 
vital for successfully suppressing a fire’ (Useem et. al. 2005, P.462). 
Exploring decision - making within the wildland fire scenario Yukl (1989) 
showed how good decision - making achieved the best possible futures and 
therefore identified good decision - making as a key component for 
leadership, with poor decision - making compounding the situation and 
increasing pressure, carrying a high demand for increased action and an 
increase with possible risk of loss of life and decision - making objective 
outcomes failing.  These demands and risks are clearly shown by incidents 
such as the Storm King Mountain fire. 
 
In this incident, Putnam (1995) felt stress, fear, and panic predictably led to 
the collapse of clear thinking and organisational structure, while Useem et. 
al. (2005) suggests that three factors – under preparation, acute stress and 
ambiguous authority- resulted in suboptimal decisions by team leaders on 
the fireline.  Both identified how one could decide the crucial factors which 
allowed this disaster to happen and both looked at the inputs and outputs 
gained from the leadership of the fire fighting crews committed to resolving 
this incident. 
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The fire started high in the mountain on July 2nd, but fire fighting resources 
did not reach the fire until July 5th, with the acknowledged truth among 
experts in this type of fire fighting, that the longer the initial attack was 
delayed, the greater the risk to the fire fighters attending.  To understand the 
environment these fire fighters were operating in on this mountain, one 
needs to understand that Wildland fires can reach 2,500 F, move across the 
ground affected at 25 miles an hour and leap a large gap overhead (at tree 
top level) without warning.  At 12.30 on July 6th 3 local crews and jumpers 
(wildfire fire fighters who parachute into the hard to reach fire zone, normally 
from airplanes, but can do so from helicopters) from 5 different bases across 
the affected area (a high number of wildfires were being fought at this period 
over a wide area) were thrown together and required to work and perform as 
a team under increasingly unstable and dangerous wildfire conditions.  As 
the incident on the mountain developed the fire fighters were working in 3 
separate groups and at 15.00 in the afternoon of the crucial day the wind 
started to pick up, gusting from 30 miles an hour to 45 miles an hour.  With 
this increase in wind speed (fanning the flames, increasing available oxygen 
and pushing it towards new fuel sources in the form of unburned trees and 
bush) there was an increasing fire activity, bringing with it a requirement for 
much more dynamic decision - making of the groups and their leaders.  At 
16.06 that afternoon an emergency radio message of ‘everyone out of the 
canyon’ went out and 18 fire fighters on the side of the mountain were 
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running for their lives, at 16.13 the same afternoon only 6 had outpaced the 
fire and reached safety, while 12 fire fighters were destined to lose their lives 
in that fire on the side of the mountain.  As well as these 12 fire fighters, two 
other fire fighters in other areas of the mountain fighting the fire in different 
circumstances were also destined to become victims to this fire, making a 
final death total of 14 fire fighters.   
 
Useem et. al. (2005) saw the events as unfolding due to 5 suboptimal 
decisions which were taken, with 3 primary factors impacting that can reduce 
the quality of decision - making by team leaders; limited preparation, 
experiencing acute stress and ambiguous authority.  In looking at what they 
feel were the 10 most consequential decisions, they concluded that 5 of 
these decisions were relatively optimal for the triple objectives of safety, 
speed and suppression, while the other 5 decisions were suboptimal. ‘The 
disaster, rather, derived in part from an underdevelopment of leadership 
skills, especially for making quality decisions under demanding and 
ambiguous conditions’ (page 477).  Useem et. al. (2005) supported Yuki 
(1989) in identifying good decision - making as one of the key components of 
leadership.  Historically, in the United States wildland fire fatality 
investigations were seen to focus on external factors like fire behaviour, 
fuels, weather and equipment; with the key elements of both human and 
organizational failures, seldom discussed in relation to the outcome of the 
investigations.  When individual fire fighters and support personnel are 
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singled out, it’s often to fix blame in the same way we blame fire behaviour or 
the fuels involved.  Putnam feels this is wrong headed and dangerous, 
because it ignores what he thinks is an underlying cause of fire fighter 
deaths; the difficulty individuals have to consistently make good decisions 
under stress (Putnam, 1995).   
 
The key issues are therefore whether in reaching their decisions do incident 
commanders always use a decision - making model to help them make their 
key decisions and if they do is there one decision - making model that helps 
and works more than another.  The truth is that there are a number of 
decision - making models that can be used (as shown above) and each FRS 
is able to pick and then modify the one that they prefer, or are most 
comfortable with.  Nevertheless, in the end it may not matter which model is 
ostensibly being followed, since as noted by Useem et. al. (2005) and 
Putnam (1995), both discuss what goes in to making a good decision, but 
they also recognise that in situations that create fear and panic, increased 
stress and pressure on leaders will follow!  Within their paper, Useem et. al. 
(2005) identifies research that confirms that when individuals are under time 
pressure or perform multiple tasks at the same time, they are more likely to 
make suboptimal decisions. Much of the stress experienced by fire fighters is 
thus a direct product of the urgent and diverse demands imposed on crew 
leaders and incident commanders when confronted by a fast evolving fire 
Page | 50 
 
(Janis and Mann, 1977; Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, and Johnson, 2000; 
Gilbert, 2005). 
 
1.7 How do we progress the current understanding of the incident 
commander role to improve incident outcomes? 
 
Research in the USA on the ‘Naturalistic Decision Making’ (NDM) model 
identified that in an operational environment information comes from many 
sources and is often incomplete.  One theory from NDM is ‘Recognition - 
Primed Decision Making (RPD) (Klein, Orasnu, Calderwood, and Zsambok, 
1993), where fireground commanders argued that they were not making 
choices, considering alternatives or assessing probabilities, but saw 
themselves as acting and reacting on the basis of prior experience.  Two of 
the key features of the RPD model are: focus on the situational assessment 
and checking that the action plan will work using mental simulation, but in 
view of the evidence from incidents such as Storm King Mountain, is this 
enough? The current research project is based on the consideration that 
another key factor may need to be addressed in explaining and supporting 
fireground command and decision - making: the issue of information bias.  
As noted above (1.1) past research (e.g. in regard to military situations: 
Edgar & Edgar, 2007; Edgar, Catherwood, Nikolla, and Alford, 2009) has 
shown that individuals differ in how much of the available information that 
they use and trust in making - decisions, referred to as the information bias 
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or scope of the individual. With the way an individual applies bias / scope to 
the situation, when under a great deal of stress (not using a rational basis) 
possibly influencing their ability to arrive at a satisfactory outcome to the 
situation by not taking account of, or applying the correct judgment to all the 
information available in making their decision.  Some people may apply a 
conservative bias / scope, trusting or using only a narrow range or scope of 
available information, which could be seen as narrowing of perception (tunnel 
vision), while others may show a more liberal or lax bias / scope, trusting or 
using a wider scope of information (butterfly syndrome) (Catherwood, Sallis, 
Edgar & Medley, 2012; Sallis, Catherwood, Edgar, Brookes, and Medley, 
2013). These considerations may be important in further development of the 
training for effective FRS incident command. 
 
1.8 Bias in decision – making 
 
As noted above, effective decision - making and SA (Endsley, 2000) involves 
acquiring information, but also needs the appropriate selection of relevant 
information from the external environment or from the decision - makers own 
internal knowledge base (Catherwood, et. al. 2011; Gasaway, 2008; Klein, 
Calderwood, and Clinton-Cirocco, 2010; Omodie, and Wearing, 2005). Past 
research into real - world decision - making (e.g. in military situations: Edgar 
and Edgar, 2007) and the Naturalistic Decision - Making theoretical approach 
have confirmed that even when individuals have similar knowledge of a 
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situation, they will vary in how, or how much of that information they actually 
choose to use in making decisions.  This project adopts a novel approach to 
investigating why such variation occurs by studying the decision bias / scope 
of individuals. 
 
It would appear that this bias or scoping can apply to either externally 
available information (eg. aspects that can be seen) or to information 
absorbed cognitively or even subconsciously (Catherwood et. al. 2012; 2011; 
Sallis, et. al. 2013). It does not just apply therefore to what individuals are 
actually seeing before them, it can also apply to the information they have in 
their knowledge or memory. Even if a wide range of information is taken on 
board, people do still mentally or internally adjust their scope or bias so they 
can select the information that suits the way they interpret / understand what 
is being presented.  Regardless of the fact that the key points and the full 
range of information in relation to the situation are available to them for their 
analysis or understanding. This can explain some of the puzzling decisions / 
errors people make even when theoretically they have all the correct 
knowledge available to them.   
 
This concept of bias derives from “signal detection theory” (Green & Swets, 
1966) (see below Figure1.6). Correct judgments are hits and correct 
rejections, but errors are either misses or false alarms. Prior research 
(Edgar, et. al. 2009) indicates that individuals tend towards either a) 
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conservative decision bias / scope,  classifying less information as true, 
making more correct rejections but also more misses or b) liberal decision 
bias / scope, deciding more is true, thus making more hits but also more 
false alarms (Figure 1.6).  
 
                                                             TRUE Information            FALSE 
Information 
 
Accept information as True/useful                                                                                              
“liberal” bias 
 
 DECISION 
Reject information as  
False / irrelevant “conservative bias” 
 
 
 
Figure 1.6.  Categories of decision - making and bias (after: Green & Swets, 
1966; Saveland, 2005). 
 
People with conservative bias / scope have a tendency to trust a narrow 
range of available information (tunnel vision), while those with more liberal or 
lax bias / scope, trust a wider / shallower scope of information (butterfly 
effect). Bias / scope starts to explain errors in decision - making even when 
theoretically all the correct information is available and with hindsight in any 
review will be seen to be available. This concept is thus highly relevant to the 
fireground incident situation e.g., as noted above, in the Storm King Mountain 
Correct 
rejection 
Miss 
False alarm 
alarm 
HIT 
Page | 54 
 
wildfire, an experienced  commander displayed  a conservative bias / scope, 
making the miss error that overlooked weather / wind information with fatal 
consequences (Useem, et. al. 2005). 
 
1.9 Aims of the current research.  
 
The current research will focus on this key issue of information bias in FRS 
decision - making to determine whether FRS personnel display bias / scope 
during realistic simulations and exercises and if so, whether they are 
conservative or liberal in nature. There has been some preliminary 
application of this theoretical framework to fireground decision - making 
(Saveland, 2005), but the current research will extend this by quantifying bias 
/ scope to enable appraisal of such tendencies across different contexts, 
within individuals over time and after the provision of personalised feedback 
about bias / scope.  
 
The current research will also explore the effects of FRS experience on 
decision - making bias / scope. Experienced FRS personnel may act on the 
basis of prior experience using “Recognition-primed decision making (RPD)” 
(Klein, 2003; Klein et. al. 2010), rather than fresh appraisal of fire situations 
(Klein, Orasnu, Calderwood, and Zsambok, 1993). RPD is beneficial if it aids 
focus on correct aspects of the situation but can induce a conservative bias / 
scope and hence miss errors’ or liberal bias, false alarms.  
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An important question to be considered in the thesis is whether bias / scope 
is consistent or varies for individuals. Does the same person vary in the bias / 
scope that they use in different situations, or at different types of incident 
(experience), demonstrating a situational bias/ scope.  Or do individuals have 
a natural and consistent bias / scope. In either case, will the understanding of 
personal bias / scope tendencies make a difference to the way individuals 
react under pressure and therefore to the way they manage an incident. Is it 
possible to alter the bias of an individual, or will it be different at different 
times / incidents, can knowledge of an individual’s own bias change the way 
bias affects, or impacts on their incident decisions.  Is it possible that 
understanding of bias can help to extend an individual’s ability to manage an 
incident under pressure without falling back to a resting bias that may impact 
detrimentally on decisions made?  This issue raises important questions for 
training which will be considered within the thesis. Do the FRS incident 
command system and command models already established and in use 
within the training and operational environment provide enough support to 
give the competence requirements of the incident commander.  Without that 
same incident commander knowing and understanding more about their 
personal bias / scope tendencies and how they react or fail to react under 
pressure in relation to these.  Can there really be effective training of incident 
command without knowing whether individuals have a conservative decision 
making bias / scope, classifying less information as true, making more 
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correct rejections but also more misses, or alternately a more liberal bias / 
scope, deciding more is true making more hits but also more false alarms 
(Figure 1.6). 
 
The specific aims (Hypotheses) of the current investigation are therefore to 
determine if: 
i) FRS personnel will display either conservative or liberal decision - making 
bias / scope (with related miss or false alarm errors respectively) during FRS 
training exercises involving simulations of fireground incidents. 
ii) any such bias / scope error patterns will be  consistent for individuals over 
situations / scenarios. 
iii) experienced FRS personnel will be less prone to displaying such bias / 
scope errors. 
iv) any such bias / scope will be reduced or moderated by providing detailed 
personal feedback on bias / scope and error tendencies to individuals 
following training exercises ( i.e. individuals can use understanding about 
their own bias / scope to reduce errors in decision - making). 
 
The broad aims are thus to improve understanding of how an incident 
commanders personal decision - making bias / scope may influence 
decisions and errors in FRS operations. Then to ultimately ascertain if this 
knowledge made available to the individual, or this type of information can 
contribute to training guidelines for self-awareness of how information is 
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sampled or scoped in fireground situations, with a view to reducing risk in 
actual FRS operations.  The ultimate goal is to progress this work from the 
theoretical model into a plan to help to identify how an individual bias / scope 
can be identified and to see if or how this knowledge can assist the FRS 
decision maker.  
 
1.10 Methodology Overview:  
 
1.10.1 Sample of participants: Participants were operational FRS fire 
fighter personnel (male and female) from both full time and part time 
(retained) fire crew from Gloucestershire FRS. The only selection criterion 
was that they were within an operational FRS fire fighting role as either 
managers or fire fighters and that they consent to be involved. With 
participant consent, results for the longer-term feedback study were 
provided on a personal and confidential basis to each participant. The 
research had full endorsement of senior FRS staff at Gloucestershire FRS 
who have previewed task content to ensure its validity for FRS operations.  
 
1.10.2 Ethical issues: The studies were undertaken at FRS stations or at 
training situations at the time of routine training / assessment exercise 
sessions although participation in these research studies was fully 
voluntary by signed consent after a preliminary briefing. Staff were fully 
advised that there are no requirements to participate in the research 
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project. Some staff elected not to be involved in the studies demonstrating 
that consent was fully voluntary. Results were anonymised for purposes of 
general analysis and for reporting in any public manner. General 
anonymous feedback was provided to the crew and individuals involved. 
For ethical reasons, individual assessment sessions were administered by 
trained FRS managers.  
 
1.10.3 Basic methodological / analysis approach: Each study involved 
a fireground simulation exercise about which yes / no or true / false probe 
questions were subsequently presented to each individual in a written 
response sheet format. The responses were analysed by a “signal 
detection” type method, the Quantitative Assessment of Situation 
Awareness (QASA): Edgar et. al. 2009) (previously known as Quantitative 
Unit Assessment of Situation Awareness (QUASA)) that gives two scores 
(from -100 to +100): i.) knowledge (or Actual Situational Awareness 
(ASA)) and ii.) bias on a scale from very liberal to very conservative (see 
Figure 1.6).  The ASA or knowledge score is conceptually similar to that 
provided by other established measures of SA, such as the Situation 
Awareness Global Assessment Technique (SAGAT)(Endsley, 1987).  The 
bias measure in QASA however gives further insights into the critical 
question of how knowledge or information may be selected or filtered for 
decision - making and whether this is being achieved in a strict and 
conservative way or alternately, a more lax or liberal manner. Moreover, 
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QASA is uniquely suited for studying real-world decision - making since it 
allows and is able to measure, the state of an individual where true 
information may actually have a weaker representation than false. Thus 
QASA may be especially suited to studying the decision - making of 
individuals who are fundamentally misguided about a situation and hence 
at great risk of making errors.  It has been used in a range of applications 
to date including simulated military contexts (Edgar, et. al. 2009; 
Rousseau, Tremblay, Banbury, Breton, and Guitouni, 2010). 
 
Initially there was a need to understand if FF’s showed a bias pattern and 
how this could then be developed with other exercises to test how this could 
impact on decisions made, which was done using a training event that 
simulated a command type of incident (breathing apparatus exercise). This 
was then developed using table top exercises which involved trial sites (fire 
stations during the fire fighters training periods) of interactive computer 
based fireground exercises with locally relevant content. A range of exercises 
were trialed,  with each  presenting a series of images and video material 
representing the exercise interspersed with probe questions to be answered 
true / false (eg. "there were 3 staircases within the search area") and how 
confident they were in their response (perceived Situational Awareness 
(PSA)). As noted above, the QASA method produce’s the SA score (both 
perceived and actual) and the bias / scope tendency score (conservative / 
tunnel bias / scope vs. liberal / broaden bias / scope). Thesewere followed 
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where possible by general qualitative feedback to the individuals / groups 
taking part and further training activities. While the exercise showed bias 
patterns for the individuals they were variable for different exercises and 
were not felt to reflect the pressure a developing incident brought to the 
individual making the decision. They did however show how bias was 
reflected in an individual decision making process and how this type of 
exercise could be used within the training environment to improve incident 
decision making. 
An exercise that could provide the pressure to test the theory that it was a 
sleeping bias involved trials for individuals during response officer 
assessment exercises at Avon Fire and Rescue Service (AFRS) Specialist 
Fire and Rescue Training Centre (Avon FRS South West Command Centre) 
based on developing emergency fireground situations with locally relevant 
content. Assessment exercises over a period of time were trialed, with each 
being assessable for the individual in relation to their competency to 
undertake their role; the exercise were interspersed with probe questions to 
be answered true / false (eg. "the services for the premises were isolated on 
arrival ") and how confident they were in their response (PSA). QASA 
produced the SA score (both perceived and actual) and bias tendency score 
(conservative / tunnel bias / scope vs. liberal / broaden bias / scope). For 
individuals taking part on an individual assessment basis this was followed 
by specific qualitative feedback and followed up by interviews for the 
participants in the trials to reflect on the results and provide feedback on the 
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perceived value of the method and suggest ways to develop it. The exercise 
were actual simulations of emergency incidents and developed with time and 
decisions made by the incident commander, more pressure on the incidents 
commander was built using interventions by other authorities replicating a 
real incident.  While this method was preferable in bringing real incident 
pressures, it was based on opportunity with the FRS. The level of 
commitment to this type of exercise (both FDM time and other participants, 
plus the cost of the centre) was not controllable in undertaking developments 
in the longer term with identifying bias of individuals for future development. 
 
These methods provided the basis for furthering the understanding of FRS 
personnel's SA and decision - making bias / scope tendencies and providing 
the data required to improve on these critical aspects of fireground 
operations making for safer fireground operations. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review: Theory and Research on how bias / scope influences 
decision – making 
 
2.1 Introduction: the concept of capacity limitations in decision – 
making 
 
Within both the United States of America and the United Kingdom Fire and 
Rescue Services (FRS) there has been a drive to improve the incident 
commander’s competence to undertake the operational incident command 
role.  Recognition primed decision - making, naturalistic decision - making 
and traditional decision - making have all been associated with both 
command and decision - making styles, along with a need to be a reflective 
practitioner, reflecting on the experiences of both training events and 
responding to emergencies and also being part of the command team and 
the experience of seeing others undertake the role.  Baddeley (2001) 
appears to challenge the assumption that more information in time-
pressured, high stakes and complex situations will necessarily help, as he 
feels it may result in a set of new problems.  In particular, too much 
information may lead to information overload, which is likely to degrade the 
decision - making quality under some circumstances, rather than enhance it.   
This overload is a consequence of the natural limitations of human 
information processing, with information overload likely to lead to sub-optimal 
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decision - making which, in turn, may result in sub-optimal performance on 
the part of the incident commander: "The human consequences of sub-
optimal decisions by fire leaders are compellingly clear and conversely, 
optimal leadership decisions are no less vital for successfully suppressing a 
fire", (Useem, Cook, and Sutton, 2005, P.462). 
 
The critical factor in these issues may be cognitive capacity. Kahneman 
(1973) first discussed the idea of limited capacity, a theory he put forward 
which suggests that within the brain there is a ‘limited capacity central 
processor’.  This processor is responsible for analysing incoming information 
and integrating it with information already held in the memory.   The idea that 
the amount of information that we can attend to is limited, that the processor 
is of limited capacity, would mean that some of the information coming in will 
not be processed and this could be the reason why we are unaware of so 
much that is happening around us.  But Kahneman did suggest that arousal 
may influence the capacity of the processor, where the higher the level of 
arousal the more information can be taken in and processed.  The source of 
these limitations may lie in various processing systems in the brain. Baddeley 
(2001) proposed that there is limited capacity in working memory, while 
looking to understand the way information is temporarily stored and 
maintained in the performance of complex cognitive processing and 
Rasmussen (1983) identified the slowness or capacity limits of knowledge 
based problem solving, again working on the theory of limited capacity.  With 
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the effectiveness of decision - making in complex situations and its 
dependency on emotional self regulation as discussed by Omodei and 
Wearing (1995), when they looked at information processing competencies 
and decision - making in complex environments. 
 
These proposals highlight the key issue of capacity limitations: we are unable 
to process everything, we just do what we have the ability to do, and so the 
argument goes that our brains are limited in terms of how much they can 
take in, process and store.  A number of core brain systems reflect this 
limitation of capacity especially systems involved in perception, attention and 
memory (working and long-term) as discussed in the following section.   
To further understand these ideas about capacity limits, it is useful to 
consider the basic psychological processes involved in making decisions and 
any capacity limits in these systems. 
 
 2.2. Basic psychological processes in decision - making  
 
Basic cognitive processes relevant to decision - making include: perception, 
attention, working memory and long-term memory (Eysenck & Keane, 2005). 
All of these may be affected by capacity limitations. 
In regard to limits in perception, high perceptual load (i.e. the need to 
process a large quantity of perceptual features or information) may elicit a 
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narrow bias towards perceiving central features only, with peripheral 
information being overlooked (Forster and Lavie, 2009; Rees, Frith and 
Lavie, 1997). This may be especially critical in perceptually complex real 
world environments. For example, the tendency of air traffic controllers to 
overlook key perceptual features of aircraft (such as location, altitude, 
heading, etc.) has been found to increase with the number of aircraft to be 
monitored (Endsley and Rodgers, 1998).  
 
Other inherent constraints include those related to the cognitive workload on 
the attentional systems that determine the scope of information for selective 
or privileged processing by the brain (Posner, Rueda and Kanske, 2007). 
Cognitive psychologists often regard attention as acting like a filter so the 
individual is not overwhelmed by more information than they can cope with. 
Posner (1980) in explaining how this might work discussed attention focus 
like a 'spotlight', illuminating only a small proportion of everything that is 
registered by the eye (visual field), with the attentional spotlight working for 
hearing as well as vision. Whereas within their theory Eriksen and Murphy 
(1987) describes it as a 'zoom lens' where attention can be focussed tightly 
on a narrow area, or broadened to cover a wider area, which would imply 
spreading the effort, a lot of effort going into a small area, or at a lower 
concentration over a large area. Which is suggesting control over your 
spotlight of attention, an ability to move it around or in and out, that you can 
decide what you want to attend to, selective attention, and a conscious 
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cognitive process.  Lavie (1995) suggests that the amount of perceptual 
information available to be processed and over which we do not have direct 
control, may also influence the size of the spotlight, or attention tunneling 
(Engel, 1971).   Lavie's (1995) work proposes that anything outside of the 
spotlight is likely to receive little or no processing, with some evidence to 
suggest we do not have complete control over where the spotlight is directed.  
Some of this direction will be involuntary (no conscious decision to direct 
attention to a particular stimulus) and with involuntary attention something 
draws you to it, you are unable to stop it.  When attention is drawn in this way 
it is referred to as stimulus induced shifts of attention, crucially an involuntary 
process, something that just happens.  Posner (1980) referred to the internal 
voluntary control as an endogenous system and the effect of reacting to 
external stimuli as making up an exogenous system. Schneider and Shiffrin 
(1977) suggested that there were two processes at work, controlled and 
automatic, where the automatic process makes little, or no demand on the 
attentional capacity and occurs without conscious awareness; the two 
process theory.  The distinction however is not that straight forward, as 
reading may be, for most, an automatic process, but is and continues to be a 
learned process, meaning that at some time it was not automatic, which 
would imply we can change the amount of control we have over attention.  
This would support Gopher’s (1993) suggestion that attention control is a skill 
that can be learned and modified to some extent.   
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Memory also reflects capacity limits. A basic model of memory proposes that 
there are three linked systems which will help explain both the strengths and 
limitations for both SA and also the decision - making process. The multi-
store model was first described in 1968 by Atkinson and Shiffrin, but has 
been criticised for being too simplistic and in particular, the idea of a “working 
memory” (Baddeley 2001) has been added.  
 
Figure 2.1. The multi-store model 1968 Atkinson and Shiffrin. 
 
Sensory memory holds information for a very brief period of time (Eysenck 
and Keane, 2005) from a half to two seconds, which allows extra time to 
process incoming information.  The ability to look at an item and remember 
what it looked like with just a split second of observation, or memorisation, is 
an example of sensory memory. It is out of cognitive control and is an 
automatic response. Working memory systems dictate the selective focus for 
maintenance of that information in an active state (Baddeley, 2003; Cowan, 
1998).  Working memory, (or the currently active short term memory) 
contains our conscious awareness, holding about seven pieces of 
information, plus or minus two (Miller 1956) and then only for a short period.  
This makes us susceptible to losing the information being held especially if 
distracted, so knowing how to preserve information in working memory is key 
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to SA. The storage in sensory memory and working or short term memory 
generally has a strictly limited capacity and duration, which means that 
information, is not retained indefinitely. Long term memory offers a huge 
storage of information collated over our whole life, which can be accessed for 
SA transferring into working memory; with certain types of information easier 
to retrieve when it is familiar, accessed recently, salient or of particular 
personal value (Endsley and Garland, 2000). Nevertheless, long term 
memories need to be retrieved into working memory to be of use in decision - 
making and there are capacity limits in this regard as noted above.  
  
All of these limitations then in perception, attention and memory may impact 
on decision - making and promote information bias. While high cognitive load 
may involve a selective or narrow focus on some aspects of a situation, this 
may be at the cost of reducing brain resources for processing other 
information (Dretsch and Tipples, 2008; Franco- Watkins, Pashler and 
Rickard, 2010; Roberts, Hagen and Heron, 1994; Zanto and Gazzaley, 
2009), which could lead to poor filtering of information not selected for 
attentional and working memory focus.  
 
Another key factor in decision - making bias is motivational (Becker, 
Mortensen, Ackerman, Shapiro and Anderson, 2011) or emotional state 
(Mosier and Fischer, 2010). Negative emotional arousal may narrow 
attentional focus (Derryberry and Tucker, 1994) so that only details 
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considered central to an event are retained (Christianson and Loftus, 1991), 
while positive emotional arousal may promote less intensive filtering of 
information (Isen and Labroo, 2003)  with a more lax or superficial 
processing bias. Even unconscious emotional cues (somatic markers) 
acquired during previous experiences (D’Amasio, 2000) can direct attention 
towards selected aspects of a situation. This influence of emotional cues has 
been noted in many areas of natural decision - making, including that of 
pilots or military commanders (Mosier and Fischer, 2010) and may be 
relevant in fireground decision - making. Thus these emotional-motivational 
factors may need to be considered in explaining bias especially in conditions 
that promote high stress or anxiety.  
 
2.3 Decision - making (traditional decision making; recognition primed 
decision making; naturalistic decision making)  
 
The traditional decision - making process has been articulated in various 
forms (Gasaway, 2009), but can be seen as a variation of eight steps 
(factors); 
1. Define the problem 
2. Identify the decision criteria 
3. Allocate weight to the criteria 
4. Develop alternatives 
5. Evaluate the positives and negatives of the alternatives  
Page | 70 
 
6. Select the best from the list 
7. Make the decision 
8. Evaluate the effectiveness of the decision 
Such models present decision - making as a linear sequence of certain 
deductive steps, but current psychological models of decision - making 
acknowledge the “fuzzier” nature of human reasoning such as the “heuristic” 
or knowledge - based reasoning that is more likely in natural contexts and is 
identified by Tversky and Kahneman’s many research studies (e.g., Tversky 
& Kahneman,1971). These studies indicated that in uncertain or ambiguous 
real-world contexts, decision - making can be swayed by such factors as 
personal bias and the availability (vividness) of information.   Indeed, 
uncertainty is a constituent element of all operational decision - making and 
in classic decision - making theory is one of the difficulties decision makers 
have to overcome (Lipshitz, 2003).   Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) talk about the 
ability to make decisions based on what individuals have described as 
feelings, and Kline (2003) referring to this knack, or skill as intuition. The 
notion of intuitive decision - making appears in numerous papers, such as 
those by Von Schell (1993) and Marshall (1947) concerning military decision 
- making.   
 
Work by Klein (2003) on intuitive decision - making confirmed that it appears 
to be a skill used by fire fighters as well as the military.  Klein’s definition was 
"the way we translate our experience into action" (Klein 2003, p. xiv).  Klein 
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described this as ‘Recognition Primed Decision - Making’ (RPD), based on 
the situational cues and ability to match patterns, supported by the 
individuals experience and judgement.  For Klein RPD distinguished 2 
important elements; a) mental simulation (a process that envisions what may 
happen) and b) how to address it.  Both elements are united within a second 
mental model or individual understanding of how and why things happen; 
completed by the individuals experience and how it influences a person’s 
RPD.  Klein also describes barriers (structures within the organisation that 
interfere with) to intuitive decision - making, such as service policies, 
procedures and information technology.   
 
'Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) is an attempt to understand how 
humans actually make decisions in complex real world settings, such as fire 
fighting' (Klein and Klinger 2008, p. 16).  The approach aims to improve 
decision - making in the field by the development of tools, training and 
decision support.  Johnson, Cummings and Omodei (2009), talk about worst 
case scenarios in decision - making, relating the low probability, high 
consequence events to these scenarios and the reaction to risk, if it is 
identified and how it influences the decision - making process.   
 
2.4 Fire and Rescue Service perspective on decision – making 
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Gasaway (2009) looked at barriers to SA and resultant good decision - 
making; describing problematic environments as ones that contained multiple 
sources of information, physical / mental stress, communications issues, 
distractions, and interruptions.  In looking at the impact of decision - making 
in relation to a single incident Putman (1995) identified that commanders 
differ in both the number of factors they use and the value they place on 
each of these factors, also identifying that in a situation where fear and panic 
is created, individual minds can regress towards a simpler, more habitual 
mode of thinking.  With individuals rarely having a full understanding of the 
few facts they have in relation to the incident, and how they are processing 
them in making their decisions; which can lead to them having a tendency to 
be over confident in their decision - making ability (Tavris and Aronson, 
2011).  
 
To understand how the incident commander having very few facts in relation 
to the incident may be overcome in relation to fire fighting operations, it is 
necessary to understand how decision - making on the incident ground relies 
on maintaining SA (as described below in 2.5) and making decisions under 
time pressure (Saveland, 2005), an environment that the traditional decision - 
making process does not fully cater for (AFAC & CRC Fire note 2009). 
Snowden and Boone (2007) however, recognised that a changing situation 
(dynamic event) can become more complex and it may be necessary to 
apply different methods of decision - making to the circumstances. They 
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identify four contexts: complex, complicated, simple and chaotic; with leaders 
needing to identify the context and adapt their behaviour accordingly, to 
assess the facts of the situation and establish their response on established 
practise. Incident ground decision - making does not simply mean collecting 
information about the incident and environment to build an understanding / 
representation of the situation (Catherwood, Edgar, Sallis and Medley, 2010; 
Gasaway, 2008; Klein et. al. 2010; Omedei, McLennan and Elliott, 2005). It 
also requires the individual to identify the decision criteria; make the 
appropriate selection and allocate any weighting he / she feel is justified to 
the range of information on offer.  Either from the incident ground, its 
contextual environment or their internal knowledge base in relation to the 
incident and the individual making the decision. Identifying that a necessary 
skill for understanding what is happening during any fire and rescue 
emergency incident is SA (Gasaway, 2010). In looking at the impact of this in 
relation to a specific incident Putman (1995) looked at the Storm King 
Mountain fire and the ‘collapse of decision - making and organisation 
structure during the wild fire in July 1994 where 14 men and women fire 
fighters lost their lives (discussed at 1.6).  Here Putman identified that people 
differ in both the number of factors they use  and the value they place on 
them and in a situation that creates fear and panic, individual’s can regress 
towards more habitual thinking (develop cognitive process).  Studies (AFAC 
& CRC Fire note 2009; p.4) also show that our thought process tends to 
underestimate hazards, particularly if the hazard is increasing at a 
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logarithmic or exponential rate.  ‘The human consequences of suboptimal 
decisions by fire leaders are compellingly clear and conversely, optimal 
leadership decisions are no less vital for successfully suppressing a fire’, 
(Useem et. al. 2005, P.462). Exploring decision - making within the wildland 
fire scenario Yukl (1989) showed how good decision - making achieved the 
best possible futures and therefore identified good decision - making as a 
key component for leadership. 
  
The background briefing on emerging issues for fire managers from the 
AFAC and CRC in Fire note, (2009) refers to human factors which are 
broadly defined as factors which influence both how the human body 
operates (physiological factors such as dehydration, fatigue etc.) and how 
the mind operates (psychological factors such as SA, planning, trust in team 
members etc.).  With their project focused on psychological factors 
(individual values) underpinning decision - making in safety critical complex 
and time pressured environments (compressed time event) based on fire 
service operations. Following extensive interviews they identified a wealth of 
valuable insight into influences on decision - making leading to a reluctance 
to change plans in response to a changing situation and a tendency by some 
leaders to ‘micro manage’ situations (narrow conservative bias / scope).  
They distilled their work into seven, what they describe as, ‘take home’ 
lessons which emerge from the data; 
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 Fire Commanders are not good at recognising when they are mentally 
overloaded at all levels of incident command (but at times some of this 
overload can be alleviated by basic decision aids). 
 They tend to underestimate what the fire will do, with a bias to predict 
change as linear. 
 They can be reluctant to change plans when the situation requires it, 
which appears to be linked to predicting change in the fire 
development (situational awareness). 
 They learn from previous experiences, near misses and accidents 
(supporting Klein’s Recognition-Primed Decision Model). 
 The importance of personal knowledge, trust in people we know. 
 They are good at doing stuff, but not at organising the fire ground, a 
lack of awareness regarding roles, or a move to an area they are 
comfortable with (bias; negative, liberal, lax, hit: positive; conservative, 
narrow, strict, miss). 
If given the opportunity, it is proposed that operational fire commanders take 
on more responsibility than they should, micro managing (narrow, 
conservative bias / scope), or not being able to focus (broad, liberal bias / 
scope).   
 
It may be that personality factors play a role in response to stress, but 
McLennan, Holgate, Omodei and Wearing, (2001) suggest that we have so 
far failed to find any evidence of a “personality type” associated with good 
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incident command (with the same being found with SA (Carretta, Perry and 
Ree, 1996)). 'It seems that good incident command is less a matter of what 
kind of person a commander is than what he or she does while in command’ 
(page 2, 39th IAMPS, Brussels 2003).  Their model of incident command 
decision - making then covers four points; 
 OIC quickly extracts the most relevant information available,  
 rapidly develop a conceptualization or mental model of the 
situation, 
 chose a response with a high probability of implementation 
effectiveness, 
 monitors change in the situation to change their response tactics. 
Showing the good incident commander operates in a manner that; 
a. their effective working memory was not exceeded, 
b. regulated their emotions and arousal level; 
 in summary they knew what to look for and what to do once they found it. 
 
AFAC & CRC Fire note (2009), identified that poor commanders had fewer 
decision rules to apply and were more likely to use a problem solving 
approach, which meant they concentrated fully on the area of operations 
(narrow, conservative approach) or were swamped with information.  When 
they were swamped salient information was likely to be given undue 
importance and relevant information to be overlooked (broad, liberal bias / 
scope).  Often giving an impression and sometimes describing themselves 
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as overwhelmed by the circumstances of the situation, reacting to 
developments in an ad-hoc manner and with difficulty forming a coherent 
plan.  Poor commanders were prone to be surprised by changes in the 
situation, appearing that all their cognitive processes were fully occupied, 
with some acknowledging they felt anxious and unconfident.  McLennan et. 
al. (2001) added a term of ‘disastrous incident command’ where serious 
injury or serious damage had occurred, or life had been lost and here they 
found an inappropriate choice of tactics as a result of key information being 
overlooked (narrow conservative bias / scope).   Discussing what they 
describe as hard wire bias (the way they felt they would always react) as; 
 optimism bias: a course of action where nothing can go wrong, 
 sunk-cost bias: persisting with a tactic because resources have 
already been committed,  
 need for action bias: where no restraint is exercised to a course of 
action and 
 linear rate of change bias: ‘where human beings seem to be incapable 
of accurately predicting non-linear rates of change (De Soir 2003, 
page 5, 39th IAMPS, Brussels 2003)'.  
(The use of the term bias in the above is a standard use where the individual 
will show his / her preference for the way they respond / react when under 
pressure at an incident to maintain a certain tactical plan for the way they 
manage the outcome.  Not the way it is used within this thesis, where it is 
used in short for information bias / scope, the way an individual filters the 
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information available to them as the incident commander, which they then 
use for deciding their tactics to produce a plan to bring the incident to a safe 
conclusion).   
 
Davis (2010) discusses an inconsistent approach by incident commanders at 
high pressure incidents, an approach that would not be taken in training 
scenarios or at low pressure incidents by the individual, when making rapid 
tactical decisions under stress.  Which he feels is due to experiencing stress 
induced pressure related to the environment and human factors, varying 
experience levels, training issues and a multitude of other reasons.   With 
this inconsistent approach by incident commanders compromising the safety 
of both fire fighters and the public, the work by Davis (2010), looked to 
determine what factors contributed to successful decision - making and what 
methods were available to improve the decision - making process.  As well 
as confirming how human and environmental factors impact on rapid 
decision - making, key recommendations were to include the Observe, 
Orient, Decide and Act (OODA) (Boyd 1987) loop into all training, teach the 
difference between naturalistic and traditional decision - making and 
implement the use of simulations.  The Incident Command System (ICS) for 
the UK FRS within ‘Fire and Rescue Manual Volume 2 ‘Fire Service 
Operations’ (FRS, Incident Command, incident command 3RD Edition 2008’), 
establishes the basic doctrine of the FRS in the context of operational 
incident management and functional command and control processes that 
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flow from it.  It is considered that the system covers the 7 predictable areas 
within the need for command that Brunacini (1985) identifies as required for 
management of the incident ground; Action, Command and Control, 
Coordination, Planning, Organisation, Communications and Safety.  While 
McLennan, Holgate, Omodei and Wearing (2001), discuss a naive ‘more is 
better’ assumption by some, promoting that more information available to 
incident commanders will inevitably result in better decision - making,   
 
Work with the Fire Service and with incident commanders within the Fire 
Service at operational incidents has identified an issue in that the Fire 
Service training currently may not provide everything the incident 
commander needs to undertake his role at high pressured incidents.  This 
work has identified that overall incident commanders are good at doing stuff, 
but not at filtering the right information to maintain SA for good decision – 
making to bring the incident to a safe conclusion. Snowden and Boone 
(2007) recognised that a changing situation (dynamic event) can become 
more complex and it may be necessary to apply different methods of 
decision - making to the circumstances, or different ways of filtering 
information.  That stress at incidents brought on because of the complex 
nature of the incident appear to show the incident commander can move to a 
decision model they are more comfortable with in the way they manage the 
available information, producing an information bias (broad, liberal bias / 
scope or a narrow, conservative, bias / scope).  Davis (2010) supports this in 
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looking at an inconsistent approach by incident commanders when making 
tactical decisions when under stressful conditions and Putman (1995) 
identifies that people differ in the number of factors they use in making 
decisions.   
 
2.5 Situation Awareness  
 
There are many reasons why deaths of well trained personnel occur, but 
increasingly the focus is on decisions made and the ability of the human 
mind to process information in high-pressure situations.  The analysis of FRS 
decision - making and errors increasingly involves consideration of the 
“Situation Awareness” of the personnel as being critical.  The components of 
SA are seen as covering three elements; gathering information, interpreting 
information and anticipating future states, sometime described as What?, So 
What?, Now What? (Flin, O'Connor and Crichton, 2008, p23).  This cognitive 
skill is primarily about gathering and processing information from the 
environment and using stored information to make sense of it. ‘SA is 
essentially what psychologists call perception of attention, it is a continuous 
monitoring of the environment, noticing what is going on and detecting any 
changes in the environment’ (Flin et. al. 2008: p. 17).  Endsley (1995) reports 
that SA not only applies to a wide variety of environments, but that acquiring 
and maintaining SA becomes increasingly difficult as the dynamics and 
complexity of the environment increase.  As dynamic situations require many 
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decisions to be made in a time compressed environment and are dependent 
on an up to-date analysis of the ongoing situation.  Kaempf, Wolf and Miller 
(1993) support the criticality of SA, as when analysing the decision - making 
of tactical commanders they identified that recognising the situation provided 
challenge to the commanders. While Okray and Lubnau (2004) identified that 
to maintain SA fire fighters during an ongoing incident need to maintain their 
up to date SA on the incident by reaffirming the situation. As SA incorporates 
an operator’s holistic understanding of the situation, which forms a basis for 
decision - making and even the best trained decision makers can make the 
wrong decision with incomplete SA. While good SA can lead to the right 
decision being made, if it is part of the right package of training, the right 
procedures, good tactics, etc.  Endsley, Sollenberger, Nakata and Stein 
(2000) identify that incident ground decision - making does not simply mean 
collecting information about the incident and environment to build an 
understanding / representation of the situation or to gain good SA, it means 
collecting it to help predict what is going to happen next..  
 
SA is, or can be defined as the understanding of events within the realm of 
the individual’s expertise as they unfold in time and for the individual being 
able to project the consequences of those events in the now (Wikipedia 
‘situational awareness’ 09/10/14). Or as the Health and Safety Executive 
(HSE) see it, knowing what is going on around you; being aware of what is 
happening around you in terms of where you are, where you are supposed to 
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be, and whether anyone or anything around you is a threat to your health and 
safety (information sheet, step 6, HSE 06/12). ‘Our knowledge, experience 
and education enable us to understand what is going on around us and helps 
us to determine if it is safe...our SA is only as accurate as our own perception 
or reading of the situation, so what we think is happening may not accurately 
reflect reality’ (information sheet, step 6, HSE 06/12, p.1).  This would lead to 
the conclusion that everyone’s SA is individual and potentially different.  
Although there are numerous definitions of SA, Endsley (1995a) defines SA 
informally as ‘knowing what’s going on’, but her more formal definition, "the 
perception of elements in the environment within a volume of time and 
space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status 
in the near future," (1995a: p36) is firmly established and widely accepted. 
With some definitions being specific to their own environment, Endsley's 
definition is applicable across multiple task domains (Flin et. al. 2008) and in 
defining SA she emphasizes three things that SA is not.  SA is not action or 
performance, it is not the same as long term memory knowledge and the 
product of SA is not the same as the process of updating SA. Although there 
are still some who question the validity and viability of the SA construct 
(Dekker and Hollnagel, 2004; Dekker and Woods, 2002) as providing an 
unnecessary construct, while there are already existing elements such as 
attention.  The increased use of the construct in both theory and application 
are testimony to its viability.   
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As discussed fire causes more than 20,000 deaths annually in the EU (EU 
Centre for Fire Statistics, 2006), these statistics include fire fighters showing 
that even highly trained and well skilled fire service personnel make unsafe 
decisions under the dynamic and high pressure conditions of the fireground. 
There are many reasons why such deaths of well trained personnel occur, 
but increasingly the focus is on the ability of the human mind to process 
information in high-pressure situations. The key issue is the capacity of the 
fire fighter to maintain an accurate understanding, or mental-model, of a 
situation when there are many competing demands. This capacity is the 
person's SA. Under pressured fireground operations, even the best trained 
individual may create a flawed mental model; poor SA (Endsley and Strater, 
2000). When this occurs, key information may be overlooked or dismissed, or 
faulty information may be used to make critical decisions (Catherwood et. al. 
2010; 2011; 2012).  
 
The importance of SA has long been recognised in other areas, such as 
aerospace (Edgar and Edgar, 2007), but has only recently been a focus for 
training in the Fire Services. Any means for training fire personnel to 
appraise and monitor their own SA under pressure offers an important 
adjunct to the training of fire fighters.  As SA involves being aware of what is 
happening around you in order to understand how information, events, and 
one's own actions will impact upon staff deployed and goals and objectives 
of the incident, both immediately and as it develops into the future. A 
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commander with a good sense of SA generally has a high degree of 
knowledge with respect to the inputs and outcomes of a given situation i.e. 
an innate "feel" for situations, people, and events that play out due to 
variables the commander can control (Kaempf et. al. 1993). While lacking or 
having inadequate ASA has been identified as one of the primary factors in 
accidents attributed to human error, and is especially important in work 
domains where the information flow can be high and poor decisions can lead 
to serious consequences (Storm King Mountain).  Having a complete as 
possible and accurate SA is essential where a rapidly changing and a high 
situational complexity for the human decision maker is a concern, as it has 
been recognized as a critical foundation for successful decision - making 
across emergency response and in military command and control operations. 
 
Even for an individual with good SA there are external influences that will 
impact on it, with stress having the ability to have a major influence (Ensdley, 
1995), either physical stress, noise, temperature variations, etc. or social 
psychological stressors, fear, uncertainty, self-esteem, prestige etc.   
Mandler (1982) discusses that a certain amount of stress may actually 
improve performance, while a higher amount of stress can have an extremely 
negative consequences.  Baddeley (1970) as already discussed identifies 
that under various forms of stress there is a tendency to narrow attention to a 
limited number of central aspects, with a decreased attention and working 
memory observed for peripheral information (conservative bias / scope).  
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Additionally, Flin et. al. (2008) discusses fatigue reducing the capacity for 
attention and stress having a similar detrimental effect, with the individual 
preoccupied with other problems and reducing attentional resources (liberal 
bias / scope). This is a critical problem for SA leading to neglect of some 
elements in favour of others, leading to disaster in a number of incidents 
Endsley (1993) identifies in the aviation industry.  Along with other areas that 
can impact detrimentally on SA, such as workload, in a dynamic situations 
high mental workload is a stressor of particular importance and complexity of 
the situation is a major factor creating a challenge for operators to maintain 
good SA.   
 
2.6 Bias 
 
A critical factor however in any account of FRS decision - making must be 
the way the incident commander sees the incident and reacts to it when 
under pressure, what personal bias / scope he / she brings to the incident 
ground and do they understand that they bring it. Bias is an overall response 
tendency resulting from numerous brain functions known to influence 
selectivity in the processing of information. This selectivity has been shown 
as apparent in many facets of information processing, including perceptual, 
cognitive and even emotional operations, and reflecting the enhancement of 
some aspects of the available information and / or the inhibition of other 
aspects.  A cognitive bias is the human tendency to make systematic 
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decisions in certain circumstances based on cognitive factors rather than 
evidence, bias arises from various processes that are sometimes difficult to 
distinguish, but include information processing shortcuts, motivational 
factors, and social influence (Catherwood, Sallis, Edgar, and Medley 2011).  
Such bias can result from information processing shortcuts called heuristics, 
which include errors in judgment, social attribution and memory (Tversky & 
Kahneman 1973). Cognitive bias are a common outcome of human thought 
and often drastically skew the reliability of anecdotal and legal evidence, a 
phenomenon studied in both cognitive science and social psychology.  This 
concept of bias derives from “signal detection theory” Green and Swets, 
(1966) in their model of the relationship between SA and bias figure 2.2: bias 
can shift towards a liberal criterion (with a risk of accepting more false 
information and making false alarm errors) or towards a more conservative 
criterion (with a risk of rejecting more true information and making miss 
errors). The decision to choose selected information from the range of 
information available can be described as the dynamic filter that is applied to 
the available knowledge. In signal detection models such as QASA (Edgar 
and Edgar, 2007), such filtering is described as “bias”. It represents the 
response tendency of the decision - maker to accept or reject available 
information, when uncertain as to its accuracy. 
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Figure 2.2.  Model of the relationship between SA and bias 
 
People with a conservative bias / scope have a tendency to trust a narrow 
range of available information, with the more conservative bias / scope the 
narrower the range of information they trust (tunnel vision), while those with 
more liberal or lax bias / scope, trust a wider / shallower scope of information, 
which could mean they look at the information only briefly (fleetingly) and to 
no great depth (butterfly effect). Bias / scope may apply to either externally 
available information (eg. tunnel vision may reflect a conservative bias / 
scope) or information in knowledge or memory. Bias / scope starts to explain 
errors in decision - making even when theoretically all the correct information 
is available and with hindsight in any review will be seen to be available.  
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As with all effective decision - making (Endsley, 1993) as previously 
discussed, incident ground decision - making does not simply mean 
collecting information about the incident and environment to build an 
understanding / representation of the situation (Catherwood et. al. 2010; 
Gasaway, 2008; Klein et. al. 2010; Omedei, McLennan and Elliott, 2005). 
This aspect of the decision - making might be described as the “filter” or “sift” 
that is applied to the knowledge available during perceptual and cognitive 
operations. In signal detection models such as QASA (Edgar and Edgar, 
2007), such filtering is described as bias. The bias acts as a filter and 
represents the response tendency of the individual decision maker to accept 
or reject information and whether information passes that filter will be 
influenced by the credibility of that information to the individual.  
 
Since any bias / scope of the decision maker can directly affect the selection 
or use of information for decision - making, it has to carry a potential for error 
with its associated risk and therefore a consequence to all on the incident 
ground. If the amount and quality of the information available to an individual 
remains the same, different bias / scope applied to that knowledge may lead 
to varying degrees of acceptance or rejection of the information available. 
Taking this into account a cautious or conservative bias / scope will permit 
use of only a narrow range of information, while a more liberal or lax bias / 
scope will allow use of a wider range of information that may be processed 
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more superficially (Edgar and Edgar, 2007). While neither approach is 
necessarily high risk if the selected information is both of use and 
appropriate, an inappropriately strict or conservative bias / scope can lead to 
a narrow focus that neglects key aspects of a situation (misses), while an 
inappropriately lax or liberal accepting bias / scope might allow incorrect or 
irrelevant information (false alarms) to be accepted and used for decision - 
making. Inappropriate information bias / scope thus carries potential risk for 
making errors and it is important to determine if there are individual 
differences in bias / scope dispositions and to consider the factors that may 
affect such tendencies.  
 
With known constraints on the brain systems, high perceptual load (the need 
to process a large quantity of perceptual features or information) may elicit a 
narrow bias / scope towards perceiving central features only, with peripheral 
information being overlooked (Forster and Lavie, 2009; Rees, Frith and 
Lavie, 1997). This could be of critical importance or especially critical in 
perceptually complex real world environments. Where constraints may occur 
in incident ground perception: for example, in a real life incident, the leader of 
a fire crew who was faced with processing many perceptual factors in a large 
wildland fire, may not have been able to process perceptual clues to changes 
in weather conditions, with fatal consequences to the crew members for 
decisions regarding the fire front and its movements (Useem, Cook and 
Sutton, 2005).   
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Other inherent constraints include those related to the cognitive workload on 
the attentional systems that determine the scope of information for selective 
or privileged processing by the brain (Posner, Rueda and Kanske, 2007) and 
working memory that dictate the selective focus for maintenance of that 
information in an active state (Baddeley, 2003; Cowan, 1998). While in some 
cases errors in incident ground command judgements and decisions have 
been linked to poor management of cognitive workloads (McLennan, Pavlou 
and Omedei, 2005). High cognitive load may involve a selective or narrow 
focus on some aspects of a situation, but at the cost of reducing cognitive 
resources for processing other information (Dretsch and Tipples, 2008; 
Franco-Watkins, Pashler and Rickard, 2010; Roberts, Hager and Heron, 
1994; Zanto and Gazzaley, 2009). Which means this high cognitive work 
load could lead to poor filtering of information, with some key information not 
selected for attentional and working memory focus. For example, in a study 
of fireground command (McLennan, Pavlou and Omedei, 2005), one 
overwhelmed participant reported "I haven’t taken in what the other officer 
has actually told me. He’s told me we’ve got a fire on the container ship... 
things are being told to me and I’m not taking it in...” (p.217). So high 
cognitive workload may lead to missing, or not accepting useful information, 
or alternately to unfiltered acceptance of false or irrelevant information, 
thereby promoting false alarms (DeFockert, Rees, Frith, and Lavie. 2001; 
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Lavie, Hirst, de Fockert and Viding, 2004; Schwartz, Vuillemier, Hutton and 
Maravita. 2005).    
 
Thus perceptual, attentional and working memory bias / scope may lead to 
misses and false alarm errors. Such bias / scope may in turn be driven by the 
priming of brain activity due to prior memory about a situation (Klein, 2008). 
Past experience can influence perception and cognition explicitly or implicitly 
(Kristjansson and Driver, 2008; Kŕol and El-Dredy, 2011; Schacter, Wig and 
Stevens, 2007; Shütz, Schendzielarz, Zwisterlood and Vorberg. 2007) and 
such influence is apparent in natural decision - making in the use of heuristic 
and “recognition-primed” decision - making processes (RPD) (Keller, Cokely, 
Katsikopoulos, and Wegwarth, 2010; Klein et. al. 2010).  RPD is evident in 
fireground decision - making, with prior experience and expertise influencing 
choices and decisions (Gasaway, 2008; Klein, 1997, 2008; Klein et. al. 
2010).  As in the example of a fireground commander who moved a crowd 
away from a burning building with a rooftop billboard, based on prior 
experience of a similar incident in which the billboard created a risk in 
relation to it falling from the building into the street (Klein et. al. 2010). 
Nevertheless, fireground simulation studies have also shown that while 
experts make more competent decisions, they may also have a narrower 
focus on selected features of a situation (Perry, Wiggins, Childs and Fogarty, 
2009) which could lead to misses and false alarms in decision - making.  
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As noted above in section 2.2, another key factor in decision - making bias / 
scope is motivational (Becker, Mortensen, Ackerman, Shapiro and Anderson, 
2011) or emotional state (Mosier and Fischer, 2010). Negative emotional 
arousal may narrow attentional focus (Derryberry and Tucker, 1994) so that 
only details considered central to an event are retained (Christianson and 
Loftus, 1991).  While positive arousal has been seen to promote less 
intensive filtering of information (Isen and Labroo, 2003) which could produce 
a more lax or superficial processing bias / scope. Even unconscious 
emotional cues (somatic markers) acquired during previous experiences 
(D’Amasio, 2000) can direct attention towards selected aspects of a situation 
and have an impact on the outcomes due to decisions made. This influence 
of emotional cues has been noted in many areas of natural decision - making 
including that of pilots or military commanders (Mosier and Fischer, 2010) 
and because of the decision - making process in these (stressful) types of 
situation may be relevant in fireground decision - making. For example, a fire 
fighter injured during a fire incident may experience either overt or 
unconscious anxiety when confronted by a similar situation in the future 
(Baumann, Gohm and Bonner, 2011), dictating a narrow bias / scope 
towards the features of the incident ground that caused harm, or were similar 
to events at the time on the previous occasion with the risk of overlooking 
other relevant features.  
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There may also be personality factors that can habitually dispose an incident 
commander towards either a narrowing of perception (tunnel vision) or a 
conservative approach in their selection of information or to a more lax or 
liberal approach, trusting or using a wider scope of information, but perhaps 
not processing it very deeply (butterfly syndrome) a liberal decision - making 
bias / scope. Personality traits have been linked to effective fireground 
command (Burke, 1997) and it may be that different patterns of bias / scope 
in fireground decision - making could be associated with particular traits. For 
example, risk taking or conversely risk adverse personality traits may 
respectively underlie relaxed or conservative bias / scope tendencies in 
some contexts (Li, Chao and Li, 2009).  
 
In sum, there is potential for bias / scope in fireground decision - making to 
arise from numerous sources of brain activity that influence the selective 
processing of information. Given the range of factors that could induce bias / 
scope in this way, individual differences or variations in bias / scope 
tendencies may well arise for the same situation. An understanding of such 
individual bias / scope patterns would seem critical for improving and training 
self awareness in regard to the selection of information and potential risk 
tendencies in incident ground decision - making. Many factors can influence 
the way information is selected in high pressure operational situations. 
Natural limits on the capacity of the human brain to process information (e.g. 
in working memory) (McLennan Pavlou and Omedie, 2005), motivational 
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factors and social influence may all be key factors. Experience may help, but 
does not necessarily eliminate the effects of such factors to remove bias / 
scope in decision - making. Experienced FRS commanders may rely on 
‘Recognition – Primed Decision Making’ (RPD) (Klein et. al. 2010) and may 
not proceed by making choices, considering alternatives or assessing 
probabilities. But rather by acting and reacting on the basis of prior 
experience, with two of the key features of the RPD model being a focus on 
the situational assessment and checking the action plan will work using 
mental simulation. Nevertheless experienced personnel may still be affected 
by bias / scope in their selection of information because they are at risk of 
overlooking aspects of the situation that don’t fit with previous experience or 
expectation (Perry et. al. 2009).  
 
These issues about how information is selected may be of prime importance 
in fireground decision - making and can explain some of the puzzling 
decisions / errors people make even when theoretically they have all the 
correct knowledge or information available to them. In tackling this the 
research will look to establish realistic exercises or training events and to 
replicate as closely as possible the pressures that are brought to bear on 
incident commanders.  Then within the exercise / assessment testing the 
incident commander’s SA by using probes during or immediately after the 
event to assess the individual’s knowledge regarding the situation as they 
see it. Correct judgments in relation to the probes are hits and correct 
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rejections, but errors are either misses or false alarms, with prior research 
(Edgar et. al. 2009) indicating that individuals tend towards either a) 
conservative decision bias / scope, or b) liberal bias/ scope.  
 
2.7 Understanding decision - making bias / scope: to improve training 
and inform individuals during training opportunities 
 
Recent research has examined how workers manage the unexpected events 
that are a feature of recognised high pressure occupations in general 
(Bechky and Okhuysen, 2011), with Branlat, Fern, Voshell, and Trent (2009) 
looking at firefighters specifically.  So training for these occupations aim to 
mitigate the effects of anxiety or reduce the anxiety to manageable levels, 
with research suggesting anxiety is often associated with acute stress, 
Bauman et. al. (2011).  Keinan and Friedland (1996) suggest that 
recommended training for personnel who work in highly stressful conditions 
is a phased approach, which can be compared to stress inoculation training 
(Meichenbaum, 1985).  Johnson, Cannon-Bowers and Salas (1998) and 
Saunders, Driskell, Johnson and Salas, (1996) have shown that such training 
reduces stress in a number of domains including some recognised high 
pressure occupations.  Burke, Salvador, Smith-Crowe, Chan-Serafin, Smith 
and Sonesh, (2011) also suggests that the highly engaging nature of 
stressful simulations may be particularly useful for domains in which on the 
job consequences of mistakes are severe.   
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To conclude, the current programme of research is ultimately concerned with 
improving safety in fireground operations through the development of 
assessing and training fireground SA (understanding of the immediate 
situation) and decision - making patterns. Past work (Catherwood et. al. 
2010; 2011; 2012; Sallis et. al. 2013; Useem et. al. 2005; Salmon, Stanton, 
Neville Walker and Jenkins, 2009; Brunacini 1985 and Gasaway 2009) has 
shown that under pressure, professional training and competence per se do 
not fully protect Fire and Rescue Service (FRS) personnel from the risk of 
losing SA and thus making errors. These errors may occur due to decision - 
making tendencies or bias / scope corresponding to either of two patterns: 
either tunneling down on aspects of the situation and overlooking others 
(Eriksen and Murphy’s ‘zoom lens’), or alternatively attempting to deal with 
too much information at once (Catherwood, et. al. 2010; Sallis, et. al. 2013). 
The former a conservative bias / scope pattern will cause miss errors 
whereby key information may not be processed, and the latter a liberal bias / 
scope pattern will cause false alarms where irrelevant or even incorrect 
information may be used to make decisions. Even with the highest levels of 
training and skill, individuals can still make such errors which are due to the 
natural limitations of the human brain under pressure (Yukl 1989).  The 
importance of SA has long been recognised (Endsley, 1988)(Endsley and 
Strater, 2000) in other areas, such as aerospace (e.g. Endsley, 1995; 
Endsley, Sollenberger, Nakata and Stein, 2000; Jeannot, Kelly and 
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Thompson, 2003; Taylor, 1990: Edgar and Edgar, 2007; Edgar, et. al. 2009) 
and medicine (e.g. Gaba, Howard, and Small, 1995), but has only recently 
been a focus for training in the FRS. Any means for training FRS personnel 
to appraise and monitor their own SA under pressure offers an important 
adjunct to the training of fire fighters and operational incident commanders. 
Such tendencies are addressed in training for many other situations ( Croft, 
Banbury, Aymeric, Dudfield, Lamers,  Roesssingh and, Lodge, 2000; Salas, 
Prince, Baker and Shrestha, 1995; Walker, Stanton,  Kazi, Salmon and 
Jenkins, 2009) where human decision - making is under pressure (e.g. 
aircraft, military, medical contexts, oil platforms, etc.) but have yet to be 
noticeably incorporated into the FRS. 
 
The main aim of the research reported in this thesis is to take the work 
identified within the ‘Naturalistic Decision Making’ model and to consider how 
‘Recognition-Primed Decision Making’ (Klein, 2003; Klein et. al. 2010) has 
the ability to influence decision - making and influence outcomes on the 
incident ground. The output of the research can then be used to consider 
how bias / scope by the individual can influence / impact on the decisions 
made by the incident commander and the subsequent outcome of the 
situation.  Variations in bias / scope across a number of individual incident 
commanders will also be examined as individual differences are likely to be 
important in any effort to train for improved SA.  Understanding of changes in 
bias / scope and the factors that drive them will allow the progression of this 
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work from a theoretical model into a training / assessment protocol that can 
help to identify how an individual’s bias / scope can be identified and used to 
improve the outcome of the decisions made by that individual.  There may be 
an opportunity then to use this research to help in the development of a tool 
that enables FRS personnel to engage in realistic simulations of fire service 
operations and receive feedback about their SA and type of decision bias / 
scope (whether they have a conservative bias / scope tunneling down or a 
liberal bias / scope broadening out) followed by guidance for improvement 
and self-monitoring of SA and bias / scope. This will provide the personnel 
with immediate insights into their own decision - making patterns and 
tendencies and provide the means by which to self-monitor these tendencies 
under pressure on the actual fireground. Hopefully this would allow greater 
understanding of how bias can affect their decision making and assist them 
to temper their conservative or liberal information bias and help in making 
ASA based decisions for a longer period. The broad objective would be to 
add value to their training by increasing their awareness of possible decision 
- making tendencies that could produce errors and increase risk to 
individuals, the environment or the wider society during their fireground 
operations.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Scoping Study 1: Assessing SA and bias / scope in a breathing 
apparatus and guideline exercise 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
As explained in the preceding chapters, as for all effective decision - making 
(Endsley, 1995; 2000), fireground decision - making does not simply involve 
accumulating information about the incident to build a good representation of 
the situation or to gain good situation awareness (SA) (Catherwood, Sallis, 
Edgar, Medley and Brooks, 2011; Gasaway, 2008; Klein, Calderwood and 
Clinton-Cirocco, 2010; Omedei, McLennan, Elliott, Wearing and Clancy, 
2005). It also requires the appropriate selection in relation to the range of 
information available from both the external environment and the internal 
knowledge base of the incident commander, who is the decision maker. The 
decision to choose selected information from the range of information 
available can be described as the dynamic filter that is applied to the 
available knowledge during perceptual and cognitive operations. In signal 
detection models such as QASA (Edgar and Edgar, 2007), such filtering is 
described as “bias”. It represents the response tendency of the decision 
maker to accept or reject available information, when uncertain as to its 
accuracy. An understanding of the decision - making bias / scope of fire and 
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rescue incident commanders and the factors affecting individual differences 
in bias / scope may prove invaluable in minimising risk in operational 
fireground decision - making. 
 
The bias / scope of the decision maker directly impacts on the selection of 
information for decision - making, it carries potential consequences for error 
or risk. Even if the body of available knowledge does not vary, different bias / 
scope may be applied to the breadth of that knowledge, leading to varying 
degrees of acceptance or rejection of the information collected and available. 
A cautious or conservative bias / scope permits use of only a narrow range of 
information, while  a more liberal or lax bias scope allows use of a wider 
range of information that may  be processed more superficially (Edgar and 
Edgar, 2007) (see Figure 3.1). Neither approach is necessarily risky if the 
captured or selected information is useful and appropriate, but an 
inappropriately strict or conservative bias scope could lead to a conservative 
narrow focus that neglects key aspects of operational information available 
(misses), while an inappropriately liberal or accepting bias / scope might 
allow incorrect or irrelevant information (false alarms) to be accepted and 
used for decision - making. Bias / scope can therefore carry potential risk for 
making errors in dynamic incident management decisions and it is important 
to determine if individual knowledge of this bias / scope profile could impact 
beneficially for the successful outcome of an incident (improved decision - 
making), as well as to consider the factors that may affect such tendencies. 
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Following evidence and discussion about bias / scope and how it affected the 
military (Edgar and Edgar, 2007; Edgar, Catherwood, Nikolla and Alford, 
2009), the question was raised regarding the fire and rescue service (FRS) 
and the similarity in their pressurised situation of incident command.  The 
uncertainty being whether bias /scope impacts on fire fighters in the same 
way and could it therefore impact on the outcomes for the incident, or were 
the two situations totally different.  Research in the USA on the ‘Naturalistic 
Decision Making’ (NDM) model (as discussed) identified that in an 
operational environment fireground commanders argued that they were not 
making choices, considering alternatives or assessing probabilities, but saw 
themselves as acting and reacting on the basis of prior experience gained 
from attending operational incidents and training exercises over time (Klein, 
Orasnu, Calderwood and Zsambok, 1993; Johnson, Cummings and Omodei, 
2009).  Two of the key features of the RPD model are being focused on the 
situational assessment and checking that the action plan will work using 
mental simulation.  With just these two key features, what are the other 
influences that impact and to what extent do they make a difference to the 
outcome of key decisions and how these key decisions change incident 
outcomes?  Past research, as mentioned previously, has shown that 
individuals differ in how much of the available information they use and trust 
in making decisions; referred to as the bias or scope of the individual. What 
is needed is to look at the way an individual applies bias / scope to the 
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situation when under a great deal of stress (not using a rational basis) and 
how will this influence their ability to arrive at a satisfactory outcome to the 
situation.  Even when individuals basically have the same knowledge of a 
situation, they may still vary in how, or how much of that information that they 
actually choose to use in making decisions.  Some people may trust or use 
only a narrow range or scope of available information, which could be seen 
as narrowing of perception (conservative or tunnel vision), while others may 
be more lax, trusting or using a wider scope of information (liberal or butterfly 
syndrome) (Catherwood et. al. 2011). It may be the same person could vary 
in the bias / scope that they use in different situations, or at different types of 
incident (experience), a situational bias / scope. Although there may be other 
contributing factors to such bias / scope tendencies including perceptual, 
attentional, working memory load, emotional and personality considerations 
(Becker, Mortensen, Ackerman, Shapiro and Anderson, et. al. 2011; 
DeFockert, Rees, Frith and Lavie, 2001;Endsley and Rodgers, 1997; Foster 
and Lavie, 2009; Klein, et. al. 2010; Lavie, Hirst, de Fockert and Viding, 
2004; McLennan, Pavlou and Omedei, 2005;  Mosier and Fischer, 2010; 
Schwartz, Vuillemier, Hutton and Maravita, 2005). 
 
The Incident Command System (ICS) within Fire and Rescue Manual 
Volume 2, Fire Service Operations, Incident Command 3RD Edition 2008, is 
the basic model for all United Kingdom based FRS.  It establishes the basic 
doctrine of the FRS in the context of operational incident management and 
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functional command and control processes that flow from it.  The key 
elements of effective incident command are represented in 3 areas; 
 Organisation of the incident ground; providing a recognised pattern for 
the incident ground for resource organisation. 
 Incident Risk Management; hazard identification and applications of a 
safe system of work for undertaking the operation. 
 Command Competence; skills, knowledge and understanding 
identified as required by the incident command and seen as the 
competencies to be maintained. 
Based on this the aim of the first study was to try and identify if bias / scope 
came into the equation in relation to SA and fire fighter reaction to pressure 
at a realistic training incident.  The broad aims of the study were to gain an 
understanding of fireground SA and decision - making in relation to how bias 
/ scope influences these decisions and to identify further studies on how / if it 
could contribute to training guidelines for self awareness of how information 
is scoped personally in fireground situations.  If the basis of good command 
training is based on continuation training and experience, then to assist this 
an understanding of any personal bias / scope and how personal bias / 
scope can / will impact on making and implementing operational decision 
would be of benefit to the incident commander. 
 
The specific prediction / hypothesis is that: FRS personnel will display either 
conservative or liberal decision - making bias / scope (or related miss or false 
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alarm errors, respectively) during FRS training exercises involving 
simulations of fireground incidents. 
 
3.2 Methodology  
This first study involved a realistic simulation of a commercial fire incident 
which involved 16 competent operational FRS fire fighters wearing full fire 
fighting personal protective equipment (PPE) and breathing apparatus (BA) 
in a cosmetic smoke filled darkened building in a search and rescue 
(casualty recovery) exercise. This scenario was used following a visit to the 
Avon South West Command centre run by Avon Fire and Rescue Service 
(AFRS), where operational FRS personnel were observed undertaking both 
Minerva and Hydra exercises (Minerva is a simulation system developed 
alongside its partner system Hydra, to operate critical incident simulation 
from a small incident to a major incident, with the opportunity to use a fire 
scenario or to build these into different scenario’s such as plane and train 
crashes).  The training centre provides the incident commander scenes of 
the incident from different perspectives, or view of the incident, each 
perspective is established within a different room to simulate the build up for 
the incident commander as the incident is approached and developing the 
incident in real time (based on the decisions that are made by the incident 
commander) during the training exercises.  The staff participating were using 
real life scenarios and were being assessed during the exercise by the South 
West Command Centre staff and senior operational staff from the relevant 
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FRS.  Following this observation, there was further discussion (with both the 
centre and university staff) from which the initial exercise to be used with the 
firefighters and managers  from Gloucestershire Fire and Rescue Service 
(GFRS) and the theoretical and methodological basis for this study were 
developed.   
 
3.2.1. Sample / participants 
Sixteen operational fire fighters and managers from community fire stations 
in Gloucestershire were programmed to respond to a central point and 
undertake a BA search and rescue exercise and all 16 agreed to participate 
in the study.  The 16 fire fighters and managers were broken down into 6 
teams, 2 teams of 2 and 4 teams with 3 personnel in each of them.  All the 
participants for the exercise were fully competent operational FRS personnel 
ranging in experience from 5 years to 27 years, 14 being male and 2 female 
and 4 being full time and 12 part time (retained) fire fighters from 
Gloucestershire FRS operational stations. The only selection criterion used 
was that they were operational FRS managers or fire fighters and informed 
consent was gained from each individual before they were to be involved, all 
participants were able to withdraw their consent should they need to. 
 
3.2.2 Context and procedure  
The exercise was undertaken in the evening during the allocated training 
period (start of the exercise approximately 19.30) and both the exercise set 
Page | 106 
 
up and scenario was a new exercise to the fire fighters and managers who 
were taking part in it. It was undertaken within a whole time fire station 
training building which was built for training purposes, the training building 
had a flexible interior, which allowed for walls, stair cases and floor levels to 
be moved around or adjusted in other ways to change the premises to meet 
the needs of the exercise and to ensure participating staff did not get familiar 
with the building layout.  The training building also allowed both heat and 
cosmetic smoke to create a realistic environment to the exercise by 
restricting vision and working in hot and humid conditions (replicating a fire 
environment). The exercise scenario was described as a fire with ‘persons 
reported’ (people reported as missing or not accounted for within the 
premise), with the building being set up to resemble an old garage / sales 
room, approximately 10 x 25 meters and sub divided.  The fire fighters were 
informed they would need to use guidelines (a fixed 60m line for fire fighters 
to search off so they maintained a point of reference when searching a 
building with reduced visibility and would not get lost due to the lack of clear 
vision), to locate the casualties (which are mannequins used to replicate 
persons reported missing and trapped within the building from information 
received at the scene) reported within the premises.  Following the initial 
briefing the crews then dressed in their fire fighting PPE and rigged in their 
BA sets.  Once each fire fighter was established into their team (6 teams of 2 
/ 3 fire fighters), as a team they then prepared to enter the building by putting 
on the face mask of the BA set and turning on the compressed air cylinder 
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(going gas tight) isolating themselves from the external environment and 
providing themselves a secure uncontaminated air supply.  They undertook 
the necessary visual checks with a designated colleague to ensure they had 
not overlooked any of the safety dressing procedures in line with the 
operational policy.   Once each team leader (five male and one female) was 
satisfied that each of their team members was fully kitted and gas tight, they 
handed in their individual recognition tallies (a hard copy tally showing the 
fire fighters name and at what pressure their cylinder held at the time they 
had entered the building) to the BA entry control officer.  The entry control 
officer placed the tallies in the BA entry control board, along with the time of 
entry (actual time shown on a digital clock on the BA entry control board), the 
pressure within the individuals cylinder (taken of the cylinder pressure gauge 
which would show how long the air supply within the cylinder would last 
under normal conditions) and undertook a calculation based on time and 
pressure to identify how much time their identified air supply for each 
individual would allow them to operate within the building and at what time 
they would need reliefs or to be out of the building.  The entry control officer 
then briefed the crew on what the objectives of the exercise were and what 
they were to do once they had entered the building (area to search and 
where to start from) to help meet these objectives.  Once the team leader 
had received the OK to proceed from the entry control officer each individual 
in the team  attached themselves to the guideline (used within a building with 
poor visibility; smoke logged) using their personal lines (which is a short 6 
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meter line attached to the belt of the BA set and the BA guide line so the 
individual does not wander off and get lost, or fall down a hole in the building 
floor) and entered the building to begin the exercise, fight the fire and search 
to locate casualties and remove them to a safe environment.   
 
The exercise lasted a total of 70 minutes, from being briefed on the 
requirements of the situation and their role in it at the entrance to the training 
building, undertaking the search of the premises in BA, working off the guide 
line and then servicing their BA equipment on exiting the building so they 
were ready to respond to a real emergency call should they need to. 
Immediately after the BA exercise, (exiting the building and removing their 
BA face masks) individuals were asked to respond to a set of true / false 
probe statements about both briefed and non briefed aspects of the exercise 
(Table 3.1 below). An example of the briefed item was: “You were briefed to 
search off branch line 2: true / false”, while an example of a non briefed items 
was: “There were two branch lines in the building: true / false”. All the 
operational fire fighters and managers taking part in the exercise were asked 
as individuals to participate within the study and all signed University consent 
forms in relation to the role they would be taking. Each individual fire fighter, 
from the 6 teams, was asked 19 questions (10 false and 9 true; 1 question 
was withdrawn as it could not be confirmed that all participants had entered 
that part of the building in relation to the proposed question) after completing 
the exercise, each sheet was collected in and was secured until they could 
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be assessed, before the fire fighters were dismissed to clean and service 
their BA sets.  
  
The premise was divided as would be expected for a property used to house 
this type of business, with no lighting internally (incoming electricity services 
isolated) and heavily smoke logged (using cosmetic smoke to simulate a fire 
and reduce vision as would be the case in a real incident).  The BA entry 
control officer gave the individual teams a full briefing (on the incident related 
information available at that time and the aims and objectives for the team) 
before committing them to the premise.  Training officers undertaking the role 
of both health and safety staff and procedural observer (using thermal 
imaging cameras so they could monitor participants within the building) had 
been assigned roles and areas of risk within the building to monitor and 
ensure safe passage could be made by the fire fighters in the training 
exercise.  The 16 fire fighters as discussed were committed in teams of 2 or 
3, forming a total of 6 teams; and each team was provided with the same 
brief prior to being committed to the exercise. In summary the brief was to 
work in BA off the guide line to undertake search and rescue, ensuring that 
they dealt with any situation (finding casualties, or the fire to extinguish) as 
they progressed. Following the end of the exercise and collection of the 
probe sheets all participants were called together to undertake a 20 minute 
debrief of the exercise, to review its aims and objectives and to share any 
comments (both positive and negative) they had regarding the exercise that 
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could be of benefit to themselves or to the other fire fighters taking part in the 
exercise at a later date.  
 
3.2.3 Test materials 
Prior to the exercise, the exercise scenario was reviewed and probe 
questions were designed with guidance from subject matter experts and 
senior experienced FRS staff, they consisted of the following material. A full 
scenario planning document was provided and reviewed, there were 
originally 20 probe statements in total identified from the scenario and each 
required a true / false response (10 true and 10 false items in randomised 
order with respect to being true or false). For example, “There were 2 branch 
lines in the building: true / false” or “You were briefed that there was a child 
casualty:  true / false”. As a pilot trial, the researchers attended the first 
exercise of this type and watched from a remote location, so they could 
review the probe sheets and ensure a direct correlation between what had 
occurred during the exercise and the questions that were posed within the 
probes, (Table 3.1). The probes, their use and the aims and objectives of the 
study were shared and discussed with the Fire and Rescue training staff who 
had set up the exercise and written the brief for it, and their comments and 
observations helped to make up the final probes. The probes for the 
individuals to respond to were tested at the first exercise of this type, as this 
was for a series of exercises to test BA procedures for a number of 
operational stations and competent fire fighters and managers.  This series 
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of exercises were designed to run over a number of weeks and included a 
number of operational stations and groups of fire fighters, the one at which 
our probes were initially tested or trialed, being held two weeks prior to the 
actual exercise used for this study.  This ensured that the probes were a 
valid measure of the information provided to the participants of the exercise.  
It meant that the probes were also relevant to the exercise and the 
operational aims and objectives of the exercise for the FRS, which ensured 
they were relevant to the tasks for the fire fighters and managers exposed to 
them. Immediately following the exercise, after the fire fighters had left the 
training building, the true / false probe questions were presented to each 
individual in a written response sheet format.  As explained above, the 
questions were aimed at finding out how much of the briefing and exercise 
information was retained (SA) and how narrowly or widely the personnel had 
scoped (taken in and accepted information from) the exercise situation (bias / 
scope).  Because of the needs of the FRS exercise co-ordinators there was a 
slightly different brief for some of the teams.  Teams two and five were 
briefed to search of branch line 2, where there was one cupboard on the 
route (which meant that question one ‘You were briefed to search off branch 
line 2’ was true and question 15 ‘There were two cupboards on your route’ 
was false.  Teams one, three, four and six were briefed to search of branch 
line 1, where there were two cupboards on the route, making question 1 false 
and question 15 true.  
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QUESTION T/F 
You were briefed to search off branch line 2 T(2,5) F(1,3,4,6) 
You were advised in the brief to conduct gauge checks T 
You were briefed that there were 2 casualties F 
There was a gas cylinder outside the building T 
You were briefed to conduct a R/H search pattern F 
There were two branch lines in the building T 
The first branch line was ~12m into the building F 
There were two staircases in the building T 
There was another team in the building at the same time as you T 
You were briefed that there was a child casualty F 
You were shown floor plans for the entire building F 
There are four appliances present T 
There was an emergency team on the BA board as you entered F 
There was a 45 gallon oil drum on your route F 
There were two cupboards on your route T(1,3,4,6) F(2,5) 
There was at least one bed on your route T 
You were using radio channel 2 F 
You crossed the main guideline 3 times F 
All teams were teams of 3 F 
 
Table 3.1. Probes identified following review of the exercise scenario and 
agreed with supervisory university staff, these were statements taken from 
the scenario to provide straight forward true / false responses to the 
participants. 
 
The questions in blue related to the information provided by the BA entry 
control officer's briefing directly to the crews, this was in line with FRS 
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procedure and undertaken prior to the crews being committed to the 
premises.  The other probes were taken from what was happening within the 
premises as it was set up for the exercise, partly about the structure, partly 
about what they could be expected to find and partly about the process / 
procedure they were undertaking and expected to follow. 
 
 3.2.4 QASA 
The responses were analysed by a “signal detection” type method using 
Quantitative Assessment of Situation Awareness (QASA) (Edgar et. al. 
2009). The QASA technique requires true / false decisions about statements 
concerning a situation that are either true or false. The approach is based on 
signal detection theory (Edgar and Edgar, 2007; Stanislaw and Todorov, 
1999) and provides a measure of a.) knowledge or SA (how well the 
individual discriminates true from false information) and b.) the bias applied 
by the decision maker to the available information (i.e. the tendency to 
accept or reject information as true). The technique gives two scores (scaled 
from -100 to +100 in each case): 
i.) Knowledge (or situation awareness, SA) (100 being good, 0 being 
poor and -100 being misguided SA) and   
ii.) Bias on a scale from very liberal (-100) to very conservative (+100), 
with 0 showing no bias either way.  Liberal bias towards accepting 
and using a broader band of information (broader scope) is reflected 
in more “false alarm” errors, saying that an item was true when it was 
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false and so showing weak or superficial processing of the situation / 
information. Conservative bias is cognitive and perceptual tunneling 
on a narrow band of information (narrow scope) and is reflected in 
more “miss” errors, saying that an item was false when it was in fact 
true, due to narrowed focus on a selective portion of the available 
information at the expense of the rest.  
The way an individual applies bias / scope to the situation can influence the 
ability to arrive at a satisfactory outcome to the situation with “miss” errors 
associated with conservative bias / scope or tunneling and “false alarms” 
with liberal bias / scope or broadening that may produce a “butterfly 
syndrome” (hopping from one aspect of information to the next) in which 
irrelevant information attracts as much attention as important information. 
See Table 3.2 for details and Appendix 1 for the computational details. 
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Score Knowledge/ Situation 
Awareness (SA) Index 
Bias Index 
Positive (max 
+100) 
Good SA.  Distinguishes true 
information from false: higher 
score is better. 
‘Strict’ conservative bias. 
Tends to reject information 
as false even if true:   higher 
the score the greater this 
tendency. Risk of making 
“miss” errors due to high 
rejection of information even 
if actually true. 
Zero No SA – guessing? No bias towards accepting or 
rejecting information.  A 
‘neutral’ attitude. 
Negative (max -
100) 
Misguided. Judges false 
information as true and vice 
versa.  More negative is 
worse. 
‘Lax’ liberal bias.  Tends to 
accept information as true 
even if false: the more 
negative the score the 
greater this tendency. Risk of 
making “false alarm” errors 
due to over-acceptance of 
information as true. 
 
Table 3.2. Patterns of knowledge/SA and bias using the QASA measures. 
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The SA or knowledge score is conceptually similar to that provided by other 
established measures of SA, such as the Situation Awareness Global 
Assessment Technique (SAGAT)(Endsley, 1987).  The bias measure in 
QASA however gives further insights into the critical question of how 
knowledge or information may be selected or filtered for decision making and 
whether this is being achieved in a strict and conservative way or alternately, 
a more lax or liberal manner. Moreover, QASA is uniquely suited for studying 
real world decision - making since it allows, and is able to measure, the state 
of an individual where true information may actually have a weaker 
representation than false. Thus QASA may be especially suited to studying 
the decision - making of individuals who are fundamentally misguided about 
a situation and hence at great risk of making errors.  It has been used in a 
range of applications to date including simulated military contexts (Edgar, 
Catherwood, Nikolla, Alford, et. al. 2010; Edgar, Catherwood, Alford, Nikolla, 
Edgar and Brookes, 2011; Rousseau, Tremblay, Banbury, Breton and 
Guitouni, 2010). For these reasons, QASA is used in the present studies to 
assess knowledge and bias / scope patterns of FRS personnel during 
simulated fireground exercises. It is predicted that individual differences in 
bias / scope tendencies will be apparent for the same situation and that such 
tendencies will be independent of the level of knowledge or SA of the 
individual. In other words, even amongst those with the same SA there may 
be different bias / scope, so that when errors are made, some people may 
tend towards making miss errors and some towards false alarm errors. 
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3.2.5 Ethical issues 
These studies were conducted in compliance with the ethical guidelines laid 
down by the British Psychological Society and ethical approval was obtained 
through the recognised procedures within the University of Gloucestershire.  
The studies took place at FRS establishments or within training situations at 
the time of routine training / assessment exercise sessions, although 
participation in these research studies was fully voluntary indicated by signed 
consent after a preliminary briefing. Participants were fully advised that there 
were no requirements to participate in the research project. No staff member 
elected not to be involved in this study and the results were anonymised for 
the purposes of general analysis and for reporting in any public manner. A 
general debrief and anonymised feedback on the data obtained was 
subsequently provided to the crews involved by visiting the operational 
stations that took part on their training nights (feedback brief appendix 2). 
 
3.3 Results 
 
As explained above (3.2.4), the responses were analysed by the method 
called QASA, this method takes into account not only the percentage of 
correct answers (the knowledge or situation awareness score) but also the 
individuals tendency to say true or false; that is their bias / scope to the 
information.  As noted above, an individual saying true to everything is 
showing a very liberal, lax or accepting bias / scope to the information 
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available to them, while a person saying false to everything is showing a very 
conservative, strict or rejecting bias / scope.  
 
The QASA analysis requires the data from all the probes, whereas the 
briefed / non briefed probes can be considered using % correct.  
QUESTION T/F % correct 
You were briefed to search off branch line 2 T(2,5) F(1,3,4,6) 93.75 
You were advised in the brief to conduct gauge checks T 100 
You were briefed that there were 2 casualties F 100 
There was a gas cylinder outside the building T 25 
You were briefed to conduct a R/H search pattern F 93.75 
There were two branch lines in the building T 68.75 
The first branch line was ~12m into the building F 37.5 
There were two staircases in the building T 87.5 
There was another team in the building at the same time as you T 100 
You were briefed that there was a child casualty F 100 
You were shown floor plans for the entire building F 43.75 
There are four appliances present T 62.5 
There was an emergency team on the BA board as you entered F 75 
There was a 45 gallon oil drum on your route F 93.75 
There were two cupboards on your route T(1,3,4,6) F(2,5) 50 
There was at least one bed on your route T 56.25 
You were using radio channel 2 F 93.75 
You crossed the main guideline 3 times F 75 
All teams were teams of 3 F 68.75 
Table 3.3. Identified probes with % scores shown for correct responses.   
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Overall the analysis shows that knowledge of the situation was good (SA), 
although predictably it was better for briefed items (mean: 88.6% correct) 
than non-briefed items (mean: 68.8% correct, with the ‘chance’ % correct if 
they just guessed being 50%) and the first probe of a non briefed item 
(“There was a gas cylinder outside the building”) showed the lowest score of 
all (mean: 25% correct).  This item produced a common theme from the fire 
fighters in their response to this question being asked, they said ‘if I had seen 
there was a gas cylinder by the entrance door I would not have entered; so it 
could not have been there’.  
 
Of most interest for the aims of this investigation however is that the results 
also show that two individuals can appear to have similar knowledge (SA), 
but in fact still have very different bias / scope in regard to that knowledge. 
The analysis shows different bias / scope patterns: with 7 people showing a 
liberal bias / scope pattern and scoping more broadly and accepting more 
information than others, while 9 people showed their bias / scope to be on 
the restricted side, with a slightly narrow focus, reflecting a  conservative bias 
/ scope.  It is also of interest to note the individual differences in each of 
these patterns with some people having stronger bias / scope than others. It 
is very clear however that similar SA may yet be associated with different 
bias / scope tendencies.  
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As an example two individuals scored especially well on the SA / knowledge 
tests:  Person A obtaining 88% correct and with Person B getting 91% 
correct, but their bias scores tell a very different story. Their results are 
shown in Figure 3.1: there are two scores shown for each person: a 
knowledge score in blue (from +100 or 100% correct ranging down to -100 or 
100% wrong) and a bias score in red (also from +100 being very strict to -
100 being very lax).  
 
Figure 3.1. Examples of results from BA guideline exercise showing two 
people with apparently similar good knowledge scores, but very different 
bias: Person A having a conservative, narrower or stricter bias/ scope and 
Person B a liberal, lax or accepting bias / scope.  
 
Person A tends to have a somewhat strict conservative bias / scope, while 
Person B shows a loose or liberal bias / scope, saying true not only to the 
correct items but indeed to many of the false or wrong items. This shows that 
these two individual fire fighters were applying very different filters, or bias / 
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scope, to the information: Person A was using a narrow scope, being more 
cautious or conservative in accepting something as true, while Person B was 
being much less cautious, using a much more liberal filter. Below (figure 3.2) 
is the full outcome of the varying knowledge scores and the bias shown 
across the range of the 16 individual fire fighters taking part in the exercise. 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Examples of results from BA guideline exercise showing the 
different paten of knowledge scores and bias for the individuals in each of the 
6 teams. 
 
As an example of the potentially serious implications of such bias / scope 
patterns, a conservative, narrow bias / scope could explain why the gas 
cylinder was missed for example. The majority of fire fighters did not identify 
the gas cylinder even though they had to walk passed it whilst undertaking 
the exercise, which was a miss error. Given the gas cylinder was right next to 
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the entrance door of the building which was supposed to be involved with fire 
right at the start of the exercise, could have meant the cylinder had been or 
would have been subjected to heat or damage.  Following the crews getting 
gas tight in BA and being briefed by the BA entry control officer (most fire 
fighters would feel under stress at this period of an unknown exercise while 
under observation), it was possibly due to the individuals tunnelling down to 
the objectives of the exercise from a conservative bias / scope.  
 
3.4 Discussion 
 
Overall the analysis shows that SA was good, although predictably it was 
better for briefed items (average of 88.6% correct) than non-briefed items 
(average 68.8% correct). The retention of the briefing information given by 
the BA entry control officer to the crews before being committed to the 
premise appears good. The results also show however that two individuals 
can appear to have similar SA, but in fact still have very different bias / scope 
in regard to that knowledge. The analysis identified these different bias / 
scope patterns, with the majority having a slightly narrow focus, reflecting a 
conservative bias / scope, but the others showing a more liberal bias / scope 
tendency and also with clear individual differences in the extent of any such 
bias / scope. Overall then, the pattern of results support the hypothesis for 
the study that FRS personnel will display either conservative or liberal 
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decision - making bias / scope (or related errors) during FRS training 
exercises involving simulations of fireground incidents. 
 
 The data analysed by the QASA tool thus clearly confirmed that most 
individuals displayed a high level of knowledge, but also showed either a 
conservative bias / scope (with miss errors) or a liberal bias / scope (with 
false alarm errors). In other words, although very few errors were made in 
SA or knowledge, when they were made, they tended to be either miss 
errors reflecting a conservative narrow bias / scope or alternately false 
alarm errors reflecting liberal accepting bias / scope. This has clear 
implications for fireground decision - making and training. 
 
Each bias / scope type (lax or strict) can have implications for training with 
different pitfalls: too conservative, narrow or strict a bias / scope means you 
can reject information that is useful and true, making a miss call / error; while 
too liberal, lax bias / scope can mean you are using wrong or useless 
information; a false alarm.  As an example, a sudden increase in risk level on 
the emergency incident ground situation could mean that Person B who was 
showing a liberal, lax or accepting bias / scope (Figure 3.2.) above may 
become much stricter in their bias / scope, with a narrowing bias / scope that 
will hone in on the items they feel are correct only and not look to utilize the 
wider information available. While it could also mean that the bias / scope of 
Person A who was showing a conservative, narrower or stricter bias/ scope 
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could become much stricter too, with an extremely narrow bias / scope that 
misses or overlooks correct information outside the immediate area of their 
incident focus. There may be no simple answer about the best level of bias / 
scope used, as it will always depend on the demands of the emergency 
situation to a large extent. However it would appear that it could be beneficial 
to have some means to check on individual level of bias or scope and this 
will be explored within the further research, when it is proposed to look at the 
bias / scope of fire fighters over a wider number of operational stations and 
increased numbers of operational staff.   
 
The particular interest of this research was how the incident ground 
information was scoped in terms of information bias that is whether 
individuals worked from either a liberal, broad or conservative, narrow span 
of available information (a liberal or conservative bias /scope, respectively).  
In other words, the aim was to determine whether they “trusted” a wide scope 
of information, but perhaps did not process it very deeply (the “butterfly 
syndrome”) or whether they focused down on a small part of the available 
information, reflected in a narrowing of perception (tunnel vision) and 
cognition, in a conservative approach to their selection of information. This 
bias / scope can have an external or internal aspect; in an external sense it 
can affect the visual inspection of the incident ground (scanning widely to 
narrowly), or in an internal sense, it can affect the mental impression that is 
formed about the situation (thinking about the wider implications for the 
Page | 125 
 
situation or only narrowing down on a few aspects). The two are closely 
linked: for example, a narrow internal bias / scope may mean that there is 
incomplete visual scanning of the situation and vice versa, a wider external 
bias / scope pattern may produce an incomplete detailed impression of the 
situation. This type of bias / scope may have (or have already impacted on) 
important consequences for decisions and errors made in actual incident 
ground situations (Catherwood, et. al. 2011; Catherwood, Sallis, Edgar and 
Medley, 2012). 
 
The ultimate aim of the project is to improve understanding of the processes 
underlying operational command and control decision - making on the 
incident ground and to see if it is possible to develop training self awareness 
of the bias / scope of information in actual incident ground situations. The 
main aim of this experiment was to determine whether the bias / scope 
patterns would be apparent in a realistic and challenging training exercise 
(putting fire fighters and managers into to an unknown building, in full fire 
fighting PPE and BA while being assessed). This was clearly the case and 
the participants showed either a conservative (positive) bias / scope pattern 
or a more liberal (negative) bias / scope pattern.   
 
The question for further research is how does the individual scope and is it 
consistent in the way they undertake it.  Is the bias / scope they show a 
resting bias / scope (one they repeat each time; one that they will invariably 
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reveal or fall back on when under pressure) or is their bias / scope a 
situational one, that will vary each time being dependent on the situation they 
find themselves in when responding to an emergency call, or may even be 
influenced by their activities prior to responding to the incident / exercise (e.g. 
rebuilding a small clock motor, or involved in a blue sky exercise).  
 
For the next study the questions of interest are whether there any such bias / 
scope error patterns and will they be consistent for individuals over situations 
/ scenarios.  Will experienced FRS personnel be less prone to displaying 
such bias / scope error patterns and will any such bias / scope patterns be 
reduced or moderated by providing detailed personal feedback on bias / 
scope and error tendencies to individuals following training exercises (i.e. 
individuals can use understanding about their own bias to reduce errors in 
decision - making). 
 
3.5 Conclusions 
 
The BA exercise in this experiment shows evidence of positive, conservative 
or negative, liberal bias / scope patterns in the FRS participants. There may 
be many contributing factors to such bias / scope patterns including 
perceptual, attentional, working memory load, emotional and personality 
considerations (Becker, et. al. 2011; De Fockert, et. al. 2001;Endsley and 
Rodgers, 1997; Foster and Lavie, 2009; Klein et. al. 2010; Lavie, et. al. 2004; 
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McLennan, et. al. 2005; Mosier and Fischer, 2010; Schwartz et. al. 2005). 
The role of such factors is not able to be determined from this experiment, 
but nonetheless the finding of bias / scope patterns in fire fighters is an 
important one that may have implications for understanding errors in incident 
ground decision - making. Future development of this research will explore 
bias / scope tendencies in further incident related decision - making and 
these should confirm or not, the tendencies that have been identified from 
the fire fighters who have taken part in this exercise session.  The further 
work will also attempt to ascertain whether any bias / scope tendencies are 
consistent for individuals across different incident ground situations and 
contexts, a situational bias / scope. Or if the bias / scope tendencies shown 
are consistent for the individual, regardless of the situation, a resting bias / 
scope that will be the way they operate at times across all incidents.  
 
These current findings confirm the methodological approach used as a 
valuable means for developing these future studies. The technique has 
clearly shown that there are response bias / scope tendencies in the decision 
- making of FRS professionals leading to either miss or false alarm errors. 
Further investigation of bias / scope patterns would thus seem critical to 
developing understanding of factors that could lead to increased risk in real 
incident ground decision - making for FRS operational fire fighters and 
managers. As we have discussed effective decision - making is dependent 
on good SA, which is an awareness of what is happening around the 
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individual, in order to understand how information and individual actions 
impact outcomes, both short and medium term.  A good feel for situations 
and events that happen due to variables the incident commander can control, 
with SA especially important where the information flow is high and varied 
and poor decision - making can and does lead to serious consequences.  
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Chapter 4 
 Table top exercises; house fire and factory fire: does bias / scope 
influence the operational outcome of pressurised fire incident 
decisions?  
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Effective decision - making is dependent on accurate situation awareness 
(SA).  SA involves being aware of what is happening around you, in order to 
understand how information and actions will impact objectives. With SA 
especially important in work domains where the information flow can be high 
and poor decisions may lead to serious consequences or understanding of 
what is happening in the situation (Endsley, 2000).  Bias / scope can tend 
either to conservative, tunneling on a narrow band of information or 
alternately liberal, towards a broader scope.  The way an individual applies 
bias / scope to the situation can influence the ability to arrive at a satisfactory 
outcome to the situation with miss errors associated with conservative 
tunneling and false alarms with liberal broadening.  
 
The main aim of this study was to further assess SA and bias / scope in 
respect to fireground operations. In this study this was achieved by means of 
a tabletop exercise involving a presentation of a fire incident with information 
provided to the participant via text, photographic and video material (details 
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below). Probe questions about key aspects of the incident information were 
interleaved at key points to assess the individual’s SA and bias / scope using 
quantitative assessment of situation awareness (QASA) scores as for the 
first exercise.  Again the aim was to firstly assess levels of SA, but against 
this to also determine if individuals vary in bias / scope, with some exhibiting 
conservative, narrow bias / scope (accepting only a narrow range of 
information as true and being in a position to make miss errors) and others a 
more liberal bias / scope (accepting a wider range of information as true and 
being more disposed to making false alarms). These aims were explored 
within these tabletop studies with it also being of interest to determine the 
effects of experience on these aspects of performance. It is also possible that 
personality factors habitually dispose someone towards either a conservative 
or liberal decision making bias / scope, but these were not tested in this 
series of exercises. Personality traits have been linked to effective fireground 
command (Burke, 1997) and it may be that different patterns of bias / scope 
in fireground decision - making could be associated with particular traits. For 
example, risk taking or conversely risk adverse personality traits may 
respectively underlie (liberal) relaxed or conservative bias / scope tendencies 
in some contexts (Li, Chao and Li, 2009). In sum, there is potential for bias / 
scope in fireground decision - making to arise from numerous sources of 
brain activity that influence the selective processing of information. Given the 
range of factors that could induce bias / scope in this way, individual 
differences or variations in bias / scope patterns may well arise for the same 
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situation. An understanding of such individual bias scope patterns would 
seem critical for improving and training self awareness in regard to the 
selection of information and potential risk tendencies in fireground decision - 
making.  
 
One of the initial aims of the project was to develop a technique that would in 
the first instance determine whether response bias / scope patterns are 
apparent for fire and rescue service (FRS) personnel in fireground simulation 
exercises and whether there are individual differences in bias / scope. The 
basic paradigm for this research has been developed in previous studies of 
SA and decision - making and involves the use of the QASA method (Edgar 
and Edgar, 2007; Edgar, Catherwood, Alford, Nikolla, Edgar and Brookes, 
2011; Edgar, Catherwood, Nikolla, Alford, et. al. 2010). 
 
The predictions or hypotheses are:  
i) FRS personnel will display either conservative or liberal decision - making 
bias / scope (with related miss or false alarm errors respectively) during FRS 
training exercises involving simulations of fireground incidents. 
ii) any such bias / scope error patterns will be consistent for individuals over 
situations / scenarios. 
iii) experienced FRS personnel will be less prone to displaying such bias / 
scope errors. 
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iv) any such bias / scope will be reduced or moderated by providing detailed 
personal feedback on bias / scope and error tendencies to individuals 
following training exercises ( i.e. individuals can use understanding about 
their own bias / scope to reduce errors in decision - making). 
 
4.2 Domestic (house) fire table top exercises 
 
4.2.1. Introduction.  
As noted above, the main aim of this study was to determine if there were 
individual differences in bias / scope patterns for operational FRS personnel 
and if these patterns were consistent across two different table top fireground 
based exercises and if they differed with fire fighting experience.  
 
4.2.2. Method 
Design 
The material for this exercise was based on a fire in a domestic property 
(house), with persons reported as missing (individuals believed to be still in 
the premises).  The exercise was chosen to represent a familiar type of 
incident based on the station ground for the fire fighters taking part, a 
relatively straight forward house fire that the FRS would respond to, to test if 
bias / scope was evident.   
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All participants were operational fire fighters (or operational commanders 
who would respond to incidents on the fire engine) and all were provided with 
the same stimulus presentation, with both SA and bias scores being obtained 
in regard to the presented information, via the QASA method described 
above and below. Three groups of participants were tested on the domestic 
fire exercise: a) full time fire fighters and operational managers, b) part time 
(retained) fire fighters and operational managers and c) a student sample. 
The inclusion of the student sample into the experiment was to obtain 
validation of the professional relevance of the task for FRS decision - 
making: if FRS participants showed better SA than the students, this would 
confirm the validity of the task as a test of SA relevant to FRS professionals.  
 
Sample 
The FRS participants  were all operational fire fighting personnel from a 
number of fire stations including larger urban and smaller county localities, 
with 30 full time fire fighters (mean age: 39 years and mean years of 
experience 13.8 years) and 20 retained (part time) fire fighters (mean age: 
43.5 years and mean years of experience 14.4 years). There were seven 
people in operational managerial roles (crew and watch manager) amongst 
the full time group and four in operational managerial roles amongst the 
retained group. All FRS participants gave informed written consent for taking 
part in the experiment and their individual responses were collected 
anonymously. The student sample taking part in the first exercise was 
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comprised of 30 local university students (mean age 25.9 years) randomly 
selected from psychology classes within the university, the students were 
also individually tested and each gave informed written consent for taking 
part in the experiment and their individual responses were collected 
anonymously.  
 
Materials and procedure 
The table top exercise was presented as a power point presentation, built up 
to reflect a fire in a domestic house where a person was reported missing (an 
individual was not accounted for and believed to still be in the house where 
the incident occurred) with the probe questions being designed with guidance 
from senior operationally experienced FRS staff.  The material in the power 
point presentation consisted of slides and video showing the fire engine 
approach to the incident travelling from the local area to the incident ground.  
With the development of the house fire incident using standard fire service 
operations in relation to tackling the situation and bringing it to a safe 
conclusion. Each group of fire fighters were assembled within the training 
room of their operational station during their normal training period.  After a 
preliminary briefing, the series of the power point slides and video segments 
representing the call of fire to a house in a local city area were shown to each 
of the small groups of participants (6 to 10 people) in the following sequence: 
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a) a slide with basic information about the incident; that at 14.57 there was a 
call to a fire, with a washing machine on fire in the kitchen of a house, 
requiring the assignment of two fire pumps (engines), 
b)  two slides respectively showing a map of the area and an aerial view of 
the neighbourhood and incident location, also showing a hazard (school) on 
the access route, 
c) a 5 minute video segment showing the drive through an urban 
environment to the fire incident from the viewpoint of the driver / operational 
manager of a fire engine with accompanying siren and traffic sounds, 
d)  two slides providing a view of the street approach to the property and a 
street view of the property (with smoke escaping from the front window), 
 
Figure 4.1. Example of images used in the domestic presentation (premises 
approach). 
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e)  two short video segments with conflicting comments from two neighbors 
once they were at the address about whether an elderly occupant was in the 
house, or was away from the house and  
f) a series of 22 rapidly presented images, providing a collage of views of the 
interior and rear garden of the house, including views of the hall and 
staircase, kitchen (with the cooker / stove rather than washing machine on 
fire), living room, landing and stairwell, bedroom and  rear garden along with 
statements from the local press. (See Figure 4.1 and 4.2 for an example of 
the slide images).  
 
Figure 4.2. Example of images used in the domestic presentation (bedroom 
view). 
 
Interspersed at three pre set intervals were sets of probe statements 
presented as requests for clarification from the station officer (senior 
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manager). There were 20 probe statements in total and each required a true 
/ false response (10 true and 10 false items in randomised order with respect 
to being true or false). For example, “You passed three other emergency 
vehicles true / false” or “The bathroom could be occupied true / false”. The 
response probes also asked how confident participants were in their answer 
to each question on a Likert scale of 1 to 4 (one being a guess and four 
being sure), allowing for the measurement of three aspects of SA: 
1) Actual situational awareness ASA: how good an individual’s ASA is 
compared to the ground truth.  
2) Perceived situational awareness (confidence) PSA:  how good an 
individual believes their PSA to be. 
3) Bias:  the tendency to use more, or less information in building SA. 
These three measures provide a unique insight into the building of SA on the 
fireground.   Participants were asked to record their individual responses on a 
prepared answer sheet along with details of their role, age and years of FRS 
experience for the FRS sample. The full list of probes are shown in Table 4.1 
below;  
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1)  Confirm possible parking issues in the area?    
2)  Confirm area high density housing?   
3)  Confirm shortest route from the station is it the optimal one? 
4)  Confirm single approach to house? 
5)  Confirm external signs of fire?   
6)  Confirm young children on street on approach to OR outside property?  
7)  You were greeted by the homeowner when you first arrived? 
8)  Front window was open on your arrival?  
9)  There are signs of child occupants in house? 
10) Washing machine was on fire? 
11) There is a single calor gas fire in the house? 
12) There is a possible explosion hazard upstairs? 
13) Stairway offers clear escape? 
14) Bathroom could be occupied? 
15) There are signs that the mother was still in the house? 
16) There is double-gate access at rear of property? 
17) Bedroom cupboards are shut? 
18) There is a double oxygen cylinder in the bedroom? 
19) There is a petrol mower in back yard? 
20)  Local press are critical of operations? 
 
Table 4.1. Full list of questions (probes, for the house fire). 
 
4.2.3 Ethical considerations 
These studies were conducted in compliance with the ethical guidelines laid 
down by the British Psychological Society and ethical approval was obtained 
through the recognised procedures within the University of Gloucestershire.  
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The studies took place at FRS establishments or within training situations at 
the time of routine training / assessment exercise sessions, although 
participation in these research studies was fully voluntary indicated by signed 
consent after a preliminary briefing. Participants were fully advised that there 
were no requirements to participate in the research project. Some staff did 
elect not to be involved in the studies demonstrating that consent was fully 
voluntary. Results were anonymised for purposes of general analysis and for 
reporting in any public forum. Results were anonymised for purposes of 
general analysis but coded, so they could be compared should the same 
staff take part in other exercises and general anonymous feedback was 
provided to the group involved. Feedback (appendix 3) was also provided to 
all participants for the FRS, both mid way and at the end of the exercises. 
 
4.2.4 Measures of SA and bias 
As discussed previously at chapter 3; 3.2.4, the QASA approach (Edgar & 
Edgar, 2007) is based on signal detection theory (Stanislaw & Todorov, 
1999) and assesses both knowledge or SA and the bias that is applied to the 
available information. QASA determines the proportion of correct responses 
(hits and correct rejections) and incorrect responses (misses and false 
alarms) and these scores are then re-scaled to respectively provide two 
measures, one of SA and the other of bias. Further justification and 
explanation regarding the measures is provided in Edgar and Edgar (2007) 
with the basic underlying signal detection theory described  in Stanislaw & 
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Todorov (1999).  QASA provides a score for SA (corrected for guessing) 
from +100 (perfect SA) to -100 (totally misguided and wrong SA). Bias is also 
scaled from +100 (very conservative bias / scope) to -100 (very liberal bias / 
scope), with zero meaning no bias either way.  
 
4.3 Results: House fire exercise 
Domestic fire exercise: overall patterns of SA and bias / scope.  For this 
study, the overall level of SA for the FRS sample was high (x̄ 70.9; SD 
17.2), with FRS personnel showing significantly higher SA than the student 
sample (x̄ 56.9; SD 21.5): t (78) = 3.184, p =.002), consistent with the 
professional relevance of the task for FRS personnel.  The results for the 
bias scores however show a different pattern. The FRS and student 
samples do not differ in bias scores: t (78) <1, both samples having negative 
(liberal, accepting or lax) bias / scope patterns on average (x̄ -18.7 and SD 
30.4 for students and x̄ -13.6 and SD 41.2 for FRS personnel), but further 
analysis for the main sample of interest (FRS personnel) confirms that there 
are individual differences in bias / scope tendencies. 
 
Bias / scope patterns in FRS sample. There is clear evidence of three 
distinct bias groups or patterns amongst the FRS personnel: χ2 (d.f. =2) = 
16.12, p <.001 and furthermore, there is no significant correlation of bias / 
scope with SA for the FRS group: r = -0.09 (n.s.). In other words, as 
predicted, bias / scope tendency varies independently of level of SA.  
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The three bias / scope groups (Figure 4.3) amongst the FRS sample are 
respectively comprised of: 
1) 29 Ps showing negative (accepting, liberal or lax) bias / scope tendencies 
(bias scores < 0) and thus tending to accept information as true (and so to 
make false alarms if they made errors),  
2) 15 Ps showing positive (narrow, conservative, strict or cautious) bias / 
scope tendencies (bias scores > 0) and thus tending to reject information as 
true (and so to make misses when making errors) and  
3) only six Ps showing no bias / scope patterns at all (bias scores = 0)  
 
Figure 4.3. Domestic house fire table top exercise: Mean bias scores for the 
3 bias groups in the FRS sample. 
 
The group showing positive bias (x̄ 29.5; SD 30.4) differed significantly in 
bias scores from the group with negative bias (x̄ -38.8; SD 28.7): t (42) = 
7.327, p <.001. Notably however there are no significant differences in the 
SA scores for these two bias groups: t (42) <1. In other words, even though 
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the two groups had apparently comparable SA, they nevertheless had 
different tendencies for accepting or rejecting information, with the negative 
bias / scope group tending towards liberal acceptance and so to make false 
alarms and the positive bias / scope group having a more conservative 
criterion and so being more prone to making misses.  
 
It should also be noted that within each bias grouping, there was a range of 
individual scores: from -100 to -2.4 for the negative / liberal bias group and 
from +100 to +5.3 for the positive / conservative bias group, indicating the 
sensitivity of the QASA analysis to reveal such individual variation (see 
Figures 4.4).   
 
Any difference in patterns of ASA and bias / scope for full time and retained 
fire fighters and the relationship to years of experience was also examined. 
As noted above, the FRS personnel had significantly higher ASA than the 
non professional (student) sample but did not differ from that sample in bias 
/ scope. Further analyses for the FRS sample do not reveal marked 
differences in either ASA or bias due to FRS status (full time vs. retained) or 
years of professional experience (See Figures 4.12 for individual results for 
Whole time fire fighters and 4.13 for individual results for Retained fire 
fighters for both exercises). 
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In regard to ASA, both full time and retained fire fighters achieved high 
levels: the full time group having a mean ASA score of 71.7 (SD 19.0) and 
the retained group having a mean of 69.5 (SD 14.4), with no significant 
differences in ASA for the two groups: t (48) <1 (n.s.). Moreover, there is no 
significant correlation of ASA with years of experience for either the full time 
group (r= -0.01, n.s.) or the retained group (r = -0.3, n.s.).  
In regard to the bias / scope scores, both FRS groups on average showed 
somewhat negative bias / scope with this being more so for the full time 
(mean of -18.8, SD 42.9)  than the retained groups (mean of -5.9, SD 38.4), 
but again there is no significant difference in bias / scope scores for the two 
groups (t (48) = 1.1, n.s.). Furthermore, there is no significant correlation of 
years of experience with bias for either the full time group (r= .002, n.s.) or 
the retained group (r= 0.17, n.s.).  
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Figure 4.4. Domestic house fire table top exercise: knowledge and scoping 
patterns for the first 20 participants. 
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Question and correct answer % of correct 
answer 
 
1) Confirm possible parking issues in the area?  Yes  
2) Confirm: area high density housing?  Yes 
3) Confirm: shortest route from the station is it the optimal 
one.  No 
4) Confirm: single approach to house? No 
5) Confirm: external signs of fire? Yes 
6)  Confirm: young children on street on approach to OR 
outside property? Yes 
7)  You were greeted by the homeowner when you first arrived: 
No  
8)  Front window was open on your arrival: Yes   
9)  There are signs of child occupants in house: Yes  
10) Washing machine was on fire: No     
11) There is a single calor gas fire in the house: No  
12) There is a possible explosion hazard upstairs: Yes   
13) Stairway offers clear escape: No    
14) Bathroom could be occupied: Yes 
15) There are signs that the mother was still in the house: Yes 
16) There is double-gate access at rear of property: No  
17) Bedroom cupboards are shut: No    
18) There is a double oxygen cylinder in the bedroom: No 
19) There is a petrol mower in back yard: No   
20)  Local press are critical of operations: Yes  
    
 
75 
92 
 
50 
75 
83 
 
92 
 
17 
83 
92 
83 
50 
92 
83 
83 
92 
67 
42 
83 
50 
92 
 
Table 4.2 Percentage of the group giving correct response for each question. 
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4.4 Discussion 
 
The ASA and bias / scope for the house fire exercises were calculated for 
each person; ASA was high with a mean (average) of 69.4 for the exercise. 
Of concern however is that there was no significant correlation between the 
ASA scores and the PSA (confidence) scores. In other words, people may 
have had poor ASA but perceived that their PSA was good or vice versa, had 
good ASA but judged it to be poor. The results indicated that the bias / scope 
and ASA measures obtained in the scenario showed no significant 
correlation.   
 
The primary aim of this tabletop study was to determine if FRS personnel 
displayed bias / scope patterns in decision - making during table top fire 
incident exercises, which would confirm the outcome from our first exercise 
using six teams in breathing apparatus for the exercise. The evidence clearly 
shows that for most participants this was the case. The majority of FRS 
participants tended towards a liberal or negative bias / scope (and hence 
towards making false alarm errors), while the remainder showed a 
conservative or positive bias / scope (and hence towards making miss 
errors), with these differences not linked to level of ASA or knowledge, nor to 
years of experience or professional status (full time vs. retained). The level of 
ASA was high for both FRS groups and significantly higher than that for 
students, confirming the validity of the task content used for FRS personnel. 
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Nevertheless, the FRS sample did not show significant differences in bias / 
scope tendencies to those shown by the students. In other words, the bias / 
scope scores reflect tendencies that are statistically independent of FRS 
experience.  
 
It cannot be determined why such bias / scope tendencies occurred in this 
exercise, but nonetheless the current evidence serves the important purpose 
of confirming that bias / scope tendencies are apparent for most participants. 
The level of ASA was high for most individuals, but when these people were 
not certain of the correct answer, they showed bias / scope tendencies 
associated with either miss errors or false alarms in decision - making. This 
is an important finding that may have valuable implications for fireground 
training, performance and risk. It could be argued however that the exercise 
is not sufficiently realistic to ascertain whether such bias / scope might occur 
in more realistic simulations or in actual fireground contexts. To further 
address this question, the next study uses a similar methodological approach 
but in a more complex training exercise. 
 
4.5 Conclusions on the house fire exercise 
 
The tabletop simulation exercise shows evidence of positive, conservative or 
negative, liberal bias / scope tendencies in the FRS participants and the 
students who took part. There may be many contributing factors to such bias 
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/ scope tendencies including perceptual, attentional, working memory load, 
emotional  and personality considerations (Becker, Mortensen, Ackerman, 
Shapiro and Anderson, et. al. 2011; DeFockert, Rees, Frith and Lavie, 
2001;Endsley and Rodgers, 1997; Foster and Lavie, 2009; Klein, 
Calderwood and Clinton-Cirocco, 2010; Lavie, Hirst, de Fockert and Viding, 
2004; McLennan, Pavlou and Omedei, 2005;  Mosier and Fischer, 2010; 
Schwartz, Vuillemier, Hutton and  Maravita, 2005). The role of such factors is 
not determinable from these current experiments, but nonetheless the finding 
of bias / scope patterns is an important one that may have implications for 
understanding errors in fireground decision - making. Future development of 
this research will explore bias / scope tendencies in actual fireground 
decision - making and will ascertain whether any bias / scope tendencies are 
consistent for the individual across different fireground situations and 
contexts.  
 
The current findings confirm the methodological approach as a valuable 
means for developing these future studies. The technique has clearly shown 
that regardless of level of knowledge or ASA, there are response bias / 
scope tendencies in the decision - making of FRS professionals leading to 
either miss or false alarm errors. The finding that bias / scope patterns are 
independent of ASA is an important one that coincides with previous 
evidence indicating that simply acquiring information or ASA does not 
necessarily lead to effective decision - making (Omedei, McLennan, Elliott, 
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Wearing and Clancy, 2005). Further investigation of bias / scope tendencies 
would thus seem critical to developing understanding of factors that could 
lead to risk in real fireground decision / making. 
 
4.6. Commercial (factory) fire table top exercise 
 
 4.6.1. Introduction.  
As noted above, the main aim of this study was to determine if there were 
individual differences in bias / scope patterns for operational FRS personnel 
and if these patterns were consistent across two different table top fireground 
based exercises and if they differed with fire fighting experience. The second 
table top exercise was again based on a power point presentation, built up to 
reflect a fire in a commercial (factory) premises with a number of persons 
reported missing. 
 
4.6.2. Method 
Design 
The material for the second table top exercise was based on a fire in a 
factory premises with a number of persons reported missing.  The exercise 
was chosen to represent an event that was not an everyday type incident, 
but a realistic event for the fire fighters based on the operational station 
ground for the fire fighters taking part; this was designed as a more complex 
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incident, a factory fire having higher operational risks; to test if bias / scope 
was evident.   
 
The second exercise was conducted with a number of operational fire 
fighters from different stations, but the focus from this exercise was on the 20 
individuals who had taken part in and who had completed the power point 
house fire exercise.  It was undertaken at approximately 8 to 12 weeks 
interval to match in with their station based training programme.  Over a 
period of time each group of fire fighters when on duty were assembled 
within the training room of their operation station during their normal training 
period and after a preliminary briefing, the series of power point slides and 
video segments representing the call of fire to a factory site in a local 
industrial estate were shown to each of the small groups of participants (6 to 
10 people). 
 
Sample 
The FRS participants were all operational personnel from a number of 
Gloucestershire fire stations including larger urban and smaller county 
localities, with a number of full time fire fighters and a number of retained 
(part time) fire fighters. There were some fire fighters in operational 
managerial roles (crew and watch manager) amongst both the full time group 
and the retained group. All participants gave informed written consent to 
taking part in the experiment and their individual responses were collected 
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anonymously.  As mentioned previously only the information from the 20 fire 
fighters who had taken part in the house fire exercise were looked at within 
the data review following the exercise. 
 
Materials and procedure 
The table top exercise was presented as a power point presentation, built up 
to reflect a fire in a factory where a number of people were reported missing 
(individuals were not accounted for and believed to still be in the premises 
where the incident occurred) with the probe questions being designed with 
guidance from senior operationally experienced FRS staff.  The material in 
the power point presentation consisted of the mobilising information 
(standard for all incidents),video footage showing the approach to the 
incident travelling from the local fire station in the fire engine and the 
development of the incident using standard fire service operations in relation 
to tackling the situation and bringing it to a safe conclusion. Each group of 
fire fighters were assembled within the training room of their operation station 
during their normal training period and after a preliminary briefing, the series 
of power point slides and video segments representing the call of fire to a 
factory were shown to each of the small groups of participants (6 to 10 
people) in the following sequence: 
 a) a slide with basic information about the incident; a call to a factory unit 
fire, smoke issuing and persons reported, requiring the initial assignment of 
two fire pumps (engines) 
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b)  two slides respectively showing a map of the area and an aerial view of 
the neighbourhood and incident location, also showing hazards (main train 
line to London and major road) next to factory unit, 
 
Figure 4.5. Example of images used in the commercial factory presentation 
(site overview). 
 
c) a 7 minute video segment showing the drive through an urban 
environment to the fire incident from the viewpoint of the driver / operational 
manager of a fire engine with accompanying siren and traffic sounds, 
d) two slides providing a view of the factory approach to the main entrance 
with smoke issuing and a wider view of the factory yard showing it worked 
with heavy engineering, 
e) a video segment with a clearly startled factory charge hand regarding what 
had caused the fire and how many members of staff were unaccounted for 
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(leaving the Officer in charge of the first fire engine not knowing an exact 
number of how many staff were missing or their location),  
f) a series of 22 rapidly presented images, providing a collage of views of the 
interior and office accommodation, including views of the factory floor, high 
level walkways, staircase, and welding bays. (See Figure 4.5 and 4.6 for an 
example of the slide images.)  
 
Figure 4.6. Example of images used in the factory presentation (workshop 
view). 
 
Interspersed at three preset intervals were probe statements presented as 
“requests for clarification from the station officer”, the most senior officer on 
their way to the incident. There were 30 probe statements in total and each 
required a true / false response (15 true and 15 false items in randomised 
order with respect to being true or false). Participants were asked to record 
their individual responses on a prepared answer sheet along with details of 
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their role, age and years of FRS experience. The response probes also 
asked how confident participants were in their answer to each question on a 
Likert scale of 1 to 4 (one being a guess and four being sure), allowing the 
measure of three aspects of SA: 
1) Actual situational awareness ASA: how good an individual’s SA is 
compared to the ground truth.  
2) Perceived situational awareness (confidence) PSA: how good an 
individual believes their SA to be. 
3) Bias: the tendency to use more, or less, information in building SA. 
 
These three measures provide a unique insight into the building of SA on the 
fireground.    As discussed participants were asked to record their individual 
responses on a prepared answer sheet along with details of their role, age 
and years of FRS experience and a figure two if they had taken part in the 
first exercise showing a house fire. The full list of questions / probes 
presented at this exercise were:  
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1)  There were 3 appliances attending.  
2)  The map reference was on the turnout sheet. 
3)  The fire impacted more on the road than the railway line. 
4)  The car park was more than half full 
5)  There is a risk of cylinders being involved. 
6)  There is no evidence of flammable liquids at the scene. 
7)  Sandwich panels are a risk in these premises. 
8)  You only travelled through one red traffic light. 
9)  A car reversed out in front of you. 
10) You passed an ambulance. 
11) You went through 2 pedestrian crossings. 
12) You were travelling towards the town centre. 
13) There were cylinders outside the factory. 
14) The fire started in an office. 
15) The person who met you was identifiable as the Fire Marshall. 
16) Entry point was indicated on the plan 
17) Hazards were indicated at the entry point. 
18) There is a laboratory on the site. 
19) The plans are less than a year old. 
20)  You entered through a roller-shutter door. 
21) The roller-shutter access was clear. 
22) There was high fire loading in the offices. 
23) There was a portable gas heater in one of the offices. 
24) There was evidence of smoke in the offices. 
25) The shop floor was heavily smoke-logged. 
26) Staff could be trapped at a high level. 
27) There were three bodies in the factory. 
28) There were numerous cylinders on the shop floor. 
29) There was a cylinder near a body. 
30) You were moving towards the seat of the fire. 
 
Table 4.3 Full list of questions (probes for the factory fire). 
 
4.6.3 Ethical considerations 
The study was undertaken at FRS stations at the time of routine training / 
assessment exercise sessions; all participation in this research study was 
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fully voluntary by signed consent after a preliminary briefing. Staff were fully 
advised that there are no requirements to participate in the research project. 
Results were anonymised for purposes of general analysis but coded with a 
figure 2 for FRS staff who had taken part in the first exercise, this way those 
staff who had taken part in both the first and second exercise could be 
identified and responses could be compared across the two exercises. The 
figure 2 allowed the age, role and years of experience to be matched to the 
returns of the first exercise and ensure we were measuring the information 
we required, but that the individual identity of the fire fighter remained 
confidential and unable to be identified. All studies adhered to both BPS 
guidelines and the university research ethics guidelines. 
 
4.6.4 Measures of SA and bias 
As discussed previously (3.2.4) the QASA approach (Edgar and Edgar, 
2007) based on signal detection theory (Stanislaw and Todorov, 1999) and 
assesses both knowledge or SA and the bias / scope that is applied to the 
available information. QASA determines the proportion of correct responses 
(hits and correct rejections) and incorrect responses (misses and false 
alarms) and these scores are then re-scaled to respectively provide two 
measures, one of SA and the other of bias.   
 
4.7 Results: factory fire exercise  
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Commercial fire exercise: overall patterns of SA and bias / scope.  For this 
study, the overall level of SA for the sample was high with the mean 
average of 66.5.  The results for the bias scores showed there was clear 
evidence of only two distinct bias groups or patterns amongst the personnel, 
with those having negative (liberal, accepting or lax) bias / scope patterns 
on average showed 13 personnel and 7 with a conservative, positive bias / 
scope pattern, but further analysis confirms that there were individual 
differences in bias / scope tendencies.  There was no significant correlation 
of bias / scope with SA: In other words, as predicted, bias / scope tendency 
varies independently of level of SA.  
 
The bias groups (Figure 4.7) for the FRS sample are respectively comprised 
of: 
1) 13 participants showing negative (accepting, liberal or lax) bias / scope 
tendencies (bias scores < 0) and thus tending to accept information as true 
(and so to make false alarms if they made errors),  
2) 7 participants showing positive (narrow, conservative, strict or cautious) 
bias / scope tendencies (bias scores > 0) and thus tending to reject 
information as true (and so to make misses when making errors) and  
3) none of the participants showed no bias / scope at all (bias scores = 0)  
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Figure 4.7. Factory fire table top exercise: mean bias scores for the three 
bias groups in the FRS sample. 
 
The other important finding is that people showed bias / scope tendencies 
(no one had a bias score of zero or no bias). 
 
Figure 4.8. Factory fire table top exercise: knowledge and scoping patterns 
for each of the participants. 
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4.8 Factory power point exercise results and comparison with house 
fire exercise.  
 
The SA and bias / scope for the house and factory exercises were calculated 
for each person. QASA provides a score for SA (corrected for guessing) from 
+100 (perfect SA) to -100 (totally misguided and wrong SA). Bias is also 
scaled from +100 (very conservative bias) to -100 (very liberal bias), with 
zero meaning no bias either way.  
 
Comparison of the House and Factory Fire exercise results: 
  
Figure 4.9. SA patterns for each of the participants. 
 
r=0.053, p=0.82 
N=20 
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Figure 4.10. Bias patterns for each of the participants. 
 
 
Figure 4.11. PSA (confidence) patterns for each of the participants. 
r=0.132, p=0.58 
r=0.629, p=0.003 
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Figure 4.12. Table top exercise: Individual results: full time fire crew. 
 
Figure 4.13. Table top exercise individual results: retained fire crew. 
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As noted ASA, confidence PSA and bias / scope for the house and factory 
exercises were calculated for each person using QASA.  ASA was high in 
both exercises: with a mean (average) of 69.4 for the house exercise and 
66.5 for the factory exercise. Also participants’ PSA was at a similar level 
over the two exercises, meaning that if they had high confidence in their PSA 
in one exercise they also had high confidence in the other exercise, or low 
confidence in one and low confidence in the other (statistical correlation 
across the exercises is significant: r =.629, p =.003). Of concern however is 
that there is no statistically significant correlation between ASA scores and 
PSA scores. In other words, people may have had poor ASA but perceived 
their PSA as good or vice versa, had good ASA but judged it to be poor. 
 
People with a conservative bias / scope accepted a narrower amount of 
information as being true but made more miss errors (eg. in the house fire 
exercise, they may have said false to the true statement: Confirm: area high 
density housing? making a miss error). On the other hand, people with a 
liberal bias / scope accepted a broader scope of information as true, but 
made more false alarm errors (eg. in the factory fire exercise they may have 
said true to the false statement: The roller shutter access was clear, making 
a false alarm error). Of interest is that there was no significant correlation 
between the bias scores across the two exercises, so people had a 
conservative bias / scope in the house exercise and liberal bias / scope in the 
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factory exercise, or vice versa. Just six out of the total of 70 FRS responses 
showed no bias at all (figures 4.12 and 4.13). 
 
4.9 Discussion 
 
Actual SA was high in both exercises: with a mean (average) of 69.4 for the 
house exercise and 66.5 for the factory exercise and the fire fighters taking 
part over both power points perceiving their confidence (PSA) in a similar 
way for both exercises.  This means that if they had high confidence in their 
PSA in one they also had high confidence in the other, or they had low 
confidence in one and low confidence in the other (correlation across 
exercises is significant: r =.629, p =.003). So the fire fighters tested appeared 
to be unaware of their own level of ASA. 
 
The other important finding is that people showed bias / scope tendencies 
(only 6 in the first exercise had a bias score of zero or no bias). In the house 
exercise 15 people had a conservative bias / scope and the other 29 a liberal 
bias / scope; while in the factory exercise, 7 had a conservative bias / scope 
and the other 13 a liberal bias / scope. Of interest is that there was no 
significant correlation between the bias scores across the two exercises, 
therefore fire fighters may have had a conservative bias / scope in the house 
exercise and liberal bias / scope in the factory exercise, or vice versa.  
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The results indicated that the bias / scope and ASA measures obtained in 
each of the scenarios showed no significant correlation, so a fire fighter who 
showed high bias / scope or ASA on one scenario might show low bias / 
scope or ASA on the other.  So individuals’ levels of bias / scope and ASA 
varied according to the situation.  The major difference between the house 
and factory exercises was the induced pressure that the participating fire 
fighters felt themselves to be under in the exercises.  In the domestic 
exercise no one had experienced this type of exercise before and had, had to 
respond in an individual fashion, each had completed a university consent 
form for the first time and the attendance of a senior officer and two senior 
individuals from the university had brought to the exercise a tangible 
pressure.  Fire fighters taking part were quiet and concentrating on the 
exercise power point, they were keen to get clarification on the process and 
clearly relieved at the end of the exercise when the process and the outcome 
of the process was explained to them in relation to how we intended to use 
the information.  The answers to each of the probes were displayed to the 
group following the exercise and there was a discussion as to why some felt 
they had put down different answers and some justification as to why they 
had chosen one answer over another.   
 
In undertaking the commercial (factory) exercise, a number of the fire fighters 
had taken part previously in the domestic exercise and were a lot more 
relaxed in both the briefing for the factory exercise and taking part in the 
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exercise itself.  It was observed before the start of the commercial exercise 
and during, by those present that the fire fighters were engaged in general 
conversation with other staff members both during the exercise and on the 
debrief, offering  comments on the exercise set up and on each other's ability 
to manage a reasonable response.  The one major difference on the factory 
fire table top exercise, to the previous house fire table top exercise and the 
breathing apparatus exercise, may thus have been a lack of pressure on the 
individuals taking part and how this played out on their individual responses 
to the questions posed with the probes. In considering if the bias / scope is a 
resting bias / scope or a situational bias / scope, this outcome with the 
difference between the two exercises being a reduction of pressure / stress 
in the factory fire exercise raises debate around the reaction of fire fighters 
and incident commanders dealing with the exercise in a different way to how 
they would deal with it normally.  It is considered that in the normal 
management of the situation, whether training or at an incident, experience 
plays a major part in bringing it to a safe conclusion, but as pressure is 
applied as the incident grows, or gets more complicated, or high risk (major 
loss of life) then we start to see a non trained response and see the 
individual bias / scope involved with the decision - making.  So if the bias / 
scope only influence decisions under pressure, then we cannot expect a 
correlation between the exercises if different pressures were applied. 
Perhaps the most important result was that there was a highly significant 
correlation between PSA in the two scenarios (r = 0.629, n = 20, p = 0.003).  
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That is, individuals maintained their level of confidence (high or low) in their 
own PSA across the two situations, independently of their ASA. Which could 
lead to an individual believing that they were aware of everything that was 
going on at the incident and confident in their knowledge on which to base 
their decisions, when they have really poor ASA on the situation? 
 
The primary aim of these tabletop studies was to determine if FRS personnel 
displayed bias / scope patterns in decision - making during table top fire 
incident exercises, which would confirm the outcome from our first exercise 
using a breathing apparatus crew. The evidence clearly shows that for most 
participants this was the case. Just six out of the total of 70 FRS exercise 
participants showed no bias / scope at all. The majority of FRS participants 
tended towards a negative or liberal bias / scope (and hence towards making 
false alarm errors), while the remainder showed a positive or conservative 
bias / scope (and hence towards making miss errors), with these differences 
not linked to level of ASA or knowledge, nor to years of experience or 
professional status (full time vs. retained). The level of ASA was high for both 
FRS groups and significantly higher than that for students, confirming the 
validity of the task content used for FRS personnel. Nevertheless, the FRS 
sample did not show significant differences in bias / scope tendencies to 
those shown by the students, the bias / scope scores reflected tendencies 
that are statistically independent of FRS experience.  
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It cannot be determined why such bias/ scope tendencies occurred in these 
exercises, but nonetheless the current evidence serves the important 
purpose of confirming that bias / scope tendencies are apparent for most 
participants in both incidents (the house fire being smaller or less complex 
than the factory, but nonetheless both showing similar outcomes).  
 
The level of ASA was high for most individuals, but when they were not 
certain of the correct answer they showed bias / scope tendencies 
associated with either miss errors or false alarms in decision - making. This 
is an important finding that may have valuable implications for fireground 
training, performance and risk. It could be argued however that the exercises 
are not sufficiently realistic to ascertain whether such bias / scope might 
occur in more realistic simulations or in actual fireground contexts.  
 
The other main aim of the studies here was to determine if bias / scope was 
consistent across situations or scenarios, these exercises did not show this 
conclusively one way or the other. People could be conservative in the house 
exercise and liberal in the factory, or vice versa, so bias / scope could vary 
over situation or even over time, which would suggest that bias / scope is 
unlikely to be a consistent personal disposition. It may be the case however 
that the exercises were different and were not of sufficient stressful intensity 
to reveal any personal resting or residual tendencies.  The next study is an 
attempt to address this issue further by ensuring the pressure brought to the 
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exercise, increases the stressful intensity of the exercise on the individuals to 
enable us to further understand the nature of information bias / scope in 
relation to ASA and decision - making on the incident ground. 
 
4.10 Conclusions 
 
Both the table top simulation exercises in these experiments show evidence 
of either positive (conservative) or negative (liberal) bias / scope tendencies 
in the FRS participants and the students who took part. There may be many 
contributing factors to such bias / scope tendencies including perceptual, 
attentional, working memory load, emotional and personality considerations, 
as discussed. The role of such factors is not determined from these current 
experiments, but nonetheless the confirmation of bias / scope patterns is an 
important one that may have implications for understanding errors in 
fireground decision - making. Future development of this research will 
explore bias / scope tendencies in actual fireground decision - making and 
will ascertain whether any bias / scope tendencies are consistent for the 
individual across different fireground situations and contexts.  
The current findings confirm the methodological approach as a valuable 
means for developing these future studies. The technique has clearly shown 
that regardless of level of knowledge or ASA, there are response bias / 
scope tendencies in the decision - making of FRS professionals leading to 
either miss or false alarm errors. The finding that bias / scope patterns are 
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independent of ASA is an important one that coincides with previous 
evidence indicating that simply acquiring information or ASA does not 
necessarily lead to effective decision - making (Omedei, et. al. 2005). Further 
investigation of bias / scope tendencies would thus seem critical to 
developing understanding of factors that could lead to risk in real fireground 
decision - making. 
 
The results indicated that the bias / scope and ASA measures obtained in 
each of the scenarios respectively showed no significant correlation.  That is, 
a fire fighter that showed high ASA on one scenario might show low ASA on 
the other and similarly bias / scope may be positive on one and negative on 
the other.  Thus individuals’ levels of bias / scope and ASA appeared to vary 
according to the situation.   
 
The fire fighters in this study had good ASA overall and a level of confidence 
in their own PSA that was consistent across situations.  This PSA was not 
however strongly related to ASA.  Some of the fire fighters in these exercises 
considered their ASA to be good when in fact it was poor (and the converse).  
This lack of alignment between ASA and PSA could lead to decision errors if 
it occurred on the fireground, as it could lead to an individual believing they 
are aware of everything that is going on and confident in the knowledge on 
which to base their decisions, when they have really poor ASA on the 
situation. The results for bias / scope also indicate a basis for decision error. 
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Some people had a conservative, cautious approach to accepting information 
as true and others a more liberal, lax approach. The former represents a 
conservative bias / scope with a narrow focus on the incident that also 
produces miss errors, while the latter is a liberal bias / scope with a broader 
but shallower processing of the information, leading to false alarms. The 
outcome from these two exercises have shown that people could have a 
conservative bias / scope in one exercise and liberal bias / scope in the 
other, but either tendency could clearly provoke error in fireground decision - 
making.  
 
The gap between ASA and PSA along with the bias / scope patterns allows 
for the possibility of error in decision - making that could have serious 
consequences in a real fireground situation. These tendencies are most likely 
due to processing constraints in the channels of the human brain. The 
participants presented with generally good ASA (as the exercises have 
demonstrated), but also displayed limits whereby they did not register the 
gaps between their ASA and PSA and also showed bias / scope error 
tendencies. If such patterns are apparent in the relatively calm environment 
in which this study was conducted, they may be even more apparent under 
highly stressful and dangerous conditions such as those that assailed the 
Storm King Commander in 1994. The human brain is a highly effective fire 
fighting tool, but its limitations are ignored at considerable peril. The further 
direction for this research is to develop guidelines that could support FRS 
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personnel in monitoring their own ASA and bias / scope patterns under such 
conditions. The next study is an attempt to address this issue further by 
ensuring the pressure brought to the exercise increases the stress intensity 
of the exercise on the individuals, to enable us to further understand the 
nature of information bias / scope in relation to ASA and decision - making on 
the incident ground.  
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Chapter 5 
Flexible duty manager’s development and assessment exercises 2012 
and 2013:  how does bias / scope influence the operational outcome of 
pressurised fire incident command decisions?  
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
One of the initial aims of the project was to develop a technique that would in 
the first instance determine whether response bias / scope tendencies are 
apparent for FRS personnel in fireground simulation exercises and whether 
there are individual differences in bias / scope. From this to build on the 
outcome of this initial research to see if there was any pattern that could be 
identified with any bias / scope shown by individuals.  The basic paradigm for 
this research has been developed in previous studies of situation awareness 
(SA) and decision - making and involves the use of the Quantitative 
Assessment of Situation Awareness (QASA) method (Edgar and Edgar, 
2007; Edgar, Catherwood, Alford, Nikolla, Edgar and Brookes, 2011; Edgar, 
Catherwood, Nikolla and Alford, 2010). As discussed the QASA technique 
requires true / false decisions about statements concerning a situation. The 
approach is based on signal detection theory (Edgar and Edgar, 2007; 
Stanislaw and Todorov, 1999) and the QASA technique provides measures 
of:  
a) Knowledge or actual situational awareness ASA. 
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b)  Perceived situational awareness (confidence) PSA 
c) The information bias / scope applied by the decision maker to the available 
information.  As discussed, the bias measure in QASA gives further insights 
into the critical question of how knowledge or information may be selected or 
filtered for decision - making and whether this is being achieved in a strict 
and conservative way or alternately, a more lax or liberal manner.  
When situational awareness (SA) is used alone (without the A or P prefix) it 
refers to SA generally without a specific type. 
 
In the previous exercises real concerns about what happens to the 
individuals' bias / scope pattern when they are under pressure, or not under 
pressure were identified.  In the BA exercise pressure was exerted as a 
result of the challenging environment and in the house fire tabletop with it 
being something new to the participants and by the presence of senior 
managers.  Consideration of the bias ratings from the first two studies (the 
BA exercise and the house fire table top) suggested that the individuals 
taking part appeared to revert to type in relation to their bias / scope pattern; 
whether it was a resting bias / scope or a situational bias / scope.  It was 
seen from these first two exercises that bias / scope could be a constant with 
the individuals undertaking them when they responded to the probes 
following the exercise, or at stages within the exercise.  In the factory fire 
table top exercise a different response to the probes was seen and this was, 
or appeared to be driven by a greater understanding of the process and the 
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impact of it personally from having participated in it before.  A relaxed attitude 
of the individuals participating was carried through to the exercise. Therefore 
these tabletop exercises, or the environment in which they were undertaken 
may not have involved sufficiently realistic contexts or consistently high 
enough demand levels of stress (applied pressure) to the individuals to 
reveal any constancy in the bias / scope applied by the individual. The 
studies described in this chapter were designed to use the increased 
pressure on the individual, generated naturally within pre-programmed 
ongoing assessment / development exercises of operational flexible duty 
manager (FDM) at a station manager (SM) level.  
 
It was found that in all of the previous exercises individual differences in bias 
/ scope tendencies were apparent for the same situation and that such 
tendencies were independent of the level of knowledge or actual situational 
awareness (ASA) of the individual. In other words, even amongst those with 
the same ASA there may be different bias / scope, so that when errors were 
made some individuals tend towards making miss errors, conservative bias / 
scope and some towards false alarm errors, liberal bias / scope. The 
progression of this work is to explore if the bias / scope shown in the 
previous studies is down to the situation the FDMs partaking in the exercise 
find themselves in (different bias / scope shown by the same individual in 
different situations; a situational bias / scope), or if the bias / scope shown is 
within the FDMs (the same bias / scope shown by the same individual in 
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different situations; a resting bias / scope).  The previous tabletop exercises 
showed no evidence of the latter and suggested that the bias / scope could 
be down to the situation, although on reviewing the outcomes from the earlier 
studies we can see there is a bias / scope shown by the majority of 
individuals taking part.  The house fire and factory fire table top exercises 
used some of the same participants, the outcome was to identify whether the 
bias / scope was situational or resting.  The outcome was inconclusive in this 
respect and could have been down to differences in pressure exerted on the 
individuals taking part in different exercises.  So the measurements of bias / 
scope within the house fire and factory fire scenarios do not provide a 
conclusive evaluation of whether trends are consistent within each individual, 
or they are driven by the situation in which they find themselves.  With no 
clear relationship identified across these exercises for bias / scope 
suggesting either a situational bias / scope or a resting bias / scope, another 
set of exercises were planned to take the experiments forward to see 
whether the pressure of the situation influences the level of bias / scope.   
From the studies already presented there is some evidence that individual 
patterns of bias / scope change when the individual is under pressure, 
although, as will be discussed in Chapter 6, individuals do not appear to be 
aware of their own bias / scope.  It would appear to be a subconscious 
reaction to the events around them, a personal response when stressed 
(outside their individual comfort zone) as a reaction to managing a more 
intense or complex incident.  The study, described in this chapter, using 
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FDMs who were being assessed in an exercise that was tailored to test their 
operational competence and to ensure they are capable of managing a real 
incident of this type and nature, gave an opportunity to evaluate whether 
pressure influences bias / scope.  Central to this was the opportunity over a 
two year period to test the same individuals, within the same study under the 
same (or similar) conditions and to see if their responses were based on the 
situation, or based on the individual.    
 
This study examined the performance and reaction of a number of incident 
commanders in highly realistic simulation exercises testing their incident 
command skills.  These exercises were assessable and were based on real 
incidents that the individuals would be expected to respond to and take over 
as incident commander.   The exercises had been designed by the FRS 
training team and the assessment was undertaken by the FDMs peers who 
used an assessment sheet based on the individual FDM's role map (the job 
description that identifies what a FDM will need to undertake operationally to 
complete their role; appendix 4).   The possible consequences of the 
individual not meeting the required standard for the assessment was based 
on two sets of criteria; the first level where they will be deemed to require 
assistance in specific areas would be a training programme designed for 
them to ensure that any areas identified as deficient were brought back up to 
an acceptable level.  The second would impact on their actual operational 
status in the FRS where a failure to maintain a minimum level of competency 
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(health and safety in relation to the incident ground and the operations they 
direct to bring the incident to a safe conclusion) means that they would lose 
their flexible duty response status and would have to re-qualify within three 
months, or stand to lose up to 20% of their salary and the car provided to 
undertake the role. Their reaction to simulated large scale fire ground 
incidents was examined using QASA to assess both SA and bias / scope. 
These simulations involved two similarly challenging and assessable fire 
ground exercises within a two year period. This study was looking to reveal 
how they filtered the information available to them, and will determine 
whether there was any consistency in this regard to see if under similar 
conditions and over a period of time, they produce related patterns of bias / 
scope.  The ultimate goal was to review this information to consider how best 
to use it to the benefit of the individual in developing their incident command 
ability and to identify how they can utilise this knowledge to improve their 
individual decision - making and the outcomes for the incident. FRS fire 
fighting personnel will display conservative, liberal, or neutral decision - 
making bias / scope (or related errors) during FRS training exercises 
involving simulations of fireground incidents. The prediction for the current 
study is that given the highly demanding conditions, the incident 
commanders will display consistent levels of SA and bias / scoping 
tendencies across the two simulation assessment exercises.   
 
The hypotheses for this study was: 
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i) any such bias / scope error patterns will be consistent for individuals over 
situations / scenarios across the two test exercises. 
 
5.2 Background to simulated fireground incidents – assessment of 
flexible duty operational managers in 2012 and 2013. 
 
The primary aim of the first study was to confirm that the bias / scope 
patterns for individual operational FRS personnel identified in the first table 
top study (chapter 4), reflected the individual’s tendencies towards either 
accepting or rejecting the available information.  In the study described here, 
in the first FDM command development / assessment fireground exercises, 
the aim was to see whether  individual’s bias / scope tendencies towards 
either accepting or rejecting the available information (Catherwood, Sallis, 
Edgar and Medley, 2012) could be identified. In particular the aim was to 
assess whether individual operational response officers in a controlled, but 
pressurised situation display one of three potential bias / scope patterns: 
 a) a narrow or conservative bias / scope (with a tendency to reject 
information and so make misses) or, 
b) a lax or liberal bias / scope (with a tendency to accept information and so 
make false alarms), or,  
c)  a neutral bias / scope showing no such bias / scope in either direction.   
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Additionally, the aim of these studies was to assess the degree of 
consistency or correlation in SA and bias / scope between the first study from 
2012 and the second study in 2013. Any correlation between the individual 
results for 2012 and 2013 might indicate either a situational bias / scope (a 
bias / scope that, for any individual, could vary across situations simulating a 
highly pressurised operational role), or a resting bias / scope (a bias / scope 
that would be consistent for an individual across simulations simulating a 
highly pressurised operational role). Given that these exercises were an 
integral part of actual incident command training and ongoing competency 
assessments, a broader goal was also to develop a way of using this 
knowledge to improve operational response officers’ training.  To this end, 
the results of the QASA were fed back to the staff involved in the debriefing 
(details below).  
 
5.2.1 Method 
Design 
All participants were provided with the same stimulus situation, in a 
development / assessment simulated fireground incident. The simulated 
fireground incidents were based on a realistic and developing incident and 
each individual had to take over command from the first attendance 
commander, and move towards a successful conclusion from an operational, 
environmental and social perspective. Both SA and bias / scope scores were 
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obtained in regard to the presented information, via the QASA method 
described above and below.   
 
Participants 
The participants for both studies were 22 operational FRS flexible duty 
incident commanders who provided operational response to incidents for the 
FRS within their county, on a shift pattern that covered 24 hours, 7 days a 
week, 365 days a year.  All of the 22 for each study gave consent for their 
assessment information to be used and 19 of these undertook both the 
development / assessment in 2012 and 2013.  Three who had undertaken 
the 2012 assessment were unavailable to attend in 2013, one due to 
retirement and two due to illness, three who undertook the 2013 assessment 
but not the 2012 assessment, were not included in the data analysis.  These 
were FRS operational officers who responded to serious incidents requiring 3 
fire engines (15 fire fighters) plus to deal with the incident (based on a pre 
determined attendance response to the specific premise, or type of incident 
following an operational risk assessment), where people were in danger of 
losing their lives (persons reported) or where hazardous materials were 
involved (environmental concerns).  They responded on their own in their 
provided car (fitted with both blue lights and audible warning device as the 
fire engines would have already been mobilised from their station location) 
from their place of work, or home.  In 2012 the participants were operational 
managers (21 male and 1 female) working (on call from their place of work, 
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or their home for a set number of hours a week) across a UK FRS (mean 
age: 48.9 years and mean years of experience 23.1 years). The 2013 
participants were 22 operational FRS incident commanders all male, of 
these, 19 had undertaken the development / assessment in 2012.  All were 
flexible response duty operational managers working across a UK FRS 
(mean age: 49.9 years and mean years of experience 24.6 years). All 
participants were in managerial roles undertaking operational response both 
full time and retained.  
 
5.2.2 Ethical Considerations 
These studies were conducted in compliance with the ethical guidelines laid 
down by the British Psychological Society and ethical approval was obtained 
through the recognised procedures within the University of Gloucestershire.  
The studies took place at FRS establishments or within training situations at 
the time of routine training / assessment exercise sessions, although 
participation in these research studies was fully voluntary indicated by signed 
consent after a preliminary briefing. All data were collected once the formal 
assessment had finished and the running of the assessments was not altered 
in any way by the research project.  Participants were fully advised that there 
were no requirements to participate in the research project. Some staff did 
elect not to be involved in the studies demonstrating that consent was fully 
voluntary. Results were anonymised for purposes of general analysis and for 
reporting in any public forum. General anonymous feedback was provided to 
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the group involved, while personalised feedback on their own performance 
was provided to individuals. Individual assessment sessions were 
administered by trained FRS managers.  
 
5.3 Development / assessment simulated fireground incident of flexible 
duty operational managers in 2012 
 
5.3.1 Materials and Procedure 
The exercises were designed by the FRS training team and the assessment 
was undertaken by FRS Group Managers who used an assessment criteria 
(Figure 5.1) based on the individual FDM's national role map agreed as part 
of their employment terms and conditions, with an example at appendix 4.  
The possible consequences of the individual not meeting the required 
standard for the assessment was based on two sets of criteria, the first level 
where they will be deemed to require assistance will be a training programme 
they would need to undertake within 3 months.  Failure at the second level 
would impact on their actual operational status in the FRS, where failure to 
maintain a minimum level of competency would be the loss of their flexible 
duty response status. The assessment criteria were as shown in Figure 5.1. 
 
Assessment criteria 
The use of the traffic light system allows for an ‘at a glance’ look at where 
development needs are required with a fuller description given within the 
summary for each element. 
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Green-No significant development needs, candidate has provided clear 
and correct evidence to support this criteria 
 
Amber-Minor development needs that have no risk critical aspects that 
would have led to an adverse occurrence 
 
Red-Core development required where risk critical element has been 
ignored or not acted on. 
 
Should there be “Red Lights” the candidate will be required to undergo 
further development in the highlighted areas and a re-assessment as 
directed by the training team manager. The question of whether the 
candidate remains engaged in operational duties during this retraining 
period will be at the discretion of the assessors and may be through 
consultation with senior operations manager. 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Example of 2012 assessment criteria. 
 
A full scenario planning document was provided (appendix 5) with the 
following initial information given to the exercise candidate;  
 
 
The time is 1000hrs on a Monday morning. There is a light drizzle of rain at present 
with a brisk northerly wind and temperatures around 4˚C. The service has been 
called to a fire at Crypt school, just off Cole Avenue, in Podsmead, Gloucester. The 
Pre Determined Attendance (PDA) is 3 appliances from both Gloucester Stations 
and a Station Commander. Station Commander __________ was mobilised with the 
initial attendance.  
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On receipt of a make pumps 5 (increase fire engines to 5 for operational 
requirements at the scene, which would provide up to 25 FF's) message from WC 
Evans, the FRS Operations Control mobilise more resources to the Incident 
including 2 further Station Managers (1 to manage the incident command unit (ICU) 
to provide information and manage the scenes communications and another Station 
Manager who was to support the Incident Command System, for command and 
control. 
 
Figure 5.2 Initial information given to the exercise candidate. 
 
The candidate was mobilised by mobile phone or operational pager to 
respond to a briefing room where he / she received a brief from a senior 
operational officer for the incident, which included an update from the first 
incident informative message (a message from the incident updating the FRS 
control room and senior managers of developments at the incident, sent as 
soon as possible from the incident ground and updated every 20 minutes by 
the incident commander) from the current commander at the incident which 
had just been received.  The informative was: 'From WC Evans at Crypt 
School, Gloucester, Fire in School, Building approx 10M x 80M well alight. 5 
persons unaccounted for at this time. 4 breathing apparatus (BA), 1 hose reel 
jet (HR) & 2 (full fire fighting) Jets, in use'. 
 
The FRS mobile incident command unit (ICU) (a unit that housed all mobile 
communications facilities for the incident ground, plus full access to all risk 
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based information held on all premises within the county by the FRS and also 
providing secure internet links for interagency and national communications) 
was fully established and set up (as for a real operational incident) and 
staffed by operational staff as it would have been for a real incident.  The 
whole exercise was scripted from start to finish, with various injects based on 
both the scenario (time based) and the decisions the incident commander 
made, as each decision would have consequences for the ongoing nature of 
the incident.  Certain decisions would have an impact on the development of 
the incident and these would require the incident commander to respond to, 
or manage this development to bring the incident to a safe conclusion. A 
number of people were nominated as role players and were indentified to 
cover the following roles, Police, Ambulance, worried mother of a child that 
was missing and someone to play the part of a press reporter; each was 
given a script and would respond to the ICU at an agreed time during the 
incident. Other injects to the exercise covered the political dimension, with 
local politicians phoning up to find out what was going on and the need for 
the incident commander to brief senior officers who were not at the scene. 
 
The task and probe questions were designed with guidance from senior 
experienced FRS staff and training managers. There were 24 probe 
statements in total identified from the scenario and each required a true / 
false response (12 true and 12 false items in randomised order with respect 
to being true or false) (List 5.1 below). All the probe questions were identified 
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as key to the operational role of the FDM undertaking the exercise, each one 
was based on information the FDM would have needed or asked for to assist 
them in managing the incident, or they would have been provided based on 
the FRS operational procedures. In essence, all probes addressed important 
aspects of the situation, awareness of which would be beneficial to 
completion of the task.  The researcher attended the first exercise and 
watching from a remote location reviewed the probe sheets, to ensure that 
the probes asked were correct. The researcher attended on the other 7 dates 
the exercise was run to ensure there were no changes within the exercise 
that could or would impact on the probes. Participants were asked to record 
their individual responses on a prepared answer sheet along with details of 
age and years of FRS experience.  
 
  
Please indicate if you believe the statements below are true or false 
1 When you were called, there were five appliances mobilised. 
2 There were six persons unaccounted for in the initial informative. 
3 Police were requested before your arrival. 
4 You were informed that plastics may be involved in the fire. 
5 Plumes of smoke were evident in a number of locations 
6 You were informed that a female teacher was missing. 
7 Missing children were all initially reported as being in the chemistry lab. 
8 The missing children were all in the age range 11-12 (first year in that school). 
9 The fire alarm indicated the fire was on the ground floor. 
10 The base pump over-ran the water supply. 
11 Two sector commanders asked you for more BA resources. 
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12 A sector reported the fire had broken through the roof. 
13 Sector commander notified location of 4 casualties. 
14 All services to the site were isolated. 
15 The police took responsibility for the safety of the children. 
16 The suggested arsonist is a former pupil. 
17 Information suggests that the arsonist purchased 50 liters of fuel. 
18 GWAS were unable to attend site. 
19 Police reported the arsonist had been arrested 
20 HART requested a RVP location. 
21 BBC radio asked about the madman loose in the grounds 
22 BBC radio asked about the four children that were badly burned 
23 A parent approached asking about their child. 
24 BA teams reported recovering all the casualties. 
 
Table 5.1. 2012, full list of probe statements in total identified from the 
scenario and each required a true / false response (12 true and 12 false 
items in randomised order with respect to being true or false). 
 
The way these exercises were designed allowed the study to also look at the 
confidence the individual undertaking the assessment had in relation to the 
answers they gave, as the study wanted to look at the two key aspects of SA 
a person’s Actual Situational Awareness (ASA) (in using the probe 
statements) and their Perceived Situational Awareness (PSA) (in using a four 
point 'Likert' scale) (Figure 5.3).   
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Figure 5.3 2012, list of 24 probe, 12 true and 12 false items in randomised 
order with respect to being true or false, the answer given to each question 
was to be supported by the degree of certainty the individual felt in giving that 
answer. 
 
Ideally, these two aspects should match, indicating the participant has the 
same PSA as ASA and is making decisions based on fact.  This has not 
necessarily been the case where previously some FDMs have shown a 
higher PSA than ASA, making decisions based on their own confidence, or a 
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lower PSA than ASA.  High ASA shows a good awareness of what is 
happening, while low scores show poor ASA, with negative scores showing a 
fundamentally wrong representation of the situation. Actual and perceived SA 
can vary independently across the situation.  This raises the possibility that 
individuals may have a high resting level of PSA and that ASA could be low, 
giving a confident incident commander with little real understanding of what is 
happening (Catherwood et. al. 2012). 
 
Given that these exercises were an integral part of actual IC training, the 
broad goal was also to propose a way of using this knowledge to improve 
operational response officers’ training.  To this end, the results of the QASA 
were fed back to the staff involved in the debriefing (appendix 6).  
 
5.4 Development / assessment simulated fireground incident of flexible 
duty operational managers in 2013 
 
The primary aim of this study was to confirm that bias / scope patterns for 
individual operational FRS personnel found in the first 2012 FDM command 
development / assessment fireground exercises, reflected the individual’s 
tendencies towards either accepting or rejecting the available information 
(Catherwood et. al. 2012). The aim is thus to identify any correlation from the 
individuals who took part in both exercises between the individuals results for 
2012 and 2013 that will point to either a situational (a bias / scope that could 
Page | 190 
 
vary with the individual when attending a highly pressurised operational role), 
or resting bias / scope (a bias / scope that will reoccur with the individual 
when undertaking a highly pressurised operational role). Given that these 
exercises were an integral part of actual incident command training and 
ongoing competency assessments, the broad goal was also to propose a 
way of using this knowledge to improve operational response officers’ 
training.   
 
5.4.1 Materials and Procedure 
The conditions and impact for the individuals taking part were the same as 
the exercise in 2012 above as the exercise was part of their continuous 
assessment process.  A full scenario planning document was provided with 
the following initial information given to the exercise candidate;  
 
 
This premise is a palliative care centre for neurological patients.  This 
includes RTC victims, Meningitis sufferers and Multiple Sclerosis sufferers.  
Most are private but some are NHS.  All have mobility issues and other 
complications.  The purpose of the Centre is to relieve suffering and to 
provide support services such as physiotherapy etc.  Patient mobility ranges 
from out-patients who are fairly mobile to residential patients who are 
ostensibly bedbound.   
There are several treatment rooms, Physiotherapy facilities and a pharmacy 
in the premises along with 13 bedrooms. 5 bedrooms have en-suite facilities 
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whilst the rest use sluice rooms or WC’s. 
The time is 16:00.  
A serious fire has broken out in the kitchen area of the premises and this has 
rapidly spread to other rooms in the sub-ground floor level.  It has also 
penetrated the lift shaft and moved up to the ground floor where it is burning 
in the central reception area.  This is an open area for both ground and first 
floors, with a Grade 2 listed staircase linking the two.  If the fire is not 
checked it will easily spread to the first floor.   
Casualties: 
 There are 4 people unaccounted for on candidate arrival.  They are 
located in the following areas; 
 Ground Floor: 1 staff member severely in the lift (they have opened 
the lift door onto the fire which has allowed fire spread up the shaft to 
1st floor). 
 First Floor: 1 patient in room 8 
 Second Floor: 1 patient and 1 staff member in Physio room 
 
 
Figure 5.4 Initial information given to the exercise candidate. 
 
The assessment was undertaken at Avon FRS South West Command 
Centre, which allowed for a walk through scenario on arrival at the incident 
ground with different rooms showing a different perspective of the incident, 
moving through to the ICU within the same site.   
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Figure 5.6 Avon South West Command Centre Ops room (courtesy of 
AFRS)  
 
Figure 5.5 Avon South West Command Centre Lay Out (courtesy of AFRS) 
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The ICU was again fully set up as for a real operational incident and staffed 
by a specialist crew from Avon FRS that undertakes this provision for Avon 
FRS at their operational incidents.  The whole exercise was scripted with 
various injects based on both the scenario and the decisions the incident 
commander made, as each decision would have consequences for the 
ongoing nature of the incident, certain decisions would have an impact and 
require the incident commander to respond.  A number of people were 
nominated as role players and were identified to cover the following roles, 
Police, Ambulance, premises owner and both local and national press, each 
was given a script and would respond to the ICU at an agreed time during 
the incident. Other injects covered the political dimension, and the need for 
the incident commander to brief senior officers who were not available at the 
scene. 
 
The task and probe questions were designed with guidance from senior 
experienced FRS staff and consisted of the following material. A full scenario 
planning document was provided and reviewed, there were 28 probe 
statements (List 5.2) in total identified from the scenario and each required a 
true / false response (14 true and 14 false items in randomised order with 
respect to being true or false) (Figure 5.5). Participants were asked to record 
their individual responses on a prepared answer sheet along with details of 
age and years of FRS experience. Their responses were collected 
anonymously and all gave informed written consent.  
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Please indicate whether you believe the statements below are true or false and 
then indicate how sure you are that the answer you have given is correct (tick 
one box ‘guess’ to ‘certain’). 
1 On mobilising, you were told there was a fire in a bedroom of a residential care centre. 
2 There were some patients in a sit tight protocol. 
3 There were 5 pumps when you were mobilised. 
4 You were informed via radio that there were three BAs in use. 
5 There were patients in wheelchairs outside the premises when you arrived. 
6 Two BA teams were in the building when you arrived. 
7 The fire started in a kitchen 
8 There were five people unaccounted for. 
9 In excess of 20 people had been evacuated by the time you arrived. 
10 The building had three floors. 
11 On your arrival there were four sectors operational. 
12 On your arrival, there were concerns over water supplies. 
13 On arrival at the command unit, you were informed of a house fire. 
14 There were no persons reported missing in the house fire. 
15 There was a report that some doors may have been wedged open. 
16 The gas isolations were internal. 
17 Fire compromised the lift shaft. 
18 Control asked if the welfare unit was required. 
19 Ambulance informed you that four ambulances were in attendance. 
20 HART have been mobilised and are on their way. 
21 There were three police staff available onsite. 
22 The police believe the fire was arson. 
23 There was one aerial in attendance. 
24 There was a Sky news reporter on site. 
25 An unconscious male patient was located in a bedroom. 
26 A BA team located two casualties in the physio room. 
27 You will / do hand over to a group manager. 
28 There were two lifts in the building. 
 
Table 5.2. 2013, full list of probe statements of 28 probe statements in total 
identified from the scenario and each required a true / false response (14 
true and 14 false items in randomised order with respect to being true or 
false). 
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Figure 5.7 2013, 28 probe statements, 14 true and 14 false items in 
randomised order with respect to being true or false, the answer given to 
each question was to be supported by the degree of certainty the individual 
felt in giving that answer. 
 
Given that these exercises were an integral part of actual incident command 
training, the broad goal was also to propose a way of using this knowledge to 
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improve operational response officers’ training.  To this end, the results of the 
QASA were fed back to the staff involved in the debriefing (appendix 6).  
 
5.5 Measures of SA and bias 
 
As referred to within previous chapters and above, the QASA approach 
(Edgar and Edgar, 2007) is based on signal detection theory (for the metrics 
used, see Stanislaw and Todorov, 1999) and assesses;  
a) knowledge or actual SA (ASA; how well the individual discriminates 
true from false information) and, 
b) the bias / scope that is applied to the available information (i.e. the 
tendency to accept or reject information as true).  
c) A measure of perceived SA (PSA) derived from asking participants to 
rate how confident they are that their responses to the true/false 
probes are correct. 
The true / false responses to the probe statements were analysed for both 
the true statements (signal trials) and false statements (noise trials).  QASA 
determines the proportion of correct responses (hits and correct rejections) 
and incorrect responses (misses and false alarms) and then uses the rate of 
hits and false alarms to calculate: 
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a) A knowledge or ASA measure based on the non-parametric signal 
detection sensitivity measure, A’ (scores being corrected for chance or 
guessing) and, 
 b) A bias measure  calculated using B’’  (performance in a yes / no or true / 
false decision task with both signal and noise trials, can be fully described in 
terms of just the hits and false alarm rate, since proportion of the other two 
types of response: correct rejections or misses follow from these rates) and, 
c)  A measure of PSA derived from confidence ratings (see above) on a 
scale of 1 to 4, with 1 indicating that the answer was a guess and 4 indicating 
that the participant is certain their response is right. 
 
All of these scores were then re-scaled to provide two measures  of SA (ASA 
and PSA) and another of bias / scope, each ranging from -100 to +100. 
Further justification and explanation regarding the measures is provided in 
Edgar and Edgar (2007) with the basic underlying signal detection theory 
metrics described  in Stanislaw & Todorov (1999).   
 
The two key aspects of SA are a person’s ASA and their PSA (confidence).  
Theoretically, ASA can vary across the situation and PSA can remain 
relatively constant, and vice versa.  This raises the possibility that individuals 
may have a resting level of PSA and that ASA could be low, giving a confident 
incident commander with little real understanding of what is happening.  An 
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example of an individual outcome from this exercise is shown below (Figure 
5.8). 
 
 
 
Figure 5.8 QASA results for 2 participants over the 2 exercises in the 
SWCC. 
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5.6 Results for both studies in the development / assessment simulated 
fireground incident of flexible duty operational managers in 2012 and 
2013 
 
The aim of these studies was to assess whether individual operational 
response officers in a controlled but pressurised situation display a particular 
potential bias / scope patterns, namely:  
a) A narrow or conservative bias / scope (with a tendency to reject 
information and so make misses) or, 
 b) A lax or liberal bias / scope (with a tendency to accept information and so 
make false alarms) or, 
c)   No such bias / scope in either direction (neutral – or a score of zero on 
bias / scope). 
These scores allow the identification any correlation (or lack of) between the 
individuals’ results for 2012 and 2013 that might suggest either a situational, 
or resting, bias / scope.   
 
In both exercises a small majority (56%) of the participants tended towards a 
positive or conservative bias / scope (and hence towards making miss errors) 
and 24% showed a very low or mixed bias / scope, with the rest showing a 
negative or liberal bias / scope (and hence towards making false alarm 
errors).  With these differences not linked to level of ASA or knowledge, nor 
to years of experience or contractual status (full time vs. retained, exercise 
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results from the table top exercises in chapter 4). The focus of most interest 
here is the correlation of ASA, PSA and bias scores for the 19 participants 
who did both exercises. 
 
Data were analysed using a Pearson’s correlation.  The results for the bias 
scores (Figure 5.9) show there is a moderate positive correlation between 
the scores obtained by individuals on the two assessments (r = 0.620, N =19, 
p = 0.005, two-tailed). This means that individuals showed similar bias 
scores over the two studies. Different individuals used different amounts of 
information, but each individual tended to be consistent across scenarios in 
what information they would accept or reject.   
 
For ASA (Figure 5.10) there is no significant correlation (r = -0.110, N = 19, p 
= 0.654, two-tailed). ASA varied across scenarios, individuals that have good 
ASA in one scenario may have poor in a different one; and vice versa. An 
individual’s handling of information may remain relatively constant across 
situations, but their level of ASA may vary.  An individual's ASA appears to 
not be consistent across each incident / exercise they respond to, but their 
bias / scope appears to be. 
 
For PSA (confidence) (Figure 5.11) there is a moderate positive correlation (r 
= 0.477, N = 19, p = 0.046, two-tailed). PSA appears to be consistent across 
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scenarios – no matter how pressured, individual FRS managers had similar 
levels of confidence across the trials.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.9 A scatter plot showing individual levels of bias in one study 
plotted against the other. 
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Figure 5.10 A scatter plot showing individual levels of actual situational 
awareness (ASA) in one study plotted against the other. 
. 
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Figure 5.11 A scatter plot showing individual levels of perceived 
situational awareness (confidence) (PSA) in one study plotted against 
the other. 
 
 
The finding that bias / scope tendencies may be regarded as having a resting 
point (Figure 5.9) would thus seem critical to developing understanding of 
factors that could lead to risk in real fireground decision - making.  
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Figure 5.12 2012 & 2013, QASA results from the same FDM. 
 
5.7 Discussion 
 
The primary aim of this study was to measure three aspects of the SA (ASA, 
PSA and bias / scope) of individual operational FRS personnel found in the 
fireground exercises. It was of particular interest to establish whether 
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individual scores on these three aspects of SA correlated across two different 
scenarios undertaken over a year apart (in 2012 and 2013).  ASA was likely 
to be heavily influenced by the situation (some situations may be inherently 
more difficult to grasp) whereas there was the possibility that PSA and bias / 
scope could be consistent as they can conceivably be a property of the 
individual and so less influenced by the situation   When the pressure is high, 
individuals seem to fall back on a resting bias / scope that remains consistent 
across scenarios, but pressure is an aspect of the situation and that is when 
consistent bias / scope seems to manifest.  That is, their tendency to reject or 
accept information is similar across situations; but only when the pressure is 
high. 
 
If there is evidence of a consistent resting bias / scope then this is an 
important finding as it suggests that the way an individual handles 
information when under pressure can be measured and will then be 
predictable.  This knowledge could then be used to improve the training of 
operational response officers.   
 
As discussed in both exercises the participants tended towards a positive or 
conservative bias / scope and hence towards making miss errors, with about 
a quarter showing a very low or mixed bias / scope.  With the rest showing a 
negative or liberal bias / scope and hence a tendency towards making false 
alarm errors. These differences did not appear to be linked to level of ASA or 
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knowledge, nor to years of experience or contractual status (full time vs. 
retained).  
 
In looking at the current data it cannot be determined why any individual 
might have shown a particular bias / scope pattern (positive, neutral or 
negative) in these exercises, but nonetheless the data suggests that bias / 
scope tendencies are apparent, measurable, and consistent for most 
participants. The level of ASA was high for most individuals, but when they 
were not certain of the correct answer, they showed consistent bias / scope 
tendencies associated with either miss errors or false alarms in decision - 
making. The bias scores showed a positive and highly significant correlation 
indicating that individuals showed similar bias scores over both the 
development / assessment simulated fireground incident trial and assessable 
simulated fireground incident trial.  These data provide support for the notion 
of a resting bias / scope (a bias / scope that will reoccur with the individual 
when undertaking a highly pressurised operation role), rather than a 
situational bias / scope (a bias / scope that could vary with the situation when 
attending a highly pressurised operational role).  The resting bias / scope 
shown in these two exercises was a different outcome to the one identified in 
chapter 4, the table top exercises. While both exercises were realistic to the 
types of incident fire fighters could respond to the second table top exercise 
lacked any type of pressure / stress on the individuals taking part.  Both of 
the exercises for FDMs were high pressure events for the individuals taking 
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part as failure in either one would have implications for the individual in terms 
of both a credibility and financial loss.  In the 2013 assessment exercise two 
FDM’s failed their assessment and were taken off operational response, both 
were successful when retaking the assessment within the provided 3 month 
period. The pressure inherent in the exercises was a real difference to the 
table top exercises and appears the most likely explanation for the different 
pattern of results found.  
 
One of the aims of this experiment was to determine whether the bias / 
scope patterns evident in the table top exercise would also be apparent in a 
more realistic and challenging situation. The participants showed a range of 
bias / scope, conservative (positive), liberal (negative) or neutral.  Of interest, 
as in the previous studies was again the apparent independence of the level 
of ASA.  As with bias / scope, for PSA (confidence) there was also a 
significant positive correlation across scenarios, with PSA being consistent 
across scenarios.  No matter whether their PSA was high or low, individuals’ 
PSA tended to remain consistent across scenarios and independent of their 
ASA.  This suggests that there are likely to be times when there is a 
mismatch, for any individual, between perceived and actual SA. Fire fighters 
need to be aware that their ASA may not be what they think it is and also to 
be aware that given the correlation they are likely to feel confident, or not, at 
every incident / exercise they attend, regardless of the actual information 
they have and their understanding of the situation.  In sum, although ASA 
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varied for individuals across the tasks, bias / scope and PSA (confidence) 
were consistent. 
 
5.8 Conclusions 
 
The assessable simulation exercises in these experiments showed evidence 
of either positive (conservative) or negative (liberal) bias / scope tendencies 
in the FRS individual participants that were consistent across scenarios. 
There may be many contributing factors to the maintenance of such bias / 
scope tendencies including perceptual, attentional, working memory load, 
emotional  and personality considerations as mentioned previously (Becker, 
Mortensen, Ackerman, Shapiro and Anderson, et. al. 2011; DeFockert, Rees, 
Frith and Lavie, 2001; Endsley and Rodgers, 1997; Foster and Lavie, 2009; 
Klein, Calderwood and Clinton-Cirocco, 2010; Lavie, Hirst, de Fockert and 
Viding, 2004; McLennan, Pavlou and Omedei, 2005;  Mosier and Fischer, 
2010; Schwartz, Vuillemier, Hutton and Maravita, 2005).   
 
As discussed the role of such factors is not determinable from these 
experiments, but the finding of consistent bias / scope patterns, in the 
absence of consistent ASA, for individual FRS incident commanders is an 
important one that could have implications for understanding errors in 
incident based decision - making. In this research bias / scope tendencies in 
individual's decision - making have been clearly identified and with the key 
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finding that these bias / scope tendencies are consistent for the individual 
across the two different fireground situations investigated here.  
The finding that individuals showed similar bias scores over both the 
development / assessment simulated fireground incident study and 
assessable simulated fireground incident study, points to a resting bias / 
scope (a bias / scope that will reoccur with the individual when undertaking a 
high pressured operational role), rather than a situational bias / scope (a bias 
/ scope that could vary with the situation when attending a highly pressured 
operational role).   
 
The current findings confirm the methodological approach as a valuable 
means for developing future studies. The technique has clearly shown that 
regardless of level of knowledge or ASA, there are response bias tendencies 
in the decision - making of individual FRS professionals leading to either 
miss or false alarm errors. The finding that bias / scope patterns are 
independent of ASA is an important one that is congruent with previous 
evidence indicating that simply acquiring information or SA does not 
necessarily lead to effective decision - making (Omedei, McLennan, Elliott, 
Wearing and Clancy, 2005).  
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5.9 Next phase: feedback to the FDMs  
 
Actual ASA varies across scenarios; individuals can have good ASA in one 
scenario but can have poor ASA in a different one and vice versa. PSA 
(confidence) appears consistent across scenarios; the confidence level 
(PSA) of the individual incident commander appears not to change even if 
their ASA does, no matter how pressured the exercise is.  This is a key point 
as confidence (PSA) was also consistent in the tabletop exercises as well as 
in this study.  So ASA varies with situation, bias / scope tends to a ‘resting 
point’ but only under pressure.  While PSA (confidence) appears to stay the 
same no matter what the circumstances of the exercise, which is both 
fascinating and important.   
 
How much information an individual uses from the information available at 
the incident varies across situations, so it could be positive (conservative / 
narrow) in one and negative (liberal / wide) in another when the situations are 
relatively low pressure.  When the pressure at the exercise / incident is high, 
individuals appear to fall back on a resting bias / scope that remain 
consistent across scenarios.  That is, their tendency to reject or accept 
information is similar across situations; but only when the pressure is high.  
So for incident commanders the implication is that the information processing 
of the individual may fundamentally change at an incident when the pressure 
increases.  So incident commanders need to be aware that their ASA may 
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not be what they think it is, it could be better, but it could be worse, and such 
an incongruence could lead to errors in decision - making.  
 
Feedback is an important confirmation that may have valuable implications 
for fireground training, performance and risk. The next aspect of the research 
is to explore whether personal knowledge of such bias / scope tendencies 
can bring awareness of one’s own bias / scope and an awareness of the 
risks attached to particular bias / scope tendencies. The possibility of 
increasing ‘bias-awareness’ in FDM’s was explored by means of semi-
structured interviews is discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 6 
Flexible duty operational manager’s development and assessment 
exercises: Semi structured interviews 15 months after receiving 
feedback on the 2012 results.  
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Following the results of the 2013 FDM exercises and identification of a 
possible resting bias / scope from the research data, there was an 
opportunity to review what the 19 FDMs who had taken part in both exercises 
saw as beneficial from their original debrief and their experiences.  Each had 
been briefed on their individual profile from the 2012 study, as shown in 
chapter 5 (appendix 6) and had been given a breakdown of their bias / scope 
profile and both SA profiles (ASA and confidence - PSA).  A discussion was 
also held with each individual on their profile and what it meant in relation to 
the way they reacted under the stressful assessment / development exercise 
they had undertaken in 2012.  As identified previously it was felt to be an 
important part of the study to gain their views as to whether the information 
they had been provided with and what they had considered over the period of 
the assessments, had  implications for fireground training, performance and 
risk.  
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Armitage 2007), argued that using just qualitative or qualitative methods 
were representative of the ‘mono method era’, whereby researchers used 
purely qualitative or quantitative research methods, depending on their 
research paradigm.   The development of a “third way” has however been 
linked to the pragmatic paradigm.   Within this, the employment of a mixed 
methodology, or approach, reflects the need for pragmatic decision making, 
consistent with working in ‘real world’ settings.  A pragmatic paradigm 
allowed for differing data collection and research methods to be utilised, 
based on their appropriateness for the research undertaken and the research 
questions to be answered (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003).  This presents an 
approach whereby methods are selected from a ‘tool kit’ rather than dictated 
by the paradigm employed.  It is argued that this epistemological and 
methodological choice is reflected of the multiplicity of the ‘real world’.   
 
In relation to the qualitative data analysis completed within this research, it 
was decided that thematic analysis would be the most suitable method.  
Braun and Clarke (2006) argue that thematic analysis is comparable with 
both essentialist and construction paradigms and offers a flexible research 
tool, often leading to rich and detailed understanding of the data.  Due to 
research questions being identified, and interviews being structured to 
explore these, it was felt that thematic analysis of the data would be applied 
in a ‘theoretical’ way.  This involved a ‘top down’ method of analysis, which 
provided a detailed analysis of aspects of the data.  A number of methods 
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were considered and it was decided that thematic analysis was most 
appropriate as it was argued to be the most appropriate tool to answer the 
research questions set.  This being the case the next identified stage was to 
explore participants’ personal views of how ASA, PSA and bias / scope 
tendencies could improve subject awareness of the risks attached to such 
tendencies. The participants’ views were explored by means of semi-
structured interviews with 14 of the 19 FDMs who had undertaken both 
exercises; 2 of the participants did not wish to take part in the interview part 
of the research and 3 were not available due to promotion out of the Service, 
one retirement and one who was on long term sick.  Each FDM was given 
the opportunity not to take part and each gave consent prior to the interview 
taking place; being told that should they have no concerns regarding the 
interviews, all information from which would be confidential and they could 
withdraw their participation and any data collected at any time.  Some FDMs 
chose not to take part in the semi structured interviews, specific reasons 
were not given or requested, and some were not available; but 14 of the 19 
agreed to take part.  The semi structured interviews were undertaken with 
each individual in a private office between 12 to 14 months after their first 
briefing on their individual performance in relation to the assessment 
outcome with respect to SA and bias / scope in 2012.  
 
6.2 Direct Aims of the Research 
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The semi-structured interviews provided a collective response allowing a 
subjective evaluation of the importance that FDMs have placed on both bias / 
scope and SA since their introduction to it within this project.  As discussed 
due to the research questions being identified, and interviews being 
structured to explore these, a thematic analysis of the data was applied in a 
‘theoretical’ way.  A ‘top down’ method of analysis, which provided a detailed 
analysis of aspects of the data based on the direct aims of the research.  A 
number of methods were considered (Appendix 7), but it was decided that 
thematic analysis was the most appropriate tool to answer the research 
questions set, identifying a method of data analysis that could reflect reality 
for the participants, but also explore and unpick that reality (Braun and 
Clarke, 2006).    
 
The aim of this analysis was to gain some understanding of how taking part 
in the exercises and being made aware of not only the concepts of ASA, PSA 
and bias / scope, but also their personal patterns, would influence FDMs 
subsequent approach to their operational role.  The research question was 
thus: 
How do FDMs feel that taking part in the exercises, and being briefed on 
their ASA, PSA and bias / scope, influenced how they regarded their 
operational role and the way they approached it?  
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6.3 Thematic analysis of the 14 semi structured interviews with FDMs 
who took part in both the 2012 and 2013 studies 
 
The qualitative data was analysed using a thematic analysis approach, 
whereby interpretation of primary data was undertaken.  Thematic analysis is 
a qualitative method of identifying and analysing patterns or themes from 
within data (Braun and Clarke, 2006).  Gomm, Hammersley and Woods, 
(1994) identify that a researcher will always have some influence on the 
research they undertake, despite their use of skills to reduce this, each 
researcher will have their own values, belief and self that will influence the 
decisions they make throughout the research process.  It is therefore 
important that this is acknowledged within the research.  
 
6.4 Ethical Considerations 
 
These studies were conducted in compliance with the ethical guidelines laid 
down by the British Psychological Society and ethical approval was obtained 
through the recognised procedures within the University of Gloucestershire.  
The studies took place at FRS establishments at a time suitable to the 
participants; participation in these research studies was fully voluntary 
indicated by signed consent after a preliminary briefing. Participants were 
fully advised that there were no requirements to participate in the research 
project; some staff did elect not to be involved in the studies demonstrating 
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that consent was fully voluntary. Results were anonymised for purposes of 
general analysis and for reporting in any public forum, while personalised 
feedback on their own performance was provided to individuals. All data was 
stored on a single private computer, with password protection to log on and 
additional password protection to access the data folders.  Hardcopies of any 
data were kept in a locked storage unit in a private location. Personal details 
for all participants have also been anonymised in the research write up.  
 
6.5 Semi-structured Interview questions 
 
The research question emerged from the previous studies and so the 
thematic analysis was theory-driven rather than inductive.  This approach 
informed the interview questions that were as follows: 
 Have you undertaken any personal learning in relation to the 
information I shared at the interview (your profile from the 
assessment)?  
o Prompt:  what was this? 
 
 Has it made you think about your bias in any way?  
o Prompt:  can you explain this?  
 
 Now you’re aware of bias: have you recognize this in any of your 
decisions following the discussions we have had? 
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o Prompt: was this in a particular area of your work / 
environment? 
 
 Has it made you think about your command of an incident in a 
different way? 
o Prompt:  can you explain this (example)?  
 
 Do you think this knowledge could, or has, changed the way you 
command an incident? 
o Prompt: Can you give any further examples? 
o Do you think this is a positive change? 
 
 Do you think that you recognise the difference between actual and 
perceived SA? Can you explain this? 
 
o Have you thought about this since our last discussion? 
 
o Has it made any difference to the way you operate at an 
incident? 
 
6.6 Thematic analysis of responses to questions asked during the semi-
structure interviews. 
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Within the semi structured interview each of the 14 FDMs who took part was 
asked a series of questions based on their debrief from the first exercise 
approximately a year before (where they had sat down and discussed the 
outcome of their 2012 assessment), or related questions from the 
development of the research.  The semi structured interviews were 
undertaken before the outcome of the 2013 assessment was shared with the 
participants, and without any update on SA or bias / scope from either the 
research or from the researcher. 
 
The thematic analysis – method; The thematic analysis focused on one level 
and followed a semantic approach, identifying the themes within the meaning 
of the data and the analysis did not look beyond what participants had said or 
what had been written.  The analytical process involved progressing from the 
descriptive where the data was simply organised to show patterns and then 
summarised; and taken through to interpretation, from the interpretation the 
significance of patterns and their broader meanings and implications were 
identified.   
 
Gomm, Hammersley and Woods, (1994) identify that a researcher will 
always have some influence on the research they undertake, despite their 
use of skills to reduce this, each researcher will have their own values and 
beliefs that will influence the decisions they make throughout the research 
process.  I have been involved with this research for over 6 years now and 
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for over 25 years have been working with the FRS as an operational incident 
commander, as well as a training assessor and trainer with operation staff at 
both training exercises and operational incident assessments.  As Deputy 
Chief Officer I was responsible for the overall day to day operational 
response of the Service and for the competence of its operational staff from 
recruit basic training and acquisition of skills, to fire fighter application of skills 
and maintenance levels, through to strategic incident command training and 
interagency working.  As a senior manager within the Service I was also 
responsible for maintenance of discipline and grievance and direct line 
management of senior managers, but not for any direct line management (I 
was at least 3 levels of direct line management above) of station managers 
taking part in the research.  I have been aware of this throughout this 
research project and the influence this could have on outcomes; there will 
always be the risk that I may not have questioned responses enough as I 
understand the language used and also that I may have used my own 
context to shape the / my understanding of some of their points. There is also 
the risk that in the discussion on bias / scope because I have been investing 
in the research my views of what firefighters should / are doing may be 
different from the reality they are telling me. But in this I have worked hard to 
complete each interview using the same procedure and following the semi-
structured interview questions and prompts, to maintain the value of the 
research, but acknowledge that the influence that I bring to this research 
should not be ignored as it will have influenced the decisions at times within 
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research process. The interview responses and thematic analysis have also 
been discussed with researchers outside the fire service in an attempt to 
ameliorate such influences. 
 
A thematic analysis of the interviews was conducted using the six-stage 
process outlined by Braun and Clarke (2006).  The stages were as follows: 
 
Stage 1. Familiarisation with the data 
Following each interview the interview data for all participants was 
transcribed in full by the interviewer, which started the process of 
familiarisation of the material content for the analysis, this allowed for reading 
and rereading of the data. Even at this early stage ideas for coding were 
captured and notes made. The tapes used to record the interview were kept 
in a locked cabinet should they be needed for reviewing transcripts or 
clarifying the context of the discussion at a later date. 
 
Stage 2. Generating initial codes  
Codes were then developed with the specific research question in mind; the 
process was a manual one using different coloured highlighters to identify 
groups of similar codes and making notes against them if there was a query 
in relation to the coding, or the possibility that the response could fit into 
multiple themes.  Over all there were 27 codes identified within the specific 
questions across the interviews and these were approached with specific 
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questions in mind that were identified to help with the development of the 
research.  The codes were then brought together into groups, generally 
across the research and specifically under the questions that had been 
asked, once these were grouped the themes were developed and refined 
that are shown within the thematic map and reported within the following 
work, some codes worked across different themes. One code that did work 
across the themes was the code ‘no change’ where in a response to a 
number of question the answer was ‘I have not taken it forward’, ‘it’s the way 
I am’, ‘I did not consider it’, or ‘I don’t see a need to change’.  The work was 
undertaken systematically through the data set identifying interesting aspects 
(including the enthusiasm of some of the participants for the new knowledge, 
using notes) that formed the basis of repeated patterns (themes), giving full 
and equal attention to each data item.  
 
Stage 3.  Searching for themes 
Taking account of the questions presented within the semi structured 
interviews and how these questions were developed to assist in taking the 
research forward collecting the different codes was undertaken by copying 
them into themes or potential themes, identified from these questions and the 
responses given.  Then using copy and paste and arranging the codes under 
each potential theme, or identifying a number of different titles that could be 
used for the theme, both against the questions and as a holistic view of the 
process.  This process allowed for a sense of significance for each individual 
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theme to be identified and reinforced a single title that was identified and felt 
to be the correct one for the theme chosen. 
 
Stage 4. Reviewing Themes 
This stage refined the themes, reading and rereading each of the codes 
placed under the theme, drawing and redrawing the thematic map.  
Reviewing it to ensure what was being said by the participant was reflected 
by the choice of theme and the codes were coherent with the theme, looking 
for the themes to form a coherent pattern across all of the codes, with some 
codes reflected under more than one theme.  A full review of the data set 
was then undertaken bearing in mind the research question, looking to see 
that the themes worked in relation to the data set and looking to see if there 
were other themes that could be identified, or needed to be identified.   
 
Stage 5.  Defining and naming themes 
In reviewing the themes there was again a need to define and refine, to 
ensure the themes and data were coherent, ensuring that there was not too 
much overlap between the themes.  In reviewing this and working through 
the names of the theme before finally naming the theme and then reviewing 
again the code under the named theme, no sub-themes were identified, so 
only the main themes already identified were named and used for the final 
analysis.   
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Stage 6. Producing the report 
Themes were identified that related to different aspects of the research 
questions.  These themes, and the part of the research question to which 
they pertain, are presented below in the thematic map, the 5 areas shown in 
blue are the areas identified from the interviews and the questions presented. 
For each of the areas identified from the interviews themes were identified 
and these themes are expanded on following the thematic map.  The map at 
6.1 below is the final outcome of the refining process that was undertaken 
over the reviews of the codes and then matching the codes to the themes. 
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Figure 6.1; Thematic map developed from the information provided 
from the semi-structured interviews following coding. 
 
Personal understanding on bias / scope and SA identified by FDMs in 
the 12 months period following the profile review of the 2012 
assessment. 
Within the questions the term bias was used (as FDMs were familiar with this 
from the research) so the term bias is reported, not the term bias / scope. 
 
Theme Example Quote 
Incident 
based 
reflection 
"I have tried to apply my understanding of what we 
discussed in those sorts of scenarios and a number of 
operational incidents I have been to, just trying to 
understand what my bias is, how I approach things, what 
my situational awareness is like so no specific learning 
but I have tried to apply it in my role." 
"I gave it a lot of thought to it and I tried to apply it a little 
bit.  I reflected on how you explained bias and that you 
can have that sort of bias and that made a lot of sense to 
me in my performance at the incident". 
Training / 
exercise 
"Yes I did look at the information given me and I 
reviewed it quite a few times and from my perspective 
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based 
reflection 
when you look at bias in terms of your perspective and 
your ability".   
"Yes I have been through the incident command process 
and the technical bulletins to try to enhance my 
knowledge and understanding of what I am doing.  To 
make me feel more polished and professional, to make 
sure that I am going down the right route". 
"I gave it a lot of thought to it and I tried to apply it a little 
bit.  I reflected on how you explained bias and that you 
can have that sort of bias and that made a lot of sense to 
me in my performance at the incident. So I tried to make 
some changes into the way I approached the recent 
assessment down at Lansdowne". 
“Since we had that conversation there has been a couple 
of courses that I have been involved in where I have 
reflected on elements of that conversation and that has 
been quite useful”. 
Observation 
based 
reflection 
"Every incident I have been on I have looked at other 
people and how they manage that incident, looking for 
their bias without asking questions looking to see if they 
are closing down or opening back up".   
"Yes I took on board what you said last year I have 
attended three or four fire seminars with some case 
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studies which are always beneficial and force you to look 
into the incidents you have attended and what is coming 
out of these seminars".   
 
In looking at the theme of ‘incident based reflection’, an approach by three 
of the FDMs who had attended large / complex incidents was that each had 
taken the opportunity to look at their personal understanding of what had 
been discussed at the original debrief regarding the incident and its 
outcomes.  Linking this into what had been discussed about their command 
of the large / complex incident they had attended / commanded and had 
taken the opportunity to reflect back on it. For each of the other FDMs who 
took part, the main observation was that they had not responded 
operationally to many large / complex incidents within the 15 month period 
between the profile discussion and the interview to reflect on.  This lack of 
attendance for major incidents led to the ‘training / exercise based 
reflection’ theme where 50% of the FDMs (seven) had reflected on the 
2013 assessment and / or other training events to review the information 
presented at the discussion, linking it back into the information that was 
available to them for continuous professional development.  Other than this 
direct approach that FDMs identified to review their personal information 
within the interviews, three had taken the completely opposite opportunity 
provided by this approach.  They had taken the available opportunities to 
look at other incident commanders, ‘observation based reflection’, a 
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theme that was based on reflection of others in relation to what they through 
their own actions would have been either, at an operational incident or at a 
training event and had considered the way that they managed ASA, PSA and 
bias. One of the participants from this group had taken the opportunity of 
reviewing the incident commander’s position from attending national 
operational training seminars, where key incidents from around the UK FRS 
were debriefed to invited groups of operational response managers.  These 
presentations focus on both good and bad practices that played out at the 
incident being debriefed, as well as improvements in incident command, 
operations, or procedures identified. From this the individual believed that 
using these as a discussion base and including the information on bias, ASA 
and PSA, could possibly bring real benefit to incident commanders. 
Other than a very short "no, I don’t think I have", the FDMs who have been 
exposed to their own performance in relation to bias and both ASA and PSA 
from the 2012 assessment, were quick to build on it and each felt that it had 
improved their own performance, but there was no way of testing this.  The 
way they felt they had benefitted was either by using the themes identified of 
self analysis at incidents or exercises, or by reviewing and reflecting on other 
FDMs when they commanded an incident operationally, including reflection 
on incident commanders’ actions when debriefed on major national incidents.  
The feedback from the interviews shows that a good understanding of both 
bias and ASA and PSA was maintained by the FDMs.  All but one FDM 
discussed how they had used the information provided within their debrief 
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session of the 2012 assessment to build on and to improve their own 
knowledge / understanding of both SA and bias to improve outcomes from an 
operational perspective. 
 
FDM’s considerations on bias understanding  
Theme Example Quote 
Awareness of 
personal 
impact. 
"It has, I don’t know yet whether my bias is a set figure. I 
think what I suspect is it varies depending on the type of 
incident I am attending and how familiar I am with that type 
of incident.  So if it is something I have done on a number of 
occasions it will allow me to step back and not concentrate 
on the detail so much; but if it is something I am less familiar 
with I will look at the detail more, my bias will be more 
positive I think because I will have to concentrate more and 
look more closely at what is happening around me". 
"Yes it is about having balance to understand what you need 
to do.  That there is not too much information so that you 
don’t know what to do, or too narrow decisions and missing 
massive parts". 
The way I am! "I remember what you told me that my bias is very minimal 
....... from what you have told me I don’t need to develop that 
too much as it is about the right place ". 
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"I felt it was clear that I used a wider perspective and by 
being more aware of that, that was sort of my natural style". 
"Yes, it has made me more aware of bias and of your own 
bias, but I suppose I wouldn’t necessarily separate bias from 
some of the other elements of reflection of my performance".   
 
The majority of participants said they had recognised bias in themselves in 
the way we had discussed it (an information bias that could impact when 
under pressure on the incident ground, or simulated incident ground) and 
had understood their own personal bias.  They also identified that they had 
reflected on it in relation to its impact when undertaking operational decisions 
and the way they felt it could impact in the future.  There were two themes 
that came from this area of discussion the theme that showed an 
‘awareness of personal impact’ and a theme that appeared to accept 
where the individual was.  In being more aware of their personal bias, they 
also appeared to be much more aware of the wider ASA and PSA discussion 
and appeared to be more aware of self reflection and the need to review and 
reflect on outcomes to improve their operational competence and decision - 
making. In looking at the theme of ‘awareness of personal impact’ in some 
responses they also appeared to raise the same questions that had been 
raised within the research, was the information bias a situational or resting 
bias. While some of the FDMs had recognised their bias and had picked up 
on it in reflection to make it a real consideration for operational use.  Some 
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(three) had appeared not to have taken it forward, which gave the theme of 
‘the way I am’.  With a small number (two) not appearing to consider bias as 
a separate entity to all the other aspects of incident command training / 
management. 
 
Impact on understanding of bias awareness on decision – making 
Theme Example Quote 
Changes in 
command 
decision 
making style   
"Yes I have and I make a conscious decision to stop and 
make a lot more planning phases and communication 
phases within the work place, I got time to sit down and 
watch myself".   
"Yes it wasn’t that I was afraid to make a decision it was 
about evaluating everything, but not coming up with an 
answer.  I was aware of that bias and trying to bring things in 
a bit so that’s irrelevant, but those are relevant and bringing 
it in to my everyday management". 
"It is very difficult to recognise you are doing it but I think 
with the background I don’t think that I will forget that 
anymore because I do understand when we discussed the 
bias it made sense to me.  So it was fairly logical that I make 
sure I keep it in the back of my mind and monitor that that is 
the best thing you can do with a bias if you are aware of it 
that is the battle". 
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Not seeing a 
need for 
change 
"I think you always want to get involved, the fireman in you is 
always going to be there, but I think you consciously try to 
step back maybe my negative bias is that I stand back too 
much and try to get a holistic view; maybe I need to try and 
improve my bias in that aspect". 
"No I haven't if I was really honest with you". 
"No I don’t think I have, not consciously.  I think you always 
self reflect.  Sometimes you talk to the manager afterwards 
is there anything we might have done different but not during 
an incident".  
Awareness on 
decision 
making 
"I think it is innate at a level so I tend to revert to type, I am 
not saying I am comfortable but if it is less familiar I would 
definitely focus in more on the incident.  It is not something I 
go to a job and think I am going to make my bias more 
positive here it is just the way I react to it". 
"Yes I have, not necessarily my decisions, but in my 
decision making process, because I wouldn’t have said 
there were any dramatic surprises for me in our last 
conversation". 
 
With the majority of FDMs already recognising and accepting that they had a 
bias and undertaking some reflective practice, it appeared to be for them an 
easy step to self analyse and look at the impact in relation to their ongoing 
Page | 233 
 
decisions. In looking at the theme with ‘changes in command decision 
making style’, again it was the majority who looked back at how their bias 
affected their decisions and the outcome for these decisions and there were 
some interesting insights to how this information was accessed, used, 
understood and then expanded on from an individual perspective.  Some had 
taken direct action in relation to their identified bias "instead of taking a wide 
view I narrow it down", while others appeared to have considered it as a part 
of their internal makeup (they way they were) and looked to integrate it into a 
more internal aspect of their innate processes. “Regarding that bias, it is 
important that I don’t look beyond my piece of the stained glass window as it 
were, because I can’t affect any of that, but for me to ensure that bias covers 
the complete part of that stained glass window, if that makes sense, rather 
than being focused on just one part of it because that could be dangerous". 
There was again a theme that showed up in ‘not seeing a need for 
change’, there were three FDMs who said they had not recognised bias 
within the decision – making at operational incidents or training exercises 
they had attended following the briefing, but only one of them was clear that 
they had not progressed any of the discussion we had at this last briefing.  
While the other two said no they had not progressed any of the new 
knowledge, they recognised they had taken it forward to a limited extent 
within the interview and one reflected that the outcome from the last 
assessment was important to fully understand their bias in relation to it being 
situational or resting. There was one direct reference to an operational 
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incident, "Yes, last week the chap that was caught in machinery" an incident 
that due to its nature was time critical and likely to be highly pressurised, so it 
could be seen as a direct comparison to the assessed exercise where the 
original bias was identified. The theme of ‘awareness on decision – 
making’ came out of the interview in progressing how bias could impact on 
the individual and its relevance’s within their decision – making, it was 
interesting to find that they had identified that while their bias had been 
identified within an operational context, they progressed it beyond that to 
other areas of high pressure work they had undertaken.  Two had taken it out 
of the direct comparison with the operational / training environment and 
looked at it in the wider environment, reflecting that they felt that their bias 
was and did impact on other activities when they had to analyse information 
and make decisions. 
 
The way the FDMs considered the understanding gained on SA and 
bias could change the way in which you command an incident 
Theme Example Quote 
Possible 
change  
"It will do, it is about having opportunities to use it". 
"It is hard to say because I have not been to any significant 
incidents, but it has definitely made me think about it". 
"I think it will". 
Already 
changed 
"Yes it has, from my perspective in terms of my command it 
is important to match my ability with my confidence, but it is 
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important not to get influenced by too many pointers that can 
drag you into making the wrong decision".   
"Well it has given me some different ways of considering 
how I respond to a certain extent; it was things I had 
considered". 
"Yes it’s made me think that I might be the overall 
commander, but you need that checks and balances to go 
back to those individuals that you are working with to say 
done this, done this what do you think, have I missed 
anything and having that check have you thought of that; it 
has paid dividends already". 
"I have no doubt that it has influenced the way I make 
decisions, the way I think about decision making". 
Internal 
process; the 
way I am 
"Not significantly, my thought processes may have changed 
slightly and occasionally if I think I am getting too focused in 
I can maybe take a step back so it has given me more of a 
structure but in terms of how I run an incident and the 
decisions I would make, probably not". 
"Not massively, it’s made me think am I doing it, is this about 
right, am I happy with my focus am I taking in all the 
periphery, or am I not giving the task enough detail". 
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The theme of ‘possible change’ due to the new knowledge gained was 
strong and most believed the potential was high; it appeared to be that they 
lacked the opportunity to use the new knowledge to make changes because 
of the declining incidents.  With the theme of ‘already changed’ the overall 
view was that it had provided something to think about in relation to their 
command and decision - making style at an operational incident or training 
exercise, but a concern in some quarters was that if you only thought about it 
at an operational incident then it may be too late.  Most identified that there 
was a need to gather the information available at an incident or training 
exercise and identify from it what they through was valid and what they 
thought wasn't and also to check the information source.  The majority had 
seen an identified need for reflection following an incident or exercise and a 
need to question why the information you had used was under consideration 
and why other information available wasn’t considered. A general consensus 
was that the new knowledge needed to be included into everything the 
individual was considering in relation to the incident to gain the best outcome 
required for the incident and how the decisions the individuals made could be 
clarified using this knowledge before implementation.  All FDMs bar one 
thought it had changed the way in which they had commanded an incident, 
or would change the way they did it in the future, to a greater or lesser 
extent.  Eight believed it would or did have a great impact on the way they 
now worked and how they would make decisions in the future.  While others 
talked about a smaller impact, but at the same time explained how they 
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would see it impacting on them in the future, or at the larger incident. In all 
but one response it was seen as a positive area to be looking at and one that 
held real value for command decisions in taking forward.  While the theme of 
‘Internal process; the way I am’ appeared to be just an acceptance of the 
new knowledge as something that always was and within the discussions a 
number of FDMs felt they could work on it, but as a small development for 
them along with all the other training they receive.  Overall the views that 
were given reinforced the view with the research that a resting bias could be 
changed, or mitigated against, or a different way could be learned, in the 
same way automatic reading was a learned process as discussed earlier.    
 
SA understanding, recognition of actual and perceived SA   
Theme Example Quote 
SA 
understanding 
"Actual (ASA) is what is occurring and perceived (PSA) is 
what I think is occurring so I would say yes". 
"Well actual is a true understanding of what is going on in 
my mind so understanding the resources, the tactics, the 
nature of the incident and how it is developing. A perception 
is purely about your interpretation of the situation and how 
you think it is your take on the situation, which may or may 
not be accurate and it could mean that it is inaccurate based 
on assumptions, or prejudice, or miss- information". 
"It made me think more about the confidence I have got and 
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the ability I have got and how it needs to match up".  
"Yes I know what I do know and I know that I might think I 
know, but am happy to say that’s not a fact that’s an 
assumption, so I will look at that and get a fact so that that is 
no longer an assumption.  Once I have the facts that it is 
genuine situation awareness not what I think". 
"I think I do know the difference, I think the issue with myself 
and I think when you are fairly experienced we have that 
library of incidents that we have attended in the past and we 
can very quickly try to fit what is in front of us in to 
something we have already experienced”. 
“I think that different perception of something which is not 
what is exactly in front of you.  You have to be very careful 
you don’t try to make the two fit". 
SA is not the 
issue 
"I think I may recognise it, but a lot of my decisions are 
made on facts". 
"I think we need to recognise that however clever we think 
we are we need to make sure that all the things that are 
going on around us, we need to be able to review and put 
into the mix all the time". 
"I think it’s perhaps demonstrated that we need to 
consistently review and be on top of the processes that are 
needed to carry out incident command". 
Page | 239 
 
General SA 
discussion 
"I would hope it has made me better and enabled me to 
make more accurate decisions". 
"It has made a difference to how I operate; it’s about giving 
yourself time to think". 
"I tend to listen to the information and don’t try and fill in the 
gaps myself.  It is easy to get part information because 
there is a lot going on and you fill in those gaps which don’t 
always ring true". 
"I have never been a great one for self analysis".   
 
 
The theme of ‘SA understanding’ there was a general understanding by 
most of the participants of both perceived SA confidence(PSA) and actual SA 
(ASA) in relation to the research project and discussion following the 2012 
exercise, with the need to understand that ASA is paramount to making the 
best decision on the incident ground.  The link to bias and how under 
pressure you could fall back onto a conservative / narrow or liberal / wide 
bias and the impact this would have on your ASA was understood by all the 
FDMs.  Most FDMs had given consideration to ASA and PSA and the theme 
‘SA is not the issue’ showed some challenge for individuals in recognising 
the difference between ASA and PSA and how this difference could impact 
on the outcome of any operational incident or training scenario.  There was 
an understanding shown in the theme ‘general SA discussion’ of how 
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important understanding ASA and PSA was for good decision - making.  With 
part of that understanding linking into the ‘Primed Decision Making’ model 
(Klein 2003; Klein et al. 2010), with this also being linked to the size of the 
incident and the pressure the FDMs recognised from the situation. Nearly all 
the FDMs believed that a greater understanding of ASA, PSA and bias was 
positive and had made a difference to the way they operated; even the FDMs 
who had doubts did not identify a negative from the experience. 
 
6.7 Overall conclusion on the responses from the thematic analysis 
from the FDM’s who were interviewed   
 
As discussed, each of the 14 FDMs who took part in the interview sessions 
were asked a number of questions covering the areas that had been under 
discussion during the participants debrief following their 2012 assessment.  
The semi structured interviews were undertaken before the outcome of the 
2013 assessment had been shared with any of the participants, and without 
any update to them on either SA or bias / scope. 
 
The broad aims of the research were to 1) gain further understanding of 
fireground command and control decision - making in relation to how bias / 
scope influence decisions and 2) determine if once identified this can 
contribute to training guidelines for self awareness of how information is 
“scoped” personally in fireground situations.   
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In essence the basis of good SA must be a full understanding of any 
personal bias / scope and how personal bias / scope can / will impact on 
understanding and implementing operational decisions. The overall view 
following the thematic analysis was that each of the FDMs learned from the 
overall process and accepted the outcome in relation to their bias / scope 
and the impact this has on their PSA and ASA.  In accepting this they agreed 
that the outcome to operational incidents was in the main dependant on a 
good understanding of both ASA for them to make the best decisions from 
the information available and to obtain the best outcomes in relation to 
bringing the incident to a safe conclusion.  A number of FDMs also 
questioned whether the identification of bias / scope applied to just the 
operational environment or to their wider work.   General comments in 
support of this were; 
"So it feeds a bigger package of self awareness I suppose, so if I was to say 
to you now that I have just focussed on my bias and tried to analyse that, that 
then would be untrue but I suppose I have used it in a wider context like 
when I do self reflection; when I think about the way I approach certain 
issues or certain problems". 
"Because I find my bias affects business decisions day to day, people 
management decisions day to day, the scenario in which it was tested was 
an operations scenario.  But for me one of the key things is the fact that 
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those bias impact in every decision you make day to day, let alone when you 
are dealing with potentially extreme circumstances". 
 
Overall although not many of the FDMs had responded operationally to any / 
many large / complex incidents within the 15 month period between the 
profile discussion and the interview to reflect on,  they had used other ways 
to review the information presented at the discussion and had linked it into 
the information that was available to them for continuous professional 
development. Some had taken the opportunity presented to them to look at 
other incident commanders and the way they manage ASA, PSA and bias / 
scope. There was also recognition and understanding of their own personal 
bias / scope, reflection on it and the impact it could have when making 
operational decisions, two of the participants raising the question ‘was it a 
situational or resting bias’.  Three had appeared not to have taken the 
knowledge forward in any specific way, but only one of them was clear that 
they had not progressed any of the discussion, while two others did not 
appear to think bias / scope was a separate entity to all the other aspects of 
incident command training.  
 
The majority had looked at how personal bias / scope affected their decisions 
and the outcome for these decisions.  With some taking direct action in 
relation to their identified bias / scope and others appearing to have 
considered it as part of their makeup (the way I am) and integrate it into a 
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more internal aspect of their decision - making processes. The overall view 
was that it had provided something to think about in relation to their 
command and decision - making style at operational incidents.  All FDMs bar 
one thought it had changed the way in which they had commanded an 
incident or managed an exercise, or would change the way they did it in the 
future.  Eight thought it would have a great impact on the way they processed 
information in making decisions, while others talked about a smaller impact, 
but at the same time explained how they would see it impacting on them in 
the future, or at the larger more complex incident. In all but one response SA 
and bias / scope was seen as a positive area to be looking at and one that 
held real value for assisting in developing incident commanders and their 
command decisions - making into the future.  The feedback and analysis 
from the interviews shows that a good understanding of both bias / scope 
and SA was maintained by the FDM’s.  With all but one FDM showing they 
had used the information gained at the discussion of the 2012 assessment to 
build on and improve their own knowledge / understanding to improve 
outcomes from an operational perspective. 
 
6.8 Using the thematic analysis technique on the direct aims of the 
research to take forward and analyse the semi structure interview 
responses 
The previous exercise outcomes and the discussion following the analysis of 
the data they produced have shown that bias / scope does impact on the 
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individual FDM and the decisions they make at an operational incident under 
pressure.  As discussed following the FDM’s assessment exercises in 
October / November 2012 all the FDMs undertaking the exercise were 
debriefed in relation to their personal profiles.  The personal profiles showed 
each individual their bias / scope position and the profile of the two areas of 
SA (PSA confidence and ASA).  Following the second assessment exercise 
each FDM attended a meeting with the researcher and prior to discussing the 
results of the 2013 assessment they were offered an opportunity to 
undertake a semi structured interview.  19 FDM's had undertaken both the 
2012 and 2013 assessment process and of these 14 took part in the semi 
structured interview process between March and June 2014, which was 
based on their previous debrief with no new knowledge on bias / scope or SA 
from their second exercise until after the interview.   Following the thematic 
analysis of their responses a second review on the responses was 
undertaken using the three direct aims of the research in the same way as 
the themes had been used to help further analysis the information gained.  
As discussed above the overall response to the interviews showed a 
confidence by the majority of the FDMs that the process and the knowledge 
gained was considered to be of real value.  This analysis allowed for the 
direct aims of the research to be evaluated by the FDMs who had gone 
through the process and were seen as the experts in evaluating the process 
in relation to their unique area of emergency response and incident 
command. 
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Considering how the thematic analysis answers the research question: 
How do FDMs feel that taking part in the exercises, and being briefed 
on their ASA, PSA and bias / scope, influenced how they regarded their 
operational role and the way they approached it?  
 
Understand how information bias / scope by the individual influences 
or impacts decisions and outcomes in fireground exercises; 
There was a wide acceptance of how bias / scope impacted and affected the 
outcome of the exercise, "you look at bias in terms of your perspective and 
your ability; I never really thought about that before", “I think what I suspect is 
it varies depending on the type of incident I am attending and how familiar I 
am with that type of incident".  While for some individuals there was a much 
more positive acceptance of the way they understood it, "it is very difficult to 
recognise you are doing it, but I think with the background I don’t think that I 
will forget that anymore", and the way it had impacted on them, "well it has 
given me some different ways of considering how I respond".  With some real 
enthusiasm for how they saw it impacting into the future, " that you can have 
that sort of bias and that made a lot of sense to me in my performance at the 
incident" and "I have no doubt that it has influenced the way I make 
decisions". 
There also appeared to be a real understanding of how bias / scope can and 
did affect an individual, with a number of FDMs offering insight into how they 
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had started to use it to improve the way they managed incidents, in relation 
to their own personal bias / scope identified at their last debrief, "it’s made 
me think am I doing it, is this about right, am I happy with my focus am I 
taking in all the periphery, or am I not giving the task enough detail".  
Identification of a narrow / conservative bias / scope at the debrief brought 
out comments such as, "I was happy to step up and allow him to remain in 
charge, before that yes I would have taken charge of the incident", and "I 
think you always want to get involved, the fireman in you is always going to 
be there, but I think you consciously try to step back".  While those who had 
been identified with a wider / liberal bias / scope felt they needed to look 
deeper into the available information, "yes particularly in relation to flooding 
where we have got large geographical areas".  Or even make a change in 
the way they managed an incident, "now part of my strategy is making sure 
all the information is put down, all the messages are collated in hard copy so 
that I can sit down and review what has happened in the last quarter of an 
hour" and "that awareness of it enables me to step back and do that in a 
more conscious way".  With an acceptance by some that their bias / scope 
may not be just confined to the operational incident, “I have used it in a wider 
context like when I do self reflection; when I think about the way I approach 
certain issues or certain problems" and "I find my bias affect business 
decisions day to day". 
The real test to both the understanding of bias / scope and SA from the 
interviews was shown in the way the information in relation to their personal 
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bias / scope was accepted by the overwhelming majority of the FDMs and 
how they had reacted to it over the period since it had been discussed with 
them.  While it had been explained to them at the first debrief  that this was 
ongoing research and the position to confirm it as a situational or resting bias 
scope had yet to be established, they had recognised within their own 
actions occasions that supported the analysis they had been shown. 
Throughout the interview comments on the impact the debrief had, had on 
both operational incidents and exercises over the intervening time came out 
at the interview.  "I have tried to apply my understanding of what we 
discussed in those sorts of scenarios and a number of operational incidents I 
have been to" and "so I was very conscious of building on the tactical 
situation and understanding my bias".  With this being quite a consistent 
response right across all the interview questions, "absolutely the way I 
looked at the first assessment impacted on the second assessment" as well 
as "it made me think more about the confidence I have got and the ability I 
have got and how it needs to match up".  With some responses appearing to 
be critical of the way they had undertaken incident management before the 
debrief, "make sure that I was carrying out the objectives that I needed to in 
a proper way", as well as "because it goes back to I make a positive effort to 
make sure I am not falling into a bias so that I miss something".   
From the feed back there is a real acceptance of the information provided 
and how it will improve the way an individual can manage an operational 
incident, "it has paid dividends already", "I would hope it has made me better 
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and enabled me to make more accurate decisions", "it has made a difference 
to how I operate; it’s about giving yourself time to think" and "I tend to listen 
to the information and don’t try and fill in the gaps myself”. 
 
Does bias / scope work in different ways across individual incident 
commanders; 
There was a recognition across the group that bias / scope impacted 
differently on different individuals, "I have looked at other people and how 
they manage that incident looking for their bias without asking questions, 
looking to see if they are closing down (conservative bias / scope) or opening 
back up (liberal bias / scope)". With some real benefits identified because of 
this, which were considered to be a way to improve the individual position, "I 
took that on board looking at other people and what they do"; "other incident 
commanders coming at the role you learnt an awful lot from them".  With 
again an acceptance that this had offered a new way to improve 
performance, by confirming what a number of FDMs felt they already knew, 
"complacency comes into it as well; you tend to ignore certain information 
because you assume it is going to be as it was in the past". Which again 
came across as a willingness to be critical of previous behavior in relation to 
incident management, "I think it is just going back to the detail again and 
making sure I confirm and utilise a number of methods to ensure that I keep 
the detail" and "I believe my particular bias may have led to me missing 
some information detail".   As well as turning it into a more constructive 
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criticism, “we have attended in the past and we can very quickly try to fit what 
is in front of us in to something we have already experienced".   
 
A number of FDMs showed the wider understanding of how it worked 
differently for different individuals, while at the same time emphasising that 
they were already aware of any bias / scope they had, "I wouldn’t say it’s 
affected the way I actually carry out that process".  Giving the impression 
they were already aware of their bias / scope, so the debrief was just 
confirmation of what they already knew, "I used a wider perspective and by 
being more aware of that, that was sort of my natural style", as well as "I 
think it is innate at a level so I tend to revert to type". With a few justifications 
coming into the interview as it progressed, "yes it wasn’t that I was afraid to 
make a decision it was about evaluating everything, but not coming up with 
an answer".  As well as the acknowledgement that it can be different, for 
different FDMs with a number discussing self analysis in the way they 
applied their bias / scope, "I think that is really important for me, because 
then I get a true reflection", with some justification, "some of those outside 
influences might have affected me in a different way".  Again there was an 
acceptance that the process was part of their internal makeup, but not a 
ready acceptance that it was a fixed part, "taking a wide view I narrow it 
down for the last assessment in a training environment", and "not necessarily 
my decisions, but in my decision making process".  With the question again 
raised in relation to the wider application of resting bias / scope, "but for me 
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one of the key things is the fact that those bias impact in every decision you 
make day to day, let alone when you are dealing with potentially extreme 
circumstances".  Bringing it down to what many would refer to as their job, 
"how much of an influence that would have when you are talking about key 
decisions, really important decisions". 
 
Progressing from the theoretical model into a training / assessment 
scenario to determine if an individual’s bias / scope can be identified 
and whether this knowledge assists the outcome of the decisions in 
actual fireground conditions; 
Overall the feeling was that the information from the assessment on both 
ASA, PSA and bias / scope was of real value in helping to make operational 
decisions on the fire ground and from the feedback and development 
identified, these benefits to the FDM are ones that can be built on.  The 
obvious comparison with the first 2012 assessment was the 2013 one, “so I 
tried to make some changes into the way I approached the recent 
assessment” and “in the run up to that assessment I did a bit of self reflection 
on the results from last time and tried to consider how that would affect my 
contribution on the second assessment”.  With also a lot of references to 
review of the information and development from reflecting at incidents, “but 
you did not step back and say ok this is what I need to do”. Which raises the 
question regarding a resting bias / scope or situational bias / scope, but given 
the debriefing to the participants on their first assessment didn’t appear to 
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make a difference to their bias / scope in their second assessment, there is a 
need to look to see if there is a correlation between ASA and PSA in the 
future, or how bias is impacted in the longer term. Looking to see if the pre 
knowledge on their bias / scope didn’t impact on their bias / scope, did it 
impact on their PSA, did it make them look for more key facts about the 
situation, rather than assume they knew it following formal training, narrowing 
the difference between their ASA and PSA.  As well as a direct influence on 
the individuals command decision process, “my bias will be more positive I 
think because I will have to concentrate more and look more closely at what 
is happening around me”, as well as personal challenge and reflection, “with 
some the situational awareness thing is something that is useful because you 
can reflect during an incident, examine how well you understand what is 
going on and challenge yourself”.   
 
There was a positive response to the studies and the outcome to them in 
understanding the information provided and taking this on into the training 
environment for operational command, “you pointed out the danger of being 
really confident and not knowing what you are doing”.  With a consideration 
that just being told your outcome was of real benefit, “but just running 
through it increases your own awareness”, and how it affects you in the 
longer term, “I think you tend to develop as a decision maker anyway so this 
is just one of those elements that fits into that development”.  With this 
development not just restricted to formal training events or to agenda items, 
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“I have attended three or four fire seminars with some case studies which are 
always beneficial and force you to look into the incidents”.  As well as some 
open conversation on how they had identified their own training needs from 
just the one session, “perhaps I need to pull out a little bit more and review 
where I am”, and how it had simulated thoughts on the wider incident 
command training needs, “How I do it.  Is it positive or negative, what are the 
pros and cons”.  With a lot of self reflection on the individual nature of the 
learning process, “it has made me more aware of bias and of my own bias”, 
“how I can develop that”, and in coming away from the incident “is there 
anything we might have done different”. So from the outcome of the semi 
structured interview it would appear that up to a point each FDM starts to set 
his own training agenda to improve the way he make operational decisions, 
“it is difficult to quantify what I actually do differently apart from you find that I 
look at that detailed picture whenever I can”, which enhances his 
professionalism, “I think it’s perhaps demonstrated that we need to 
consistently review and be on top of the processes that are needed to carry 
out incident command”. Even moving to provide their own assessment 
process, “it is very difficult for me to be able to grade how much of a 
difference that would make if you know what I mean”, and “this is an 
extremely valuable tool because it is giving the bench mark standard”. 
 
6.9 Reflexive analysis 
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In reviewing the data provided and writing up the analysis it would appear, 
the most positive benefit coming from the interviews was the ownership 
shown by the individual FDMs in the way they had taken on the outcomes 
from the first assessment, “because I do understand when we discussed the 
bias it made sense to me”, acting like a “trigger to go away and do some 
more work because you should be concerned or worried about it”. Reviewing 
what they had been told and looking to improve in specific areas, right across 
the operational training requirement, “It is suggesting that I am looking a bit 
too narrow and maybe getting sucked in a little bit too closely so I think it is 
about trying to become more strategic take that step back”, and “it is very 
easy to rock up and take over and that’s probably what we do too often and 
shouldn’t do”. 
 
In essence the basis of good SA on the incident ground must be a full 
understanding of any personal bias / scope (either negative / liberal or 
positive / conservative) and how this personal bias / scope can / will impact 
on the understanding of what is happening on the incident ground.  With this 
understanding of how bias / scope can influence ASA, a fuller picture of the 
actual situation will be available to the incident commander and this will then 
ensure operational decisions are made with the best information available at 
the time, which will help to gain the best outcomes for all involved.   
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I have been aware of the influence I can bring to this area of the research 
throughout this research project and the influence this could have on 
outcomes, but have worked to remain objective to maintain the value of the 
research, but acknowledge that the influence that I bring to this research 
should not be ignored as they will have influenced the decisions at times 
within research process. 
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Chapter 7: Summary and conclusions 
 
7.1 The main issue and aims of the thesis 
 
The model used within the UK Fire and Rescue Service (FRS) for incident 
command is the ‘Managing Incident: Decision making model’ (Figure 1.4) 
(Fire and Rescue manual; Volume 2, Fire Service Operations, Incident 
Command 3rd Edition 2008). This model requires the incident commander 
to look at the incident information available, identify the type of incident 
resource required and bring it to a safe / satisfactory conclusion.  In the 
USA they use Boyd’s OODA loop (Figure 1.5) for incident command 
incorporating four essential elements: Observe, Orient, Decide and Act 
(Boyd 1987), but this has similar stages to the UK's model. The training 
and development provided to the operational commander from the models 
discussed should take them through the conscious competence learning 
model (Gordon 1970) up to either the ‘conscious competent' or the 
‘unconscious competent’.  Under the four stages for learning any new skill 
the incident commander would travel sequentially through the 
unconscious incompetent, conscious incompetent, conscious competent 
to unconscious competent stages while undertaking incident response 
and dealing with incident management via operational incidents and 
exercising.  Once promoted to a flexible duty manager and responding to 
operational incidents, this is the stage in the operational career of the 
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individual their ability to manage an incident as an incident commander is 
exercised and assessed on a regular basis as a competent person 
undertaking a role within the incident command structure.  The question 
raised within the thesis is, given that this competence is gained, assessed 
and exercised, how do we explain some of the puzzling decisions / errors 
people make even when theoretically they have all the correct knowledge 
and operational information available to them at the incident?   
 
We know that information bias / scope can apply to either externally available 
information, what people are being informed of and seeing before them, as 
well as applying to the information people hold as their knowledge or 
memory. Even if / when a wide range of information is taken on board, 
people can still mentally or internally adjust their bias / scope so they select 
the points they want to use from the full range of information available held 
as knowledge within their memory. This process can explain some of the 
puzzling decisions / errors people make even when theoretically they have all 
the correct knowledge and information available to them.  Following the 
outcome of the research it is felt that information bias could be looked on as 
developed subconsciously and can be seen as a reaction to events and 
exposure to situations one experiences.  What the research has shown is 
that the action of a bias / scope (as defined in this thesis) can explain a 
variety of actions in pressured situations, driven by largely subconscious 
processes.  In this way the bias / scope becomes a subconscious ‘attitude’ or 
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reaction and focus that the individual undertakes to deal with the situation 
they are managing when under pressure; to assist them make decisions and, 
from their perspective, to bring the situation under control.   
 
A cognitive bias is the human tendency to make systematic decisions in 
certain circumstances based on cognitive factors rather than evidence. 
These processes include information processing shortcuts, motivational 
factors, and social influence. Cognitive bias is a common outcome of human 
thought, and can often drastically skew the reliability of evidence and 
situational outcomes. In all, effective fireground decision - making does not 
just involve accumulating information to build a good picture of the situation 
or to gain good SA (Catherwood, Sallis, Edgar and Medley, 2010; Gasaway, 
2008; Klein, Calderwood and Clinton-Cirocco, 2010; Omedei, et. al. 2005). It 
requires the right selection in relation to the information available from the 
external environment and the internal knowledge base of the decision - 
maker. This is the type of bias / scope that has been studied explicitly in this 
thesis and could be labeled as an, ‘information bias.’   As this information 
bias / scope of the decision maker directly affects the selection of information 
for decision - making, it carries implications for error or risk. Even if the body 
of available knowledge does not vary, different bias / scope may be applied 
to that knowledge, leading to varying degrees of acceptance or rejection of 
the available information. Inappropriate bias / scope thus carries potential 
risk for making errors and it is important to determine if there are individual 
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differences in bias / scope dispositions and to consider the factors that may 
affect such tendencies. 
 
There is a potential for bias / scope in fireground decision - making for 
conscious and unconscious processes to influence the information selection 
process. Given the range of factors that could induce bias in this way, 
individual differences or variations in bias / scope tendencies may well arise 
within the same situation. An understanding of such individual bias / scope 
patterns would seem critical for improving and training self-awareness in 
regard to the selection of information and potential risk tendencies in 
fireground decision - making. The initial aim of the current research was thus 
to develop a technique that would in the first instance determine whether 
response bias / scope tendencies are apparent for FRS personnel in 
fireground simulation exercises and whether there are individual differences 
in bias / scope. The QASA technique provides measures of:  
 
a) Knowledge or actual situational awareness ASA. 
 
b)  Perceived situational awareness (confidence) PSA 
 
c) The information bias / scope applied by the decision - maker to the 
available information.  As discussed, the bias measure in QASA gives further 
insights into the critical question of how knowledge or information may be 
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selected or filtered for decision - making and whether this is being achieved 
in a strict and conservative way or alternately, a more lax or liberal manner.  
 
When situational awareness (SA) is used alone (without the A or P prefix) it 
refers to SA generally without a specific type. 
 
It was predicted that individual differences in bias / scope tendencies would 
be apparent for the same situation and that such tendencies may be 
independent of the ASA and PSA of the individual. In other words, even 
amongst those with the same SA there may be different bias / scope, so that 
when errors are made, some people may tend towards making miss errors 
and some towards false alarm errors. 
 
7.2 Summary of findings from the breathing apparatus study: Is there 
evidence of bias / scope in a realistic fireground exercise 
 
This first study involved a realistic simulation of an operational fire incident 
within a commercial premise with 16 competent operational FRS fire fighting 
personnel wearing breathing apparatus (BA) in a cosmetic smoke filled 
darkened building in a search and rescue (casualty recovery) exercise. The 
broad aims of the study were to gain an understanding of the individual fire 
fighters fireground SA and decision - making in relation to how bias / scope 
influences these decisions and to indentify further studies on how it could 
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contribute to training guidelines for self-awareness of how information is 
scoped personally in fireground situations.  If the basis of good command 
training is based on continuation training and experience, then to assist this 
an understanding of any personal bias / scope and how personal bias / 
scope, can / will impact on making and implementing operational decisions 
would be a step forward in reducing some of the devastating incidents we 
have seen in the past. 
 
The data analysed by the QASA tool identified that most individuals 
displayed a high level of knowledge (ASA) about the incident they were 
committed to, but also showed either a conservative bias / scope (with miss 
errors) or a liberal bias /scope (with false alarm errors). Overall the analysis 
shows that knowledge of the situation and what was going on was good 
(ASA), although predictably it was better for the briefed items undertaken by 
the BA entry control officer than non-briefed items. The results however also 
show that two individuals can appear to have similar knowledge (ASA) about 
the situation, but in fact still have very different bias / scope in regard to that 
knowledge. The real interest of this study however was how incident ground 
information is scoped, reflecting an information bias.  That is, the aim was to 
determine whether individuals worked from a broad span of information 
available, with lax or liberal bias / scope, trusting the information they were 
presented with from all the different inputs using a wider scope of information 
available, but perhaps not processing it very deeply (butterfly syndrome).  Or 
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whether the individual focused down on a small part of the available 
information, reflected in a narrowing of perception (tunnel vision) and a 
conservative bias / scope in their selection of information. As noted before, 
this bias / scope can have an external or internal aspect; in an external 
sense, it can affect the visual inspection of the incident ground (scanning 
widely to narrowly), while in an internal sense, it can affect the mental 
impression that is formed about the situation (thinking about the wider 
implications for the situation or only narrowing down on a few aspects). The 
two are closely linked: for example, a narrow internal bias / scope may mean 
that there is incomplete visual scanning of the situation and vice versa, a 
wider external scanning pattern may produce an incomplete detailed 
impression of the situation lacking depth. This type of scoping may have 
important consequences for decisions and errors made in actual incident 
ground situations (Catherwood, et. al. 2010). 
 
The ultimate aim of this part of the project was to improve understanding of 
the processes underlying operational command and control decision - 
making on the incident ground and to see if it is possible to train self-
awareness of the bias / scope of information in actual incident ground 
situations. The main aim of the BA experiment was to determine whether 
bias / scope patterns would be apparent in a realistic and challenging 
situation, which was clearly the case. Nearly all participants showed either a 
conservative (positive) bias / scope tendency or a more liberal (negative) 
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bias / scope tendency. The question for further research was whether such 
bias / scope is consistent for individuals, a resting bias / scope that is an 
inherent part of their cognitive apparatus for decision - making that may 
become especially apparent when under pressure.  Or is bias / scope a 
situational tendency that will vary each time with the situation, or the 
emergency incident or exercise. 
 
7.3 The table top exercises: assessing bias / scope consistency 
 
The main aim of the second and third study was to determine and confirm 
that there were individual differences in bias / scope patterns for operational 
FRS fire fighting personnel using two different table top fireground based 
exercises and to assess if such bias / scope was consistent across the 
exercises.  The table top exercises were based on a fire in a domestic 
property (house) and a fire in a commercial premises (factory), in both 
exercises there were persons reported as missing (individuals believed to be 
still in the premises).  Both exercises were designed to reflect the individual 
fire fighter's tendencies towards either accepting or rejecting the available 
information and to confirm if they showed a defined bias / scope pattern 
within their response to the probes used. In particular the aims were to 
assess: 
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 1) Whether individuals displayed one of three potential bias / scope patterns, 
namely:  
a) a narrow or conservative bias / scope (with a tendency to reject 
information and so make misses) or,  
b) a lax or liberal bias / scope (with a tendency to accept information 
and so make false alarms) or, 
c)  no such bias / scope in either direction. 
 
2) Whether such bias / scope were affected by firefighting experience. 
 
3) If they did show bias / scope, whether it was consistent for the individual 
across the two scenarios.  
 
In this exercise three groups of participants were tested:  
 
a) Full time fire fighters and operational managers 
b) Part time (retained) fire fighters and operational managers. 
c) A student sample. The inclusion of the student sample into the 
experiment was to obtain validation of the professional relevance of 
the task for FRS decision - making.  
 
The overall level of ASA for the FRS sample was high, with FRS fire fighting 
personnel showing significantly higher ASA than the student sample, 
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consistent with the professional relevance of the task for FRS personnel.  
The results for the bias scores however show a different pattern. The FRS 
and student samples did not differ in bias scores, both samples having 
negative (liberal, accepting or lax) and also positive (conservative, narrow) 
bias / scope tendencies on average for students and for FRS personnel, but 
further analysis for the main sample of interest (FRS fire fighting personnel) 
confirms that there are individual differences in bias / scope tendencies. 
 
The primary aim of this experiment was to determine if FRS fire fighting 
personnel displayed bias / scope patterns in decision - making during a table 
top fire incident exercise, which would confirm the outcome from the first BA 
training exercise. The evidence clearly shows that for most participants this 
was the case, just six out of the total of 50 FRS participants in the first study 
showed no bias / scope at all. The majority of FRS participants tended 
towards a negative or liberal bias / scope (and hence towards making false 
alarm errors), while the remainder showed a positive or conservative bias / 
scope (and hence towards making miss errors).  With these differences not 
linked to level of ASA or knowledge, nor to years of experience or 
professional status (full time vs. retained). The level of ASA was high for both 
FRS groups and significantly higher than that for the students, confirming the 
validity of the task content used for FRS fire fighting personnel. Nevertheless, 
the FRS sample did not show significant differences in bias / scope 
tendencies to those shown by the students. In other words, the bias scores 
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reflect tendencies that are statistically independent of FRS experience. For 
the fire fighters, ASA was high in both exercises, while fire fighters perceived 
their PSA (confidence) in a similar way over the two exercises, meaning that 
if they had high confidence in their ASA in one exercise they also had high 
confidence in the other exercise, or low confidence in one and low 
confidence in the other. Of concern however is that there is no significant 
correlation between the ASA scores and the PSA scores. In other words, 
people may have had poor ASA but perceived that their ASA was good or 
vice versa, had good ASA but judged it to be poor.  
 
The other important finding is that the pattern of bias / scope tendencies 
differed across the two studies (no one had a bias score of zero or no bias / 
scope in the second study). There was no significant correlation between the 
bias scores across the two exercises, so people that had a conservative bias 
/ scope in the house exercise and may have had a liberal bias /scope in the 
factory exercise, or the other way round.  The results indicated that the bias / 
scope and ASA measures obtained in each of the scenarios showed no 
significant correlation.  That is, a fire fighter that showed high bias / scope or 
ASA on one scenario might show low on the other.  Thus individuals’ levels 
of bias / scope and ASA varied according to the situation.  Interestingly, there 
was no significant correlation between perceived and actual SA in either 
scenario, so the firefighters tested appeared to be unaware of their own level 
of ASA.  
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The major difference that appeared between the two table-top exercises was 
the induced pressure that the fire fighters who were undertaking them, felt 
themselves to be under.  In the domestic (house) exercise no one had 
experience of this type of exercise before and the attendance of a senior 
officer and two senior individuals from the university had brought to the 
exercise a tangible pressure.  In undertaking the commercial (factory) 
exercise nearly all the fire fighters had taken part previously in the domestic 
exercise and appeared to be a lot more relaxed in both the brief for the 
exercise and in the taking part in the exercise itself.  The one major 
difference on the table top exercise and the previous breathing apparatus 
exercise appeared to be the pressure, or lack of pressure on the individuals 
taking part and how this played out on their individual responses to the 
questions posed with the probes. In considering if the bias / scope is a 
resting bias / scope or a situational bias / scope, this raises debate around 
the reaction of fire fighters and in particular incident commanders in dealing 
with the exercise / incident.  In the normal management of the operational 
situation or training, experience is seen to play a major role in bringing it to a 
safe conclusion, but as pressure is applied as the incident develops, or gets 
more complicated, or higher risk (major loss of life); we start to see a non 
trained response - we perhaps start to see the individual bias / scope 
involved with the decision - making.  So if the bias / scope only influence 
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decisions under pressure, then we cannot expect a correlation between the 
exercises if different pressures were present. 
 
It cannot be determined why such bias / scope tendencies occurred in this 
exercise, but nonetheless the current evidence serves the important purpose 
of confirming that bias / scope tendencies are apparent. The level of ASA 
was high for most individuals, but when these people were not certain of the 
correct answer, they showed bias / scope tendencies associated with either 
miss errors or false alarms in decision - making. This important finding could 
have valuable implications for fireground training in the future by improving 
performance and reducing risk. It could be argued however that the exercise 
in this study is not sufficiently realistic to ascertain whether such bias / scope 
might occur in more realistic simulations or in actual fireground contexts. 
There was also a lack of consistency of bias / scope across the two 
exercises, which was felt to be because of a lack of pressure exerted on the 
subjects taking part in the second exercise. To further address this question, 
the next study used a similar methodological approach but in a more realistic 
training exercise with a higher level of pressure or demand. This further 
research examined individual bias / scope and whether it is consistent 
(resting) for the individual, or is a situational one varying with the incident / 
exercise. 
 
Page | 268 
 
7.4 Scoping studies 4 and 5: Flexible duty station managers 
development and assessment exercises:  how does bias / scope 
influence the operational outcome of pressurised fire incident 
command  
 
The primary aim of this study was to confirm the evidence of bias / scope 
patterns for operational FRS fire fighting personnel found in the table top 
fireground exercises, reflecting the individual’s tendencies towards either 
accepting or rejecting the available information (Catherwood, Sallis, Edgar 
and Medley, 2012). In particular however, the aim here was to assess 
whether individual operational response officers in a controlled but highly 
pressurised situation that had greater demand and personal consequences 
than the previous exercises showed a resting, or situational bias / scope.  
The primary aim of the second exercise in this study was to assess the 
consistency of any bias / scope patterns for individual operational FRS 
personnel found in the first command development / assessment fireground 
studies.  The aim was thus to identify any correlation from the individuals 
who took part in both exercises between the individual results for 2012 and 
2013 that will point to either a situational bias / scope (a bias / scope that 
could vary with the individual when attending a high pressure operational 
role), or resting bias / scope (a bias / scope that will reoccur with the 
individual when undertaking a high pressure operation role) and ultimately to 
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propose a way of using this knowledge to improve operational response 
officers training and understanding of their bias / scope pattern.   
 
All participants were immersed in the same situation as operational FRS 
incident commanders in an assessable simulated fireground incident. The 
simulated fireground incidents were based on a realistic and a developing 
incident that each individual had to take over the command of from the first 
attendance commander and move towards a successful conclusion from an 
operational, environmental and social perspective. The ASA, PSA and bias 
scores were obtained with respect to the scenario, using the QASA method 
described earlier.  The participants were all flexible response operational 
officers working across a UK FRS and all participants were in managerial 
roles undertaking operational response (station manager) both full time and 
retained. Their responses were collected anonymously and all gave informed 
written consent.  
 
Most of the participants tended towards a positive or conservative bias / 
scope (and hence towards making miss errors) and some 24% showed a 
very low or mixed bias / scope, with the rest showing towards a negative or 
liberal bias / scope (and hence towards making false alarm errors).  With 
these differences not linked to level of ASA or knowledge, nor to years of 
experience or contractual status (full time vs. retained). The level of ASA was 
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high 60> = 68% and 50< 20% confirming the validity of the task content for 
FRS personnel.  
 
As discussed in Catherwood et. al. (2012) it cannot be determined why such 
bias / scope tendencies occurred in these exercises, but nonetheless the 
current evidence serves the purpose of confirming that bias / scope 
tendencies were apparent and consistent across both scenarios for most 
participants. The level of ASA was high for most individuals, but when these 
people were not certain of the correct answer, they showed bias / scope 
tendencies associated with either miss errors or false alarms in decision - 
making. In relation to bias / scope there was a statistically significant high 
positive correlation across the two sets of scores for each assessment, the p 
value was lower than the critical 0.05 significance level. This means that 
individuals showed similar bias scores over both the development / 
assessment simulated fireground incident study and the assessable 
simulated fireground incident study, which points to a resting bias / scope (a 
bias / scope that will reoccur with the individual when undertaking a high 
pressure level operation role), rather than a situational bias / scope (a bias / 
scope that could vary with the situation when attending a high pressure level 
operational role).   
 
The key difference between this set of exercises and the table top exercises, 
appeared to be the pressure that was on the individual undertaking the 
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exercises. The first table top exercise (house fire) was new to the individuals 
and they were unaware of the outcome or impact in relation to themselves 
(even though they were briefed that this was for the university).  The 
attendance of a senior officer and two individuals from the university also 
increased the pressure for the individuals taking part.  The second table top 
exercise (factory fire) was undertaken using some of the same fire fighters 
who had taken part in the first table top and had received a debrief on the 
outcome from this exercise.  The environment for the second exercise was a 
great deal lighter than the first, with some laughter and joking taking place 
regarding the outcome, the participants were also familiar with the 
attendance of a senior officer and university staff. The inconclusive outcome 
for individual bias / scope patterns from the table top exercises led to the 
assessable flexible duty response officer exercises to assess the effect of 
pressure on individuals to help in identifying the individual bias / scope 
pattern.  
 
One of the aims of this research was to determine whether the bias / scope 
patterns evident in the table top exercise would also be apparent in a more 
realistic and challenging situation. This was clearly the case. The participants 
showed either a conservative (positive) bias / scope tendency or a more 
liberal (negative) bias / scope pattern and of most interest, this was again 
independent of the level of ASA. More importantly, the positive correlation 
over both exercises suggests a resting bias / scope rather than a situational 
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one.  Which means, if there was a way to devise a process to identify an 
individual bias / scope by a manageable test, then training or information on 
an individual's bias / scope tendency could be worthwhile.  A summary of all 
exercises can be found in appendix 8. 
 
7.5 Overall conclusion of the responses from the thematic analysis 
from the interviews   
 
As discussed, following the FDMs assessment exercises in 2012 all the 
FDMs undertaking the exercise were debriefed in relation to their personal 
profiles, and following the second assessment exercise each FDM had the 
opportunity to discuss the results of the 2013 assessment.  19 FDMs had 
undertaken both the 2012 and 2013 assessment process and of these 14 
took part in a semi structure interview process between March and June 
2014, which was based on their initial  debrief of the 2012 assessment with 
no new knowledge on bias / scope or SA from their second exercise until 
after the interview.  The 14 FDMs who took part in both of the operational 
assessments and the interview sessions were asked a number of questions 
covering the areas that had been under discussion during their debrief 
following their 2012 assessment.  The semi structured interviews were 
undertaken before the outcome of the 2013 assessment was shared with 
them, and without any update on SA or bias / scope. The broad aims of the 
research were to;  
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1) gain further understanding of fireground command and control decision - 
making in relation to how bias / scope influence decisions and, 
 
2) determine if once identified this can contribute to training guidelines for 
self-awareness of how information is scoped personally in fireground 
situations.   
 
The overall view following the thematic analysis was that each of the FDMs 
learned from the overall process and accepted the outcome in relation to 
their bias / scope and the impact this has on their ASA and therefore on their 
decision - making. Within this two themes that emerged were ‘incident based 
reflection’ and ‘training / exercise based reflection’ suggesting an approach 
that looked at their personal understanding and linked this into what had 
been discussed with them about their command and they had then taken the 
opportunity to reflect back on it. Another theme was ‘observation based 
reflection’ not such a direct approach, but based on reflection of others 
actions in relation to what they thought their own actions might have been. 
The feedback from the interviews showed a good understanding of bias, ASA 
and PSA was maintained by the FDMs, a majority of participants said they 
recognised bias in themselves in the way it had been discussed (an 
information bias/ scope) and understood their own personal bias.  There 
were two themes that came from this area of discussion, an ‘awareness of 
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personal impact’ and a theme that appeared to accept ‘it’s the way I am’ in 
being aware of their personal bias / scope, they also appeared to be much 
more aware of the wider ASA and PSA. With the majority of FDMs appearing 
to recognise and accept that they had a bias and undertaking some reflective 
practice, it appeared to be for them an easy step to self analyse. In looking at 
the themes identifying ‘changes in command decision making style’ and 
‘awareness on decision making’, it was interesting to find that while their bias 
had been identified within an operational context, they considered it in 
relation to other areas of high pressure.  There was a theme of ‘possible 
change’ and a theme of ‘already changed’ showed the new knowledge had 
provided something to think about in relation to their command and decision - 
making style.  All FDMs, bar one, thought it had changed the way in which 
they had commanded an incident, or would change the way they did it in the 
future, it was seen as a positive area to be looking at and one that held real 
value for improving command outcomes.   The themes around ‘SA 
understanding’ and around ‘general SA discussion’ supported the important 
of understanding your personal ASA and PSA to improve decision - making.  
Nearly all the FDMs believed that a greater understanding of ASA, PSA and 
bias was positive and had made a difference to the way they operated; even 
the FDMs who had doubts did not identify a negative from the experience. 
 
FDMs agreed that the outcome to operational incidents was dependant on a 
good understanding of SA for them to make the best decisions and to obtain 
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the best outcomes.  A number of FDMs also questioned whether the 
identification of bias / scope applied to just the operational environment or to 
their wider work.  Although not many of the FDMs had responded 
operationally to many complex incidents within the 15 month period between 
the profile discussion and the interview to reflect on, they had used other 
ways to review the information presented at the discussion. The overall view 
was that it had provided something to think about in relation to their 
command and decision - making style at an operational incident or training 
exercise.  The majority of FDM appeared to have used the information 
gained from the debrief of the 2012 assessment to build on and improve their 
own knowledge / understanding to improve outcomes from an operational 
perspective – suggesting a tangible benefit from the research. 
 
7. 5. 1 Analysis using the direct aims of the research as the themes to 
take forward the research 
 
The research question was; how do FDMs feel that taking part in the 
exercises, and being briefed on their ASA, PSA and bias / scope, influenced 
how they regarded their operational role and the way they approached it?  
 
The previous exercise outcomes and the discussion following the analysis of 
the data the FDMs produced has shown that bias / scope does impact on the 
individual FDM and the decisions they make at an operational incident under 
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pressure.  Following the thematic analysis of their responses the overall 
response to the interviews showed a confidence by the FDMs that the 
process and the knowledge gained were considered to be of real value.  The 
second analysis allowed for the direct aims of the research to be evaluated 
by the FDMs who had gone through the process and were seen as the 
experts in evaluating the process in relation to their unique area of 
emergency response incident command. As discussed, although not many of 
the FDMs had responded operationally to complex incidents within the 15 
month period between the profile discussion and the interview that they could 
reflect on, they had used other ways to review the information presented at 
the discussion and had linked it into the information that was available to 
them for continuous professional development. There was also recognition 
and understanding of their personal bias / scope, reflection on it and the 
impact it could have when making operational decisions. In all but one 
response it was seen as a positive area to be looking at and one that held 
real value for command decisions.  The feedback and analysis from the 
interviews showed that a good understanding of bias / scope and SA was 
maintained by the FDMs and used to improve their own knowledge / 
understanding with the aim of improving outcomes from an operational 
perspective.   
 
In essence the basis of good ASA must be a full understanding of any 
personal bias / scope and how personal bias / scope can / will impact on 
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understanding and implementing operational decisions. The take home 
message following the thematic analysis is that each of the FDMs learned 
from the overall process and accepted the outcome in relation to their bias / 
scope and the impact this has on their ASA.  In accepting this they agreed 
that the outcome to operational incidents was in the main dependent on a 
good understanding of ASA for them to make the best decisions and to 
obtain the best outcomes.  With a number of FDMs also questioning whether 
the identification of bias / scope could apply just to the operational 
environment or to their wider work. 
 
7.6 Overall conclusion 
 
The studies described here suggest that regardless of level of knowledge or 
ASA, there are response bias / scope tendencies that may affect the decision 
- making of individual FRS professionals leading to either miss or false alarm 
errors. The finding that bias / scope patterns are independent of ASA or PSA 
is an important one that coincides with previous evidence indicating that 
simply acquiring information or ASA does not necessarily lead to effective 
decision - making (Omedei et. al. 2005). While the findings that bias / scope 
tendencies may be regarded as resting within the individual would seem 
critical to developing understanding of factors that could lead to risk in real 
fireground decision - making.  As discussed (Catherwood et. al., 2012) it 
cannot be determined why such bias / scope tendencies occurred in these 
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exercises, but nonetheless the evidence presented in this thesis suggests 
that bias / scope tendencies are apparent and consistent for most 
participants (a resting bias / scope) when under pressure. Which was 
demonstrated by similar bias scores over both the development / 
assessment simulated fireground exercise and assessable simulated 
fireground exercise, suggesting a resting bias / scope within the individual, 
rather than a situational bias / scope.   
 
The key difference between this set of exercises and the table top exercises, 
appeared to be the pressure that was on the individual undertaking the 
exercises. The inconclusive outcome for individual bias / scope patterns 
across the house and factory fire table top exercise led to the assessable 
flexible duty response officer investigations to try and increase the pressure 
on individuals to help in identifying the individual bias/ scope pattern. One of 
the aims of this experiment was to determine whether the bias / scope 
evident in the table top exercise would also be apparent in a more realistic 
and challenging situation, which was arguably the case. The participants 
showed either a conservative (positive) bias / scope tendency or a more 
liberal (negative) bias / scope tendency and of most interest, this was again 
independent of the level of SA. Most importantly from a development 
perspective, the positive correlation over both exercises suggests a resting 
bias / scope rather than a situational one. 
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In essence the basis of good ASA must be a full understanding of any 
personal bias / scope and how personal bias / scope can / will impact on 
understanding and implementing operational decisions. The take home 
message following the data and thematic analysis was that each of the 
FDM's learned from the overall process and accepted the outcome in relation 
to their bias / scope and the impact this has on their ASA.  In accepting this 
they agreed that the outcome to operational incidents was in the main 
dependent on a good understanding of ASA for them to make the best 
decisions and to obtain the best outcomes.  The project has shown a 
possible  mechanism for improving safety in fireground operations by 
identifying an individual's bias / scope - and it may be possible to do this by 
developing accessible interactive software for the personalised vocational 
training of fireground SA. The work undertaken has shown that, under 
pressure, competence per se does not protect FRS personnel from the risk 
of losing SA. Critical errors may occur due not to a lack of competence, or 
even lack of information; but to a failure to make optimal use of readily 
available information. The key for the individual is to select enough of the 
right information to make the right decision, without selecting too much 
information overall and so becoming overloaded.   
 
A possible model of how bias / scope may impact on the individual and how 
knowledge of the individual’s personal bias / scope may extend the 
individual’s ability to command an incident in the safest possible manner is 
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presented in figure 7.1.  The model attempts to put into visual format the 
influence current incident command training has on the trainee, in allowing 
them to extend their competence at an incident.  The introduction of a way to 
identify bias / scope for the individual at an early stage of training should 
allow them to extend the period for making optimal decisions in relation to the 
incident beyond the competence that current incident command training 
alone allows.  
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7.7 A model of how the individual understanding of bias / scope could extend the competence for fire fighters 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A    B    C       D  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1 A Model for understanding how bias / scope could extend competence for fire fighters
Command model; PDR; ODOA; ICS 
Potential gain through 
understanding personal 
bias / scope 
Overload: Incident Commander bias / 
scope (Unconscious competent) 
Supervisory; Intermediate; Strategic  
(Conscious incompetent, moving to 
conscious competent) 
Overload: Incident Commander bias / scope  = 
increased risk for operational activity 
Type of Individual bias / scope 
Liberal  Conservative 
Negative Positive 
Lax  Strict 
Butterfly Narrow 
Hit  Miss 
Cognitive approach 
established 
Birth FireFighter; ICS 
(Unconscious incompetent) 
 
FF training period Command Role 
(self selection) 
Beginning of ICS 
training 
Information on bias / scope 
is transferred to the 
candidate for use in their 
command development. 
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The model identifies (Figure 7.1) how bias / scope may manifest as an 
integral part of an individual’s incident command training process and as 
part of the mental processes and apparatus during development as a 
reaction to events and exposure to situations one experiences.  Bias / 
scope in this case supports a variety of actions that have been possibly 
subconsciously understood by the individual to give the best results for 
dealing with situations when they are under pressure and in this way 
becomes a part of their strategy to manage or remedy the situation.  Does 
information bias / scope start to explain some of the puzzling decisions / 
errors incident commanders make even when theoretically they have all 
the correct training and the information on the situation available to them 
in relation to the incident?  Does bias / scope applied to either externally 
available information (eg. aspects that can be seen) or to information 
absorbed mentally; help us to understand some of the puzzling decisions / 
errors made by competent incident commanders at a number of different 
incidents and over a long period of time?  Does bias / scope once applied 
make an incident commander react differently to what they are actually 
seeing before them and does it also influence them in relation to the 
information they use in their knowledge, or memory? Even if a wide range 
of information is taken on board, do people still mentally or internally 
adjust their bias / scope so they can select the points they want to use 
from the full range available in their knowledge or memory to fit their 
cognitive perspective and how do we improve the odds on incident 
commanders not doing this? 
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The four stages for learning any new skill 
No matter what new skill we decide to learn, it has been suggested 
that there are four learning stages each of us goes through, 
encapsulated in the conscious competence learning model (Gordon 
1970).  Being aware of these stages helps us better accept that 
learning can be a slow and frequently uncomfortable process; the four 
stages are; 
Stage 1 – Unconsciously incompetent (unskilled). We don’t know 
what we do not know; we are inept in some areas and we are unaware 
of it. An example of this may be our first view and understanding of 
how a car works and how just getting the opportunity to get in will 
make us a driver.  
Stage 2 – Consciously incompetent (unskilled). We know what we 
don’t know. We start to learn at this level when sudden awareness of 
how poorly we do something shows us how much we need to learn. 
This can be the experience we have following the first driving lesson as 
a new driver, when we realise that just getting into the car is not what it 
takes to be a competent driver. 
Stage 3 – Consciously competent (skilled). Trying the skill out, 
experimenting, practicing, we understand how to do the skill the right 
way, but need to think and work hard to do it. This has been likened to 
the driver who has just passed their driving test, they understand all 
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they need to do to operate the car on the highway, but need to think 
about each of the operations as they experience the need to react. 
Stage 4 – Unconsciously competent (skilled). If we continue to 
practice and apply the new skills, eventually we arrive at a stage where 
they become easier, and given time, even natural.  Where most drivers 
find themselves after a period of time driving, the feeling you can have 
when turning up at work and you can't remember what happened to 
the journey.  Or the day you stall the car at a junction and have to go 
back to the consciously competent in thinking about what you need to 
do to restart it and drive away. 
 
An individual’s progression (or not) through these stages is represented 
by the following regions in the model depicted in Figure 7.1. 
 
Area A) Depicts the position of the man on the Clapham omnibus;  
This is the position that the average person in the street with no specific 
education or training in how to manage an emergency event outside of 
what would normally be expected for Joe Public. Each individual will react 
differently as each would have had different experiences and may be able 
to use some of these experiences to mitigate some elements of the 
emergency incident.  In looking at the average person, they have 
undertaken no specific education or training on the needs of incident 
management or the structure required to manage an operational incident.  
They have no experience of prioritisation in relation to bringing an 
emergency incident to a safe conclusion and in this sense they can be 
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viewed as an ‘unconscious incompetent’, not aware of what they don’t 
know in relation to managing an emergency event. 
 
B) Depicts the position of the average new fire fighter following 
basic training and undertaking development;  
This is seen as the period following an individual joining the FRS and 
developing within the FRS in relation to their understanding of incident 
command as an objective tool to bring about a safe conclusion to an 
emergency incident.  As well as an overview of the incident command 
system and how it impacts in relation to their position within the 
organisation at this period and within its operational parameters and their 
current understanding of the operational needs.  They can be assessed 
as a ‘conscious incompetent’ for development, starting to be aware of 
what they don’t know in relation to the whole incident command system 
and how their role as an operational fire fighter fits in to it.  Over the first 
sixteen weeks of joining they will be in development and will quickly move 
from ‘unconscious incompetent’ to ‘consciously incompetent’, in relation to 
both incident command and the incident command system.  While their 
knowledge of the incident command system will develop at an early stage, 
their knowledge of incident command will not develop at the same rate 
and during their period as a fire fighter at most incidents they will be task 
orientated.  This task focus on directed outcomes within the incident 
envelope will be a direct outcome of the management of the incident and 
their contribution will be responding to the incident command structure.  
During this period staff within this stage of development will start to 
 Page | 286 
 
develop an understanding of the incident command process / system, but 
will not be in a position (unless circumstances dictate) to implement it.  
Their knowledge of the incident command system will be paramount to 
their personal development at this level within the organisation and their 
ability to work safely within the organisational structure when on the 
incident ground. 
 
C) Depicts the position of the developing incident commander, 
undertaking their command role that will progress as their career 
develops;  
The individual will make a conscious choice to develop as an incident 
commander by applying for promotion, or to stay as an operational fire 
fighter.  Once the decision is made to apply for promotion, the individual 
will apply to become an incident commander (this approach is via them 
becoming a Service manager as they will have to manage both staff and 
processes during the period they are not undertaking incident command 
duties) and this will be the beginning of their development in relation to 
this role. This is due to the amount of both training they have received 
within their firefighter role and the operational experience they have 
gained at emergency incidents, and exercises they have attended.  
 
In relation to incident command at this stage of their career most 
individuals will be seen within their development as a ‘conscious 
incompetent’.  With all their training, development and exercising 
undertaken focused on bringing them up to the ‘conscious competent’ 
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stage.  Their training will be managed over a period of time and progress 
will be based on both the amount of training and their operational 
experience (with both being subject to opportunity in relation to promotion 
chances and incidents attended).  There is also the managerial element of 
the role that will be developed in tandem with their incident command role 
and development in this area will influence any other opportunities they 
have for development. The incident command training undertaken will be 
developed through the 3 stages of; 
 Supervisory, the officer in charge of the first attendance fire engine 
and crew to the incident, mainly dealing with small fires, road traffic 
collisions and other call outs. 
 Intermediate, the officer responding to incidents in support of the 
fire engine using a car provided with blue lights and horns, and 
responding to larger incidents such as house fires with persons 
reported, or commercial fires, large road traffic collisions and more 
major incident types (and managing other incident commanders in 
a subordinate role). 
 With the third stage being strategic management, taking charge of 
the major incident, which will cover all types’ of emergency 
incidents, from political to multiple fatalities at either a road traffic 
incident or fire?  This will also included managing incidents on 
behalf of the organisation off site and working with other 
emergency services and category one responders.  This will take 
place at the Strategic Co-ordinating group level, working at the 
impact to the wider community, environment and financial costs. 
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D) Potential gain through knowing bias / scope;  
The research described in this thesis has identified that individual fire 
fighters show bias / scope and the bias / scope the individual shows can 
be either a conservative or liberal one, but appears to be a resting bias / 
scope.  So if a way can be found to identify an individual fire fighter’s bias 
/ scope, by way of undertaking a test in relation to managing an 
emergency incident, then from the studies described here it would appear 
that informing them of this bias / scope could improve the way they 
develop through their incident command training and be able to extend 
their competence in managing an incident beyond that resulting from the 
current incident command training.   
  
This data gathered from the studies described in this thesis suggest that 
the effects identified could be used to inform further studies. The general 
approach used has demonstrated that there are response bias / scope 
tendencies in the decision - making of FRS professionals leading to either 
miss errors or false alarm errors. Further investigation of bias / scope 
tendencies would thus seem critical to developing an understanding of 
factors that could lead to risk in real incident ground decision - making.  
While it is accepted that these assessments were undertaken during 
training exercises and whether these training exercises could really 
replicate operations is always questionable, the exercises used brought 
their own pressures. The BA exercise was in hot and realistic conditions, 
with observers placed inside the building, and this was a relatively new 
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experience for most staff, so being under observation in this way was 
considered stressful.  Both of the exercises for FDMs were high pressure 
events for the individuals taking part as failure in either one held both a 
credibility and financial loss for the individuals (appendix 8; break down of 
exercises undertaken).  The nature of the FDM exercises, particularly, 
focused on getting the best out of each of the individuals from an 
operational perspective and looked to ensure competence of the 
individual on behalf of the organisation. The pressure applied through 
these exercises appeared to be the real difference when compared to the 
table top exercises.   
 
7.8 Overall conclusion set against the aims of the research   
 
7.8.1 Assessment of the outcomes of the research as compared to 
the broad aims at the outset. 
 
There were 2 broad aims for the research; 
 
1) To gain further understanding of fireground command and control 
decision - making in relation to how bias / scope may influence data 
gathering and subsequent decisions. 
 
For fire fighters taking part in the exercises, there was a clear bias / scope 
pattern shown.  A few showed a nil bias / scope, but the majority showed 
either a positive, conservative or negative, liberal bias / scope and when 
 Page | 290 
 
the fire fighters were put under pressure in their role the research results 
demonstrated that a particular bias / scope tended to reoccur in the same 
way for the same individual, suggesting the bias / scope pattern was a 
resting bias / scope within the individual. With the possibility that the bias / 
scope pattern reflects a resting bias / scope, the value of knowing what 
type of bias / scope an individual has will allow the individual to either 
stand back to review decisions, ensuring their bias / scope is not 
impacting on the selected decision, or to use it within their training to help 
reduce any subconscious impact.   
 
2) To determine if once identified this can contribute to training guidelines 
for personal self-awareness of how information is scoped in fireground 
situations. 
 
From the follow up interviews the participants felt there was real value 
undertaking the work and being shown their individual bias / scope and 
SA patterns and each had undertaken work to improve their own ASA.  
With the research suggesting a resting bias / scope for those undertaking 
the two assessment exercises in 2012 and 2013, training on improving 
awareness of their individual bias / scope is seen as providing real benefit 
within their incident command training to help reduce or mitigate any 
negative impact this bias / scope may have on decision - making. 
 
Therefore it could be argued that the basis of good ASA must be a full 
understanding not only of aspects of the situation, but also an 
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understanding of any personal bias / scope and how personal bias / 
scope can / will impact on understanding and implementing operational 
decisions. 
 
7.8.2 Specific Aims of the Research 
 
The broad aims discussed above resulted in 3 specific aims for the 
research across all the studies undertaken and discussed previously; 
 
1) To understand how information bias / scope by the individual influences 
or impacts on decisions and outcome in fireground exercises. 
 
For nearly all the participants within the exercise bias / scope impacted on 
their decision - making, with them either using a narrow conservative bias 
/ scope or a wide liberal bias / scope when scoping the information 
available on the incident.  Depending on which type of bias / scope was 
made led them to making either miss errors, or false alarm errors, which 
may have impacted on their decision - making in relation to trying to 
obtain the best outcome for the incident.   
 
2) To determine whether bias / scope works in different ways across 
individual incident commanders. 
 
With bias / scope being identified and while either broad liberal or narrow 
conservative, it was different for each individual and the outcome of the 
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study from the pressurised assessments suggesting a resting bias / 
scope.  In each case the bias / scope pattern found was individual to the 
participant taking part and in debriefs following the first study for FDMs in 
2012, each of the individuals found no surprise in relation to being 
informed of their own bias / scope pattern. 
 
3) Finally to then progress this work from the theoretical model into a 
training / assessment scenario to determine if an individual’s bias / scope 
can be identified and whether this knowledge assists the outcome of the 
decisions in actual fireground conditions.  
 
This is the next step for this research and is being undertaken through the 
European Union with the assistance of their Erasmus plus program; this 
work will take place with other European fire services in Poland, Demark, 
Belgium and Holland and is identified in the next chapter. 
 
7.8.3 Support for original hypotheses  
 
The hypotheses were:  
 
i) FRS personnel will display either conservative or liberal decision - 
making bias / scope (with related miss or false alarm errors respectively) 
during FRS training exercises involving simulations of fireground 
incidents. 
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The majority of the fire fighters taking part in the studies undertaken 
displayed either a conservative or liberal decision - making information 
bias / scope during FRS training exercises involving simulations of 
fireground incidents. Only in a small number of cases did fire fighters 
show no bias / scope pattern over all of the studies undertaken. 
 
ii) any such bias / error patterns will be consistent for individuals over 
situations / scenarios. 
 
The FDMs taking part in the pressurised studies did generally display the 
same bias / scope in relation to the information available for the exercise, 
showing either a conservative or liberal decision - making bias / scope 
during FRS assessment exercises involving simulations of fireground 
incidents.  The bias / scope pattern suggests that, for the FDMs taking 
part in these studies, were showing a resting bias / scope, a pattern of 
information bias / scope that would reoccur for the individual when 
undertaking incident command within a stressful environment. 
 
iii) experienced FRS personnel will be less prone to displaying such bias / 
errors. 
 
There was no evidence found to substantiate this hypothesis as within all 
the studies experience with the situations simulated did not show an effect 
on the outcomes to the exercises. The only evident difference of 
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experience was that trained firefighters showed better ASA on the 
tabletop exercises than university students. 
 
iv) Any such bias / scope will be reduced or moderated by providing 
detailed personal feedback on bias / scope and error tendencies to 
individuals following training exercises ( i.e. individuals can use 
understanding about their own bias / scope to reduce errors in decision - 
making).  
 
From the follow up interviews the participants felt there was real value 
taking part in the studies and being shown their individual bias / scope 
and ASA, PSA patterns, with the majority having undertaken work to 
improve their own ASA.  With the research suggesting a resting bias / 
scope for those undertaking the two assessment exercises in 2012 and 
2013, training on their individual bias / scope is seen as a possible way of 
providing real benefit within their incident command training. 
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Chapter 8; Future Considerations 
 
8.1 The identified need for the research 
 
Gasaway (2008) looked at barriers to situational awareness (SA) and 
impacts to decision - making, describing high stress environments as 
ones that contained multiple sources of information, physical / mental 
stress, communication issues, distractions, and interruptions among 
others.  He also identified that understanding what was needed for good 
SA and having the correct SA about the situation was a necessary skill for 
understanding what is happening during any fire and rescue emergency 
incident. In looking at the impact of these factors in relation to a single 
incident Putman (1995) wrote on the collapse of decision - making and 
organisation structure on Storm King Mountain. The analysis of this 
incident identifies that commanders differ in both the number of factors 
they use in decision - making and the value they place on each of these 
individual factors.  The analysis also identified that in a situation where 
fear and panic is created, individuals can regress towards a simpler, more 
habitual thinking that does not reflect appropriate training guidelines.  
Individuals rarely have a full understanding of the few facts they have in 
relation to the incident and how they are processing them in making their 
decisions (Tavris and Aronson, 2011). Studies (AFAC & CRC fire note 
2009; p.4) also show that our thinking tends to underestimate hazards, 
particularly if the hazard is increasing at a logarithmic or at an exponential 
rate.  ‘The human consequences of suboptimal decisions by fire leaders 
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are compellingly clear and conversely, optimal leadership decisions are 
no less vital for successfully suppressing a fire’, (Useem et. al. 2005, 
P.462). Exploring decision - making within a wildland fire scenario, Yukl 
(1989) showed how good decision - making achieved the best possible 
outcomes and therefore identified good decision - making as a key 
component for leadership, with poor decision - making compounding the 
situation and increasing pressure.  These demands and risks are clearly 
shown by incidents such as the Storm King Mountain fire in July 1994, a 
fire fighting disaster where 14 fire fighters lost their lives.  Putnam (1995) 
felt that a high pressure environment and high stress, predictably lead to 
the collapse of clear thinking and organisational structure’, while Useem 
et. al. (2005) suggests that under-preparation, acute stress and 
ambiguous authority, can and do result in suboptimal decisions by team 
leaders on a fire line.  Both identified how one could decide the crucial 
factors that allowed this disaster to happen and both looked at the inputs 
and outputs gained from the leadership of the fire fighting crews 
committed to resolving this incident.   
 
It is important to consider what decision - making models incident 
commanders’ use in making these key decisions and if there is a single 
model that helps, or will incident commanders use the one that they are 
first taught, or the one they are most comfortable with.  In the end it may 
not matter which model is ostensibly being followed, since Useem et. al. 
(2005) and Putnam (1995) recognise that in situations that create fear and 
panic, increased stress and pressure on leaders will follow.  Within their 
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paper Useem et. al. (2005) identify research that confirms when 
individuals are under time pressure or perform multiple tasks at the same 
time, they are more likely to make suboptimal decisions. Much of the 
stress experienced by fire fighters is a direct product of the urgent and 
diverse demands imposed on crew leaders and incident commanders 
when confronted by a fast evolving fire (Janis and Mann, 1977; Finucane, 
Alhakami, Slovic, and Johnson, 2000; Gilbert, 2005). 
 
The studies in this thesis aimed to explore why some of these decisions 
are made, why an incident commander, as happened in the Storm king 
mountain incident, can move from effective decision - making in the 
morning, to making what Useem et. al. (2005) classify as suboptimal 
decisions leading to multiple loss of life in the afternoon.  The training for 
incident commanders is well established in most FRSs and has been 
developed over time.  Most of this training is culturally based, taking into 
account how the FRS has been established (full time, part time or 
volunteer), how it has been funded (centrally, locally, or by donation), its 
support structure as part of a national group, local authority, or voluntary 
unit and the legislative health and safety environment it operates within. 
With this being the case the incident command training program is not 
easily transferred as a whole (from one country to another and in some 
areas from one location to another), although elements of good practise 
within the training program have been accepted by most FRS and 
included within their training packages and will continue to be.  
 
 Page | 298 
 
The research described in this thesis has looked at other factors that 
could influence the decision - making process for operational incident 
commanders, focusing on the key issue of information bias / scope in 
FRS decision - making.  The research investigated whether FRS fire 
fighting personnel displayed bias / scope during realistic simulations and 
exercises and if so, whether the bias / scope was conservative, narrow or 
liberal, broad in nature. There has been some preliminary application of 
this theoretical framework to fireground decision - making (Saveland, 
2005), but the current research has extended this by quantifying 
information bias / scope to enable appraisal of such individual tendencies 
across different studies and over time.  The effect of the provision of 
personalised feedback to individuals concerning their bias / scope has 
also been investigated. 
  
The current research has also explored the effects of FRS fire fighters 
experience on information bias / scope. Experienced FRS fire fighting 
personnel may act on the basis of prior experience using “Recognition 
primed decision making (RPD)” (Klein, 2003; Klein et. al. 2010), rather 
than fresh appraisal of fire situations (Klein et. al, 1993). RPD is beneficial 
if it aids focus on correct aspects of the situation and the situation does 
not change greatly from the previous incidents that it is modeled on.  
 
This thesis addressed a number of important questions concerning 
information bias / scope in FRS fire fighting personnel.  Does the same 
person show different bias / scope in different situations or at different 
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types of incident (experience), suggesting a situational bias / scope?  Or 
do individuals have a natural and consistent bias / scope, a resting bias / 
scope that is consistent across different situations? One important issue 
was whether the manifestation of information bias / scope might be linked 
to the way individuals react under pressure and therefore to the way they 
manage an incident.  Will the FRS incident command system and 
command models already established and in use within the training and 
operational environment provide enough support to meet the 
requirements of the critical incident commander?  Can there really be 
effective training of incident command without knowing whether 
individuals have a conservative decision - making bias / scope, classifying 
less information as true, making more correct rejections but also more 
misses or alternately a more liberal bias / scope, deciding more is true, 
thus making more hits but also more false alarms (figure 1.6)?  Would that 
same incident commander knowing and understanding more about their 
personal bias / scope and how it impacts on their ASA and decision - 
making under pressure at an operational incident make better decisions?   
 
The broad aims of the research was to gain further understanding of 
fireground command and control decision - making in relation to how bias 
/ scope might influence decisions and to determine if once identified this 
can contribute to training guidelines for personal self-awareness of how 
information is scoped in fireground situations.  In essence the basis of 
good ASA must include a full understanding of any personal bias / scope 
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and how personal bias / scope can / will impact on understanding and 
implementing operational decisions. 
 
The direct aims of the research were to understand how information bias / 
scope by the individual may influence or impact on decisions and 
outcome in fireground exercises and then to determine whether bias / 
scope works in different ways across individual incident commanders and 
finally to then progress this work from the theoretical model into a training 
/ assessment scenario to determine if an individual’s bias / scope can be 
identified and whether this knowledge assists the outcome of the 
decisions in actual fireground conditions. 
 
8.2 How the research described in this thesis extends previous 
research and theory. 
 
The current research significantly extends prior research and theory on 
naturalistic decision making, on SA and on incident ground decision - 
making in general, and in the FRS in particular. Past research has 
examined barriers to SA (Gasaway, 2009) and the knock-on effect on 
good decision - making; describing problematic environments as ones 
that contain multiple sources of information, physical / mental stress, 
communications issues, distractions, and interruptions.  Putman (1995) 
identified that commanders differ in both the number of factors they use 
and the value they place on each of these factors, with individuals rarely 
having a full understanding of the few facts they have in relation to the 
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incident, and how they are processing them in making their decisions. To 
understand this in relation to fire fighting operations, it is necessary to 
understand how decision - making on the incident ground relies on 
maintaining SA and making decisions under time pressure (Saveland, 
2005). It requires the individual to identify the decision criteria, make the 
appropriate selection and allocate any weighting they feel is justified to 
the range of information on offer, either from the incident ground, its 
contextual environment or their internal knowledge base in relation to the 
incident. Identifying that a necessary skill for understanding what is 
happening during any fire and rescue emergency incident is SA 
(Gasaway, 2010). The components of SA are seen as covering three 
elements; gathering information, interpreting information and anticipating 
future states, sometime described as What?, So What?, Now What? (Flin, 
O'Connor, and Crichton, 2008, p23).  This cognitive skill is primarily about 
gathering and processing information from the environment and using 
stored information to make sense of it.  Kaempf, Wolf, and Miller (1993) 
support the criticality of SA, as when analysing the decision - making of 
tactical commanders they identified that recognising the situation provided 
challenge to the commanders.  Endsley, Sollenberger, Nakata and Stein 
(2000) identify that incident ground decision - making does not simply 
mean collecting information about the incident and environment to build 
an understanding / representation of the situation or to gain good SA.  
 
A key issue is the capacity of the fire fighter to maintain an accurate 
understanding, or mental model, of a situation when there are many 
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competing demands. In pressurised fireground operations, even the best 
trained individual may create a flawed mental model; poor SA (Endsley 
and Strater, 2000). When this occurs, key information may be overlooked 
or dismissed, or faulty information may be used to make critical decisions 
(Catherwood et. al. 2010; 2011; 2012). The term bias / scope is used 
differently within this study to the way it is used in SA, the term used for 
the bias as discussed within this work is ‘information bias’, to refer 
specifically to the use of information (conservative / narrow or liberal / 
broad).  Since any bias / scope of the decision maker can directly affect 
the selection or use of information for decision - making, it has to carry a 
potential for error with its associated risk and therefore a potential 
consequence to all personnel on the incident ground. If the amount and 
quality of the information available to an individual remains the same, 
different bias / scope applied to that knowledge may lead to varying 
degrees of acceptance or rejection of the available information, impacting 
directly on ASA. In essence, individuals with access to exactly the same 
information could have quite different ASA.   A cautious or conservative 
bias / scope will permit use of only a narrow range of information, while a 
more liberal or lax bias / scope will allow use of a wider range of 
information that may be processed more superficially (Edgar and Edgar, 
2007).  There is potential for bias / scope in fireground decision - making 
to arise from numerous sources of brain activity (Catherwood, Edgar, 
Nikolla, Alford, Brooks, Baker and White 2014) that influence the selective 
processing of information. An understanding of such individual bias / 
scope patterns would seem critical for improving and training self-
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awareness in regard to the selection of information and the potential risks 
in incident ground decision - making.  
 
The studies described in this thesis investigate a missing factor in building 
ASA - information bias / scope. The research suggests that FDMs under 
stress may fall back to a resting bias / scope and the FDMs have 
acknowledged that they feel they can moderate the impact of this bias / 
scope by training or using the incident command system support more. 
Neither a liberal / broad or conservative / narrow bias / scope is 
necessarily wrong or right, but each has its own dangers. If people apply 
too narrow a bias / scope they run the risk of ignoring important aspects of 
a situation, while having a broad bias / scope may mean that irrelevant or 
even wrong information is given equal weight to useful or relevant 
information.  There may be many contributing factors to such bias / scope 
tendencies including perceptual, attentional, working memory load, 
emotional and personality considerations, as previously discussed. The 
role of all such factors cannot be determined from this research, but 
nonetheless the finding of consistent bias / scope patterns in fire fighters 
is an important one that may have implications for understanding errors in 
incident ground decision - making.  The finding of a possible resting bias / 
scope in incident commanders is an even more important one, which will 
have implications for understanding errors in incident ground decision - 
making and how we can help to reduce them.  The ultimate goal of the 
current research is to further the understanding of this bias / scope 
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tendency, in order to support the training of effective fireground decision - 
making. 
 
 8.3 Development and next steps 
 
From the research outcomes identified within the project in relation to a 
resting bias / scope for FDMs, the next aim for this line of investigation will 
be to work and develop a vocational training protocol.  That will facilitate 
an individual’s use of information to drive optimised decision - making in 
high pressure situations. In looking to develop a future training protocol or 
future training activities it is felt at this time it could be based around an 
incident based training exercise tool to identify an individual's information 
bias / scope and then to inform them about this information bias / scope to 
then work to improve individual decision - making.  In doing this it is 
hoped it would go some way to helping to improve ASA and the decision - 
making process of incident commanders and improving safety of incident 
ground operations for all personnel involved. 
 
The importance of SA has long been recognised in other areas, such as 
aerospace and the military, but has only recently been a focus for training 
in the FRS and no prior study has examined the role of information bias / 
scope. Any means for training FRS fire fighting personnel to appraise and 
monitor their own SA and bias / scope under pressure offers an important 
step in increasing safety on the incident ground in the training of incident 
commanders. The data from these studies reported in this thesis is 
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uniquely placed to address this gap.  Critical errors may occur due not to 
a lack of competence, or even lack of information; but to a failure to make 
optimal use of readily available information in decision - making. The key 
for the individual is to select enough of the right information to make the 
right decision, without selecting too much and so becoming overloaded or 
selecting too little and making key decisions based on very little 
information.  This approach will not be aimed at eliminating such natural 
tendencies (which the research presented here suggests might be difficult 
or impossible), but is looking to provide individuals with an awareness of 
any bias / scope in their own information processing.  Explaining to them 
the implications of any such information bias/ scope, as it can or will 
impact on their ASA, their decision - making based on that ASA, and the 
quality of those decisions in relation to the objectives of the incident.  As 
shown by the current studies understanding these mental aspects of ASA 
and decision - making are essential to improving safety.  By extending the 
ability of the fire incident commander to work under pressure to manage 
the information availability and in doing so improve their decision - making 
at operational incidents is as necessary as are basic fire fighting 
competencies. Simply providing vocational expertise per se may not 
protect individuals from losing SA under pressure and failing to gain the 
objectives to bring the incident to a safe conclusion.  
 
Given that decision - making under pressure is not confined to the FRS 
(the initial development of the QASA approach was taken from work with 
the military), the studies undertaken within a project of this type could also 
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have an impact beyond the FRS.  The approach has been developed 
within the FRS as it provides a challenging environment where the impact 
of improvements to training is likely to be high. The underlying model 
underpinning the approach is, however, both quite unique and quite 
generalisable giving it the ability to transfer across and into other 
organisations.  The model on which it is based could be applied to a wide 
range of situations, including, for example, other emergency services, 
strategic decision - making in crisis situations and possibly teaching 
methods in exam techniques.  The reality of poor ASA and poor decision - 
making based on poor information use is already widely acknowledged, 
but the tools to measure this have not previously existed.  The 
development of these studies could provide the tools to assess the 
individual and how they maintain good ASA and so improve decision - 
making.  Identifying any information bias / scope when under pressure 
and then designing training to assist individuals in minimising any impact 
the indentified bias / scope could have.  This approach would give the 
methods developed within this thesis a potential impact across all 
processes and organisations where humans are required to make 
pressurised decisions. For the individual FRS personnel who employ such 
a tool, this could ultimately enable them to perform at a higher level under 
pressure on the actual incident ground, to extend their competence in a 
more dynamic or complex developing incident.   This would allow them to 
improve their ASA, reduce decision - making errors and thereby improve 
safety for FRS personnel and for the wider community that they serve. 
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As mentioned earlier a next step for this research is being undertaken 
through the European Union with the assistance of their Erasmus plus 
program; this work will take place with other European fire services in 
Poland, Demark, Belgium and Holland. 
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Appendix 1; Further details on the QASA method (See Method in 
chapter 3 for other details) 
 
 ‘As noted in the Method for Experiment 1, the QASA method is based on 
signal detection theory (for further explanation of relevant aspects of 
signal detection theory see: Green & Swets, 1966 and Stanislaw and 
Tadorov, 1999). In traditional signal detection theory, the decision 
required is usually whether a signal is present, against a background of 
noise, in any given stimulus. A modified version of this approach is used 
by the QASA tool, with signal and noise replaced respectively by true and 
false information. The QASA approach erasures SA by presenting a 
series of True/False probe statements (some of which are true and some 
of which are false) drawn from the situation of interest, and the individual’s 
task is to state whether they believe the statement to be true or false.  
 
The QASA tool then uses signal detection theory to give a measure of 
how well the individual can tell true from false information (the SA or 
Knowledge score) and also an indication of the individual’s bias, i.e., how 
biased they are towards accepting information as true or rejecting 
information as false (the Bias score). The SA score is based on a 
nonparametric signal detection measure, A’ that corrects for guessing and 
represents the person’s ability to tell true from false information. A’ is a 
robust measure as it can be applied even for sample distributions where 
the variances may be unequal. Bias is calculated using B’’ which 
represents the person’s overall tendency to accept or reject information. 
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A more comprehensive justification for using A’ and B” (as opposed to d’ 
and s, the usual signal detection measures of Knowledge and Bias) is 
given in Edgar and Edgar (2007) and further discussion of the underlying 
computational aspects can be found in Stanislaw and Todorov (1999). 
Essentially however the QASA tool calculates these scores by using the 
“hit rate” (i.e., the proportion of responses on the “signal” trials that are 
correct “hits”) and the “false alarm rate” (i.e., the proportion of responses 
on the “noise” trials that are false alarms). 
 
The essential computations can be represented as (after Stanislaw and 
Todorov, 1999):  
 
 
 
 
(where H= hit rate and F = false alarm rate and max (H, F) = either H or F, 
whichever is the greater).  
 
The A’ and B’’ scores are then re-scaled to give two measures, each 
running from -100 to +100. An advantage of the QASA tool over other 
signal detection approaches is that it makes relatively few assumptions 
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about the shapes of the underlying distributions of the trace strengths of 
true and false information, or even that true information should have a 
generally stronger representation than false’. 
  
 Page | 331 
 
Appendix 2; “Scoping” study: BA Guideline Exercise 6 April;  
 
Gloucestershire FRS and CRACKLE (Centre for Research in Applied 
Cognition, Knowledge, Learning and Emotion) University of 
Gloucestershire 
Sixteen people from 6 teams were asked 19 questions after finishing the 
exercise. The questions were aimed at finding out how much of the 
briefing was retained and how narrowly or widely the personnel had 
“scoped” (taken in and accepted information from) the exercise situation. 
The response to the questions (over all the teams) is shown below  
QUESTION T/F 
% 
correct 
You were briefed to search off branch line 2 
T(2,5) 
F(1,3,4,6) 93.75 
You were advised in the brief to conduct gauge checks T 100 
You were briefed that there were 2 casualties F 100 
There was a gas cylinder outside the building T 25 
You were briefed to conduct a R/H search pattern F 93.75 
There were two branch lines in the building T 68.75 
The first branch line was ~12m into the building F 37.5 
There were two staircases in the building T 87.5 
There was another team in the building at the same time 
as you T 100 
You were briefed that there was a child casualty F 100 
You were shown floor plans for the entire building F 43.75 
There are four appliances present T 62.5 
There was an emergency team on the BA board as you 
entered F 75 
There was a 45 gallon oil drum on your route F 93.75 
There were two cupboards on your route 
T(1,3,4,6) 
F(2,5) 50 
There was at least one bed on your route T 56.25 
You were using radio channel 2 F 93.75 
You crossed the main guideline 3 times F 75 
All teams were teams of 3 F 68.75 
 
 The questions in blue relate to the briefing and the rest to the exercise 
situation. In general the retention of briefing information appears good. 
The results for the situation questions are mixed:  eg. 25%  noticing the 
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gas cylinder (at the entrance to the building where the guidelines were 
initially connected) but 87.5% noticing the two staircases.  
 
The research team has used an analysis called QASA (Quantitative 
assessment of situation awareness) to get an impression of how 
individuals were “scoping” the situation. The analysis shows different 
patterns: with some people scoping more broadly and accepting more 
information than others, but overall the scope tended to be on the 
restricted side, with a slightly narrow focus (which could explain why the 
gas canister was missed for example).  This is also a common finding in 
other contexts where decisions have to be made under time and stress 
pressures (eg. military situations). It is not necessarily good or bad to 
scope widely or narrowly: different situations may need one or the other 
approach. But it may help FRS personnel to be aware of their 
own”scoping” pattern at any point in time. The research team plans to 
continue exploring these issues to help develop useful ideas for training 
FRS personnel in the future. This study was just one step in that direction 
and we are very grateful for the help of all personnel at the exercise. 
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Appendix 3. Feedback was also provided to all participants for the 
FRS, both mid way and at the end of the exercises, example of mid 
way feedback. 
 
There were individual differences in how the information had been 
scoped. Some people tended to show a slightly narrow scope. They were 
using a fairly cautious bias or filter in regards to what they would accept 
as being true or useful.   Other personnel showed a different pattern: they 
had a somewhat broader scope or less cautious filter and were more 
inclined to say something was true (even when they weren’t sure if it 
was). This means that they were saying Yes to correct items, but they 
were also saying yes to false ones. These people were making more false 
alarms than their colleagues. Some other people didn’t show a particular 
tendency either way. There is no right or wrong scope to apply: it depends 
on the demands of the situation. Sometimes a broad scope may be the 
best way to proceed but other times a narrower filter may be the better 
option. The important finding here is that people will show different 
patterns and each approach does carry its own risks. It might be helpful 
then to have feedback on how the situation was scoped.  
 
Figure 4. 3 shows the pattern for each of the 18 people and it is clear that 
there are differences amongst the personnel from person 1 (D1) to person 
18 (D18).  The blue bars show how good each person’s knowledge 
(situation awareness) scores are (from -100 to +100%) and the red bars 
show which way they were scoping: from very cautious or narrow (+100) 
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to very lax or broad (-100). It is clear that people can seem to have the 
same level of knowledge (situation awareness) but they may be using 
very different scopes or filters. For example, DT 1 and DT2 show similar 
levels of knowledge about the situation, but when they don’t know the 
answers, DT2 is more inclined to be cautious and less likely to accept 
something as true than is the case for DT1.  
 
 
Knowledge: %correct                SCOPE: below zero = broader filter, accepting 
scope 
                                                                    above zero= stricter filter, 
narrower scope 
Figure A. 1 Knowledge and Scoping patterns for each of the participants 
 
Conclusions: 
The results are not intended to be a judgment on particular personnel. 
The most important aspect is that they show that there can be individual 
differences in how the same information is scoped or taken in. Some 
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people used a cautious scope or filter while others used a broader or less 
strict scope when judging information. Both approaches have their own 
risks. It is possible that the same person may use different scopes 
depending on the situation. The project aims to explore if this is the case 
in future work. Overall, the project is working towards some means for 
FRS personnel to self-check their own scoping at key decision-making 
points, with the aim being to support good decisions and lower risk. Your 
participation has been of immense value towards this goal. Thank you for 
your help.  
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Appendix 4. Example of a National Occupational Standard EFSM2 for 
Fire Service Station Managers;  
 
Unit title: EFSM2 - Lead, Monitor and Support people to resolve operational incidents 
Scope of this unit 
This unit relates to the leadership role taken at operational incidents. This includes initial 
review and planning of incident management, operating within the Incident Command 
System. It includes implementation, review and monitoring of plans and management of 
resources to resolve the incident. It also includes planning and conduct of relevant 
briefings. 
 
This unit contains three elements: 
 
2.1 Review and determine incident status 
This includes your initial review of the incident type, status and progress, the collection of 
relevant information and analysis of implications for the community and for resource 
allocation. 
2.2 Assume responsibility and implement action to support those involved in the 
incident 
This includes your formulation of a plan for resolution of the incident, taking account of 
anticipated risks, monitoring the progress of activities against your plan and making 
relevant adjustments.  It includes obtaining advice from relevant specialists and the conduct 
of operational briefings with relevant personnel. 
2.3 Debrief following resolution of incident 
This includes the arrangements and conduct of relevant briefings both immediately 
following and at later stages of incident review. 
Unit title: 
National Occupational Standard EFSM2 - Lead, Monitor and 
Support people to resolve operational incidents 
Element titles: 
2.1 Review and determine incident status 
2.2 
Assume responsibility and implement action to support those 
involved in the incident 
2.3 Debrief following resolution of incident 
Knowledge for this unit 2.1 2.2 2.3 
The range and sources of information required to evaluate and manage 
incidents and how to access this 
   
Relevant legislation and its correct interpretation and implementation    
Your role, responsibilities and level of authority at operational incidents    
The roles, responsibilities, limitations and capabilities of personnel and 
other agencies 
   
Lines of communication at incidents and the incident command system    
The range and type of resources available at incidents, their capabilities 
and limitations 
   
How to prioritise and allocate tasks and set clear objectives at incidents to 
achieve operational objectives 
   
Your local community, its characteristics and associated risks    
 Page | 338 
 
Dynamic risk assessment and associated health, safety and welfare 
issues 
   
How to communicate effectively and efficiently with personnel to achieve 
changing objectives and manage sensitive issues 
   
How to anticipate needs and requirements of the incident and of the 
personnel involved in its resolution 
   
Issues of confidentiality, security including data protection, intellectual 
property rights, Human Rights and the implications of potential litigation 
   
Organisational objectives, values and how to operate within them    
Methods, styles and principles of leadership and their application in 
operational contexts 
   
The range, type and extent of information needed for effective debriefs    
How to analyse trends, identify needs for change to procedures and 
instigate action to make relevant improvements 
   
Methods of providing feedback and how to select those appropriate to the 
context and sensitivities of the situation 
   
Requirements and methods of reporting on incidents and how to report to 
key internal, external, political and community contacts 
   
How to formulate and implement an incident plan and the factors affecting 
this 
   
How to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant information and 
formulate plans and decisions which influence successful resolution of 
incidents 
   
The range of specialists available and how to make best use of their 
technical expertise and support 
   
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Appendix 5. Station Commander Assessment Exercise  
 
The time is 1000hrs on a Monday morning. There is a light drizzle of rain at 
present with a brisk northerly wind and temperatures around 4˚C. The service 
has been called to a fire at Crypt school, just off Cole Avenue, in Podsmead, 
Gloucester. The PDA is 2 appliances from both Gloucester Stations and a 
Station Commander. Station Commander __________ was mobilised with the 
initial attendance.  
 
On receipt of a make pumps 5 message from WC Evans Operations Control 
mobilise more resources to the Incident including 2 further Station Commanders 
(1 to manage the ICU and the candidate to support the Incident Command 
System). 
 
The candidate will be mobilised by mobile phone/pager to a briefing room where 
he/she will receive a brief for the incident including an informative just received:  
From WC Evans at Crypt School, Gloucester, Fire in School. Building approx 
10M x 80M well alight. 5 persons unaccounted for at this time. 4 BA, 1 HR & 2 
Jets. 
(Observations at this time – WC in charge and is looking to candidate to take 
over: SC on PDA has not attended – Where are they? 
Actions; Large building with potentially large numbers of BA: consideration for 
stage 2 and Main Control; water supplies available (MDT)? Large occupancy in 
the building: Roll call and potential for parents descending; Plans?) 
Resources sent on MP5 = 5 pumps + ICU + support pump + BAT + support 
pump + ISU + DCU + IT support + workshops + 3 SC’s (General + Command 
Support + FI level2) 
 
The candidates brief from WC is as follows: 
“we have 5 persons confirmed unaccounted for; search & rescue and firefighting 
operations is underway; we have 1 pump at the front, 1 pump around the back, 
and 1 securing a water supply at the entrance; ICU is setting up and SC 
_______  is here to run command support but has not received a briefed as yet; 
there is a great deal of smoke about with a thick black plume from the roof and 
by the smell I would say there are plastics involved; the teachers and pupils are 
self deploying and are difficult to manage; there is an increase in fire 
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development over the last 10 mins and it is my intention to flood the building with 
BA teams; we have 4 pumps in attendance and all personnel employed at 
present; my last informative was: Fire in School. Building approx 10M x 80M well 
alight. 5 persons unaccounted for at this time. 4 BA, 1 HR & 2 Jets. I have BA 
crews using channel 3 and all other traffic on channel 1. Are you taking over?” 
(Considerations – Last known location of the missing? Teachers or pupils? 
ages? Tactical mode? Contact with the Head teacher? Message to take over? 
Access points for building and site? Fire alarm system and location? 
Sectorisation? Sector commanders? Communications network?) 
SC takes over (or not)? 
If not confirm their role at the incident.  
If so what role does WC undertake? 
(Consideration: Confirm tactical plan – Sectors, resources, IC structure). 
 
Inject (1) – Head Teacher: 
Approach the ICU and seek out IC. Provide a set of school plans and an 
overview of the fire risk assessment for the site. Provide a roll call for the IC.  
“I can confirm that 1 teacher and 4 children are unaccounted for at this time. The 
teacher is a white male aged 26 and called Dave Allen. The four children are 
Charlie Sharp aged 14, Arvad Prahad aged 13, Billy Finn aged 14, and Martha 
Bell aged 13. Dave Allen was last known to be taking a class in the English room 
on the first floor of the building. Both Arvad and Martha were in his class at the 
time of the incident. Charlie should have been in a chemistry class on the ground 
floor and Billy should have been in a geography class on the first floor (show 
them on the plans).  
We have an emergency policy for this situation and need to identify a safe 
location for all the school children at this time as we have to consider welfare (as 
it is raining cold windy etc). Are you happy with us using the sports hall?” 
 
If asked where and how the fire started – “Not sure at present. I did hear 
someone say that a pupil was in the building with a can of petrol but I did not see 
this myself. I know that the Fire Alarm panel indicated that the fire is on the first 
floor.” 
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(Considerations: Holding area for kids and teachers, missing persons, 
evacuation, safety officers, FI level 2, + Police involvement from an arson 
perspective, potential crime scene, cordons, traffic control,). 
 
Inject (2) – from Base pump to IC/OC: 
“we are running low on water as the base pump is over running the supply. We 
need to find an alternative water supply as soon as possible”. 
 
(Considerations: Make up, resources required, alternative mains supply, open 
water, specialist appliances, water officer role). 
 
Inject (3) – [Police] Sergeant Bob Blue:  
“We are dealing with the traffic management as requested. We are also looking 
into the possibility of the fire being a malicious arson attack and the suspect may 
be still on the premises. Calls are being received by the Police Control from 
parents regarding the location and safety of children. Have you considered this 
aspect and what are you proposing to do? 
Is there anything further that we can do for you?” 
 
(Considerations – obtaining details and description of possible offender as they 
maybe still on premises? Is there an investigating officer for these threats to 
provide a link into investigation strategy?) 
 
Inject (4) – [GWAS] ADO Gary Green: 
“I have 2 ambulances on scene at present. How many casualties are we looking 
at? HART have been mobilised from a local event and should be here very 
shortly. 
Do you need anything else from me?” 
 
Inject (5) – from Ops Control: 
“HART wish to know if there is an RVP for this incident.” 
 
Inject (6) – from sector 1 commander to IC/OC: 
“BA crews are struggling to make progress due to thick smoke and high 
temperatures. Can we have 4 more BA wearers for relief purposes and an 
emergency team?” 
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Inject (7) – from sector 3 commander to IC/OC: 
“I require 4 BA wearers for relief purposes and an emergency team”. 
 
Inject (8) – from sector 1 commander to IC/OC: 
“the fire is piercing the roof now. This should make firefighting inside easier with 
reduced smoke levels but will develop the fire significantly”. 
 
Inject (9) – Ops Commander (or SC1 if OC not in operation) to IC: 
We have confirmed the isolation of all the services to facilitate operations. It has 
meant that the power to the whole site is down. 
 
Inject (10) – from HART Team Leader: 
(dependant on direction) “I have 6 vehicles including an incident response unit 
and extended duration BA equipment for use if you need it. Where do you want 
me to set up?” 
 
Phone inject (11) – (ring ICU mobile 07799347496) from Fire Gold (CFO): 
“The service are receiving many calls from worried parents asking about their 
children. Will Windsor-Clive is with me and three local Cllrs have already 
contacted me regarding the incident. Can we have an update regarding the 
current situation there please?  Can you call us in 20mins with a further update.” 
 
Inject (12) – Police Chief Inspector: 
“We can inform you that the suspect is a former pupil [male, white, aged 15, Paul 
Orange]. Our intelligence suggests that he purchased a quantity of petrol from 
the local garage on his way here, 50 litres or so. Articles on social media 
networks suggest that he has planned this for some time and may be considered 
dangerous. We have cordons in place and are managing them. Cole Avenue 
has been closed to traffic and diversions are in place. We are waiting to identify 
appropriate areas for a rest centre. Do you require any more information from 
me at this time?” 
 
Inject (13) – (Liaise with Jess/Chris in CP) Civil Protection Officer/Schools Team: 
Concern for the children’s welfare. Crime scene so Police will need to interview 
kids (organise a strategy). Move pupils to place of safety. Refreshments for 
those that we are unable to clear the site.  
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(Consideration; Reunite strategy – parents in one area, kids in another. Pupils 
unaccounted for not necessarily in school. Names of missing, Parents contact 
details. Contact Highways also. Keep Councillors updated.) 
 
Inject (14) – BBC Radio Gloucestershire: 
“Are you the Officer in charge and if so can you give me an interview please? I 
understand that a couple of children have been badly burnt can you comment?” 
FOLLOWED DIRECTLY BY: 
Inject (15) – Parent: 
approaching the bus “I’ve heard about this fire and can’t get hold of my little Billy, 
can you tell me if he is ok?” 
 
Inject (16) – sector 1 commander to IC/OC: 
“a BA team have located 2 casualties and are withdrawing from the building”. 
 
(Considerations: ICU Officer proposal of a crew refreshments/relief plan.) 
 
Group/Area Commander is now in attendance and requires a handover brief 
(OTHERS). – END EX 
 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
Station Commander Assessment Timetable: Venue: HQ 
 
ICU to arrive at 0900hrs to allow an hour to set up. 
 
Start – briefing (15 mins) in meeting room 1 (or suitable briefing room) 
- To include drive to  
- Proceed to ICU in car park 
- Receive a handover briefing from the existing Incident Commander 
 
- Delegation of roles including suitable briefing 
- Incident Management (approx 30 mins) 
- Handover to GC/AC (OTHERS) 
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- Candidate self reflection in meeting room 1 (15 mins) 
- Assessors to conduct general debrief of role players 
 
- Assessors to debrief candidate (15 mins) 
 
Total time: 1 hour 15 to 30 mins 
 
Candidate 1 – 1000-1130hrs 
Candidate 2 – 1130-1300hrs 
Candidate 3 – 1400-1530hrs 
Candidate 4 – 1530-1700hrs 
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Appendix 6. 2012, results of the QASA as they were fed back to the staff 
involved in the debriefing. 
 
Got 1/6 (Nos. ) metacog wrong - One F when T. Zero T when F. 
 
SA Bias Confidence 
  
 
85.7708468 34.3554798 75.5555556 
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  20 82.9761905 11.8881119 63.3333333 
  22 82.9761905 11.8881119 63.3333333 
  24 88.7752525 -8.8863892 66.6666667 
  26 88.8888889 -1.542E-14 66.6666667 
  28 82.6388889 28 73.3333333 
  30 82.9826038 20.1978566 80 
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      Below is the model of the relationship between Situation Awareness (SA) and
bias in regard to the example of incident management under pressure: 
 
Bias can shift towards a liberal criterion (with a risk of accepting more false 
information and making false alarm errors) or towards a more conservative 
criterion (with a risk of rejecting more true information and making miss errors).  
SA comprises an individual’s awareness of what is going on around them that 
will, in turn, guide decision making and action. 
 
Range of 
Scores 
Knowledge (SA) Bias 
Positive  
(max + 100) 
Good knowledge: 
distinguishes true from 
false; higher the score the 
better. 
Strict or conservative: tends to 
reject information as false even 
if true; higher the score the 
greater the tendency (lack of 
confidence in source / self?); 
increased risk of miss errors. 
 
Zero 
 
 
No knowledge – guessing? Neither accepts or rejects 
information (neutral attitude) 
Negative  
(max – 100) 
Misguided: judges false 
information is true & vice 
versa; more negative is 
worse 
Lax or liberal: tends to accept 
information as true, even if false 
(over confidence in source / 
self), the greater this score the 
greater this tendency.  
Increased risk of false alarm 
errors 
 
 
Situational Awareness 85.8 
Two key aspects of SA are a person’s actual SA and their perceived SA.  Ideally, 
these two aspects should match but this is not necessarily the case.  High SA 
shows a good awareness of what is happening, while low scores show a 
misguided SA, or a fundamentally wrong representation of the situation. 
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A score of 85.8 shows a very good knowledge of what is going on at the 
incident, identifying the ability to tell true from false; the higher the score the 
better understanding of the environment and a good personal picture of the 
incident. 
 
Bias 34.4 
Positive bias scores above 0 are taken to reflect a conservative or cautious bias; 
a tendency to reject information (but at risk of making miss errors). While 
negative scores below 0 reflect a more liberal bias, a tendency to accept 
information as true (so making false alarm errors).  While a 0 score reflects no 
bias either way; equally likely to accept or reject information.   
A score of 34.4 shows a conservative bias. A conservative bias could possibly 
lead to “miss” errors under some circumstances when attention is highly focused 
or tunneled in difficult conditions.  This bias tendency reflects a likelihood of 
rejecting information (reject information as false even if true) based on the 
incident and the environment.  
 
Confidence 75.6 
SA can vary across the situation and perceived SA (confidence) can remain 
relatively constant, while actual SA can be in the negative.  This raises the 
possibility that individuals may have a ‘resting level’ of perceived SA and that 
actual SA could be low, giving a confident incident commander with little real 
understanding of what is happening! 
Confidence is very high at 75.6%, matched with an actual SA of 85.8 reflecting a 
very good grasp of the ongoing situation and an ability to reconcile the individual 
ability in handling the incident. 
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Appendix 7: Epistemological and Methodological Discussion 
 
It has been argued that historically two main research paradigms have 
employed, that of positivist (related to quantitative approaches and an 
epistemology of truths and facts), and constructionist (typically related to 
qualitative approaches and an epistemology that sees the world as 
interpreted by individuals) approaches (Armitage, 2007).  Within these 
quantitative methods were identified to result in numerical data, whereas 
qualitative approaches result in open ended, textual data.   Armitage went 
on to argue that both methods were representative of the ‘mono method 
era’, whereby researchers used purely qualitative or quantitative research 
methods, depending on their research paradigm.   The development of a 
“third way” has however been linked to the pragmatic paradigm.   Within 
this, the employment of a mixed methodology, or approach, reflects the 
need for pragmatic decision making, consistent with working in ‘real world’ 
settings.   
 
A pragmatic paradigm allows for differing data collection and research 
methods to be utilised, based on their appropriateness for the research 
undertaken and the research questions to be answered (Ritchie & Lewis, 
2003).  This presents an approach whereby methods are selected from a 
‘tool kit’ rather than dictated by the paradigm employed.  It is argued that 
this epistemological and methodological choice is reflected of the 
multiplicity of the ‘real world’.   
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In relation to the qualitative data analysis completed within this research, 
it was decided that thematic analysis would be the most suitable method.  
Braun and Clarke (2006) identify two main styles of qualitative models of 
analysis and within these are a number of types.  These being, those that 
are linked to a particular theory and applied in a fairly rigid way, for 
example interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA); and those that 
are applied with different manifestations, for example discourse analysis 
and thematic analysis.  They go on to argue that thematic analysis is 
comparable with both essentialist and construction paradigms and offers 
a flexible research tool, often leading to rich and detailed understanding of 
the data. 
 
Due to research questions being identified, and interviews being 
structured to explore these, it was felt that thematic analysis of the data 
would be applied in a ‘theoretical’ way.  This involved a ‘top down’ method 
of analysis, which provided a detailed analysis of aspects of the data.  A 
number of methods were considered and it was decided that thematic 
analysis was most appropriate as it was argued to be the most 
appropriate tool to answer the research questions set.  Within this paper 
this required identifying a method of data analysis that could reflect reality 
for the participants, but also explore and unpick that reality (Braun & 
Clarke, 2006).    
 
Other methods considered included grounded theory and interpretative 
phenomenological analysis (IPA).  Grounded theory was felt to require a 
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process of data collection and analysis, which is repeated with the aim of 
identifying and testing new theories (Greckhamer & Koro-Ljungberg, 
2005).  It was felt that a ‘bottom’ up method would also not be suitable, as 
the researcher had already explored the area in completing the initial 
literature review and was aware of common themes and areas to explore, 
prior to designing the research questions.   
 
The aim of IPA is to explore in detail how participants are making sense of 
their personal and social world, with an attempt to explore personal worlds 
rather than producing objective statement (Smith & Osborn, 2007).  The 
aim within this research was to explore personal experiences and how 
this related to outcomes from the exercises and briefings undertaken.  It 
was therefore felt that IPA was not appropriate for this study.   
 
  
Appendix 8; Break down of exercises undertaken. 
Event Input Outcome Other Information  
Visit to Avon Incident 
Command Centre 
(September 2009) 
 
To look at the facilities and to 
understand the exercise scenario 
and how competence is assessed 
for operational purposes.  
 
Facilitated discussion on how this 
could be used and developed 
within the work program we had 
identified. 
 
Attendance at  a major 
Breathing Apparatus exercise 
(February 2010) 
To look at the scenario and to 
understand how an exercise of this 
nature can be used to provide 
information in relation to individual 
differences in Bias patterns for 
operational personnel. 
 
Facilitated discussion on how this 
could be used and developed 
within the work program we had 
identified. 
 
Attendance at  a major 
Breathing Apparatus exercise 
(April  2010) 
The primary aim of this study was 
to determine if there are individual 
differences in Bias patterns for 
operational FRS personnel in a 
fireground exercise, reflecting the 
individual’s tendencies towards 
either accepting or rejecting the 
available information. 
 
The main aim of this experiment 
was to determine whether the bias 
patterns expected in the exercise 
would be apparent in a more 
realistic and challenging situation 
(this was clearly the case). 
 
There were 16 
operational fire and 
rescue service 
personnel working in 
teams of two to four in 
the exercise. 
Attendance and assessment 
at a domestic house fire 
designed table top exercise 
(June - September 2011) 
 
The primary aim of this study was 
to determine if there are individual 
differences in Bias patterns for 
operational FRS personnel in a 
“table-top” fireground exercise, 
reflecting the individual’s 
tendencies towards either 
accepting or rejecting the available 
The primary aim of this experiment 
was to determine if FRS personnel 
displayed bias patterns in 
decision-making during a table-top 
fire incident exercise (the evidence 
clearly shows that for most 
participants this was the case). 
All participants were 
provided with the same 
stimulus presentation 
(house fire) and both SA 
and Bias scores were 
obtained in regard to the 
presented information, 
via the QASA method. 
Content; 12 x 2 x40 
Page | 352 
 
information. To also undertake a 
comparison in relation to a table 
top exercise and an operational 
exercise. 
 
Comparison of SA for 
FF’s and students were 
undertaken later and 
showed FF’s had a 
greater SA. 
Attendance and assessment 
at a commercial factory fire 
designed table top exercise  
(November - January 2012) 
 
The primary aim of this study was 
to determine if there are individual 
differences in Bias patterns for 
operational FRS personnel in a 
“table-top” fireground exercise, 
reflecting the individual’s 
tendencies towards either 
accepting or rejecting the available 
information. To also undertake a 
comparison be getting the 
agreement of staff to allow us to 
reflect back on their initial 
responses to the ‘house fire’ 
scenario and identify any change. 
 
The primary aim of this experiment 
was to determine if FRS personnel 
displayed bias patterns in 
decision-making that vary during 
table-top fire incident exercises. 
All participants were 
provided with the same 
stimulus presentation 
9factory fire) and both 
SA and Bias scores 
were obtained in regard 
to the presented 
information, via the 
QASA method. 
 
Attendance at a major Incident 
command exercise / 
assessment for 4 Group 
Commanders. 
(March 2012) 
 
The primary aim of this study is to 
determine if there are individual 
differences in Bias patterns for 
these Group Commanders under a 
stressful assessment process.   
 
 4 Group Manager 
assessments looking at 
incident command 
competence.  
Attendance at a major Incident 
command exercise / 
The primary aim of this study is to 
determine if there are individual 
The primary aim of this experiment 
is to determine if FRS personnel 
22 station Manager 
assessments looking at 
Content; 12 x 2 x40 
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assessment for 22 Station 
Commanders, 
Gloucestershire. 
(October - November 2012) 
 
differences in Bias patterns for 
these Station Commanders under 
a stressful assessment process.   
displayed bias patterns in decision 
during a simulated fire incident 
exercises. The data will be 
analysed by QASA as before. 
However in this case if the 
participant consents, they will be 
given feedback on their individual 
bias 
 
incident command 
competence. 
Attendance at a major Incident 
command exercise / 
assessment for 22 Station 
Commanders, Avon. 
(November - December 2013) 
 
The primary aim of this study is to 
determine if the individual 
differences in Bias patterns for the 
Station Commanders taking part 
are replicated from the first study.  
Progressing it to see if there is a 
way of producing a simple model to 
use in identifying what an 
individual’s bias is.  Which will 
allows us to understand if knowing 
what your bias is can allow you to 
counter it, or review your decision 
against it, when making key 
operational decisions under 
pressure! 
 
The primary aim of this experiment 
is to determine if FRS personnel 
displayed the same bias patterns 
in decision during a simulated fire 
incident exercises. The data will be 
analysed by QASA as before. 
However in this case if the 
participant consents, they will be 
given feedback on their individual 
bias 
22 station Manager 
assessments looking at 
incident command 
competence. 
 
17 whole time 
 
5 retained duty system 
This will be the follow-up study 
in which consenting 
participants will be interviewed 
(with a semi-structured 
approach) to determine 
whether providing feedback on 
bias following first exercise 
This will involve the preparation of 
guidelines for assessing, providing 
feedback on and monitoring bias 
patterns in FRS training exercises 
based on the findings from the 
series of studies above.  
The guidelines will be shown to 
FRS personnel for their feedback 
which will be incorporated into the 
dissertation. 
 
Content; 12 x 2 x40 
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has made any difference to 
their awareness and 
performance. 
(March - June 2014) 
 
 
